On 17 February 2010 18:08, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

> You may already understand (by uda) that the first person notions are
> related to infinite sum of computations (and this is not obviously
> computable, not even partially).

Yes, I do understand that.  What I'm particularly interested in, with
respect to comp is what is the relation between the 1-p notions  and
the 3-p ones, from the point of view of causality (which you can put
in scare quotes if you prefer).  IOW, any 1-p notion, such as pain, is
not only non-computable (as opposed to inferrable by analogy) from any
3-p perspective, but is seemingly irrelevant to the unfolding of the
3-p account with which it is (somehow) associated.  What scope is
there, in the unfolding of the infinity of computations by the UD, for
1-p experience to be viewed as having any consequences beyond those
already implicit in the 3-p describable nature of the computations
themselves?  Does this question make any sense from a comp
perspective?

> I guess you mean that we cannot "prove" the existence of the 1-p from the
> 3-p grounds. That's correct (both intuitively with UDA, and it is a theorem
> of machine's theology (AUDA).

Not only can't we prove it, but we couldn't, from a 3-p pov, even
predict or in any way characterise such 1-p notions, if we didn't know
from a 1-p perspective that they exist (or seem to know that they seem
to exist).

>> But doesn't this lead to paradox?  For example, how are we able to
>> refer to these phenomena if they are causally disconnected from our
>> behaviour - i.e. they are uncomputable (i.e. inaccessible) from the 3-
>> p perspective?
>
> Good point. But you are lead to this because you still believe that matter
> is a primitive 3-p notion.

No, I don't "believe" it, but I'm able to entertain it (as an
alternative to comp) to see where this hypothesis leads.  One of the
places it leads (which ISTM some are anxious not to acknowledge)) is
the kind of brute paradox I've referred to.  So what I'm asking you is
how is this different from a comp perspective?  Can our 3-p references
to 1-p phenomena escape paradox in the comp analysis?

> But the physical 3-p notions are just NOT closed for explanation. It
> collapses all the points of view. It explains consciousness away!

I understand that you take this view from a comp perspective, but what
about from a primitive-materialist pov in its own terms?  Do you
believe that such a "closed" explanation is fundamentally unable to
account seriously for consciousness for the reasons I've cited?  Is
there any way to "re-open" it outside of comp?

(In reply to Stathis):

>>> Consciousness could be computable in the sense that if you are the
>>> computation, you have the experience.
>
>
> I think you have the correct intuition, but the phrasing is really
> misleading. I am not a computation, I am a person.

If this is the correct intuition, then the computations already
contain every possibility from the 3-p perspective, and the additional
existence, nature and possible consequences of 1-p notions are as
inaccessible as they are from a primitive-materialist pov, AFAICS.

David

>
> On 16 Feb 2010, at 19:07, David Nyman wrote:
>
>>  Is consciousness - i.e. the actual first-
>> person experience itself - literally uncomputable from any third-
>> person perspective?
>
> There is an ambiguity in you phrasing. I will proceed like I always do, by
> interpreting your term favorably, relatively to computationalism and its
> (drastic) consequences.
>
> The first person notion, and consciousness, are not clearly notion to which
> the label computable can be applied. The fact is that, no machine can even
> define what is the first person, or what is consciousness.
>
> You may already understand (by uda) that the first person notions are
> related to infinite sum of computations (and this is not obviously
> computable, not even partially).
>
> But auda makes this utterly clear. Third person self-reference is entirely
> described by the provability predicate, the one that I write with the letter
> "B". Bp is " *I* prove p", Beweisbar ('p'), for p some arithmetical
> proposition.
> The corresponding first person notion is Bp & Tp, with Tp = True('p'). By a
> theorem of Tarski "true" cannot be define (even just define!) by the
> machine, and the logic of Bp&Tp (= Bp & p) is quite different from Bp, from
> the point of view of the machine. That result on "truth" has been extended
> by Kaplan & Montague for "knowledge".
>
> Let Bp = I prove p
> Let Kp = Bp & Tp = Bp & p = I know p
>
> Then, what happens is that
>
> G* proves Bp <-> Kp
> NOT(G proves Bp <-> Kp)
>
>  G does not prove the equivalence of Bp and Kp, for correct machine. It is
> false that G proves Bp <-> Kp, and the machine cannot have access to the
> truth of that equivalence (or indirectly by postulating comp).
>
>
>
>
>
>
>>  The only rationale for adducing the additional
>> existence of any 1-p experience in a 3-p world is the raw fact that we
>> possess it (or "seem" to, according to some).  We can't "compute" the
>> existence of any 1-p experiential component of a 3-p process on purely
>> 3-p grounds.
>
> I guess you mean that we cannot "prove" the existence of the 1-p from the
> 3-p grounds. That's correct (both intuitively with UDA, and it is a theorem
> of machine's theology (AUDA).
>
>
>> Further, if we believe that 3-p process is a closed and
>> sufficient explanation for all events, this of course leads to the
>> uncomfortable conclusion (referred to, for example, by Chalmers in
>> TCM) that 1-p conscious phenomena (the "raw feels" of sight, sound,
>> pain, fear and all the rest) are totally irrelevant to what's
>> happening, including our every thought and action.
>
>
> That is why a materialist who want to keep the mechanist hypothesis have no
> other choice than to abandon consciousness as an illusion or matter as an
> illusion. In this list most people, including you (if I remember well)
> accept that it is just impossible to dismiss consciousness, so ... Ah, I see
> you are OK with this in some replies today.
>
> Note that the movie graph shows directly that the notion of primitive (3-p-
> matter makes no sense, and shows the way how to recover the appearance of
> matter from the logic of the first person plural point of view (somewhere in
> between Bp & Dp and Bp & Dp & p where Dp is ~B~p).
>
>>
>> But doesn't this lead to paradox?  For example, how are we able to
>> refer to these phenomena if they are causally disconnected from our
>> behaviour - i.e. they are uncomputable (i.e. inaccessible) from the 3-
>> p perspective?
>
> Good point. But you are lead to this because you still believe that matter
> is a primitive 3-p notion.
>
>
>> Citing "identity" doesn't seem to help here - the
>> issue is how 1-p phenomena could ever emerge as features of our shared
>> behavioural world (including, of course, talking about them) if they
>> are forever inaccessible from a causally closed and sufficient 3-p
>> perspective.
>
> But the physical 3-p notions are just NOT closed for explanation. It
> collapses all the points of view. It explains consciousness away!
>
>
>
>> Does this in fact lead to the conclusion that the 3-p
>> world can't be causally closed to 1-p experience, and that I really do
>> withdraw my finger from the fire because it hurts, and not just
>> because C-fibres are firing?  But how?
>
>
> Because it concerns knowledge, which, by definition, relate your beliefs to
> the truth. But that relation belongs itself to the corona G* minus G, and is
> unavailable by the machine itself.
>
> Nice and clear and important questions. You explain well the mind-body
> problem. You put your fingers where it hurts!
>
> I will comment some answers hereby:
>
>
>> On 16 Feb 2010, at 19:19, Stephen P. King wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>        Is there a problem with the idea that 3-p can be derived from some
>>> combinatorics of many interacting 1-p's? Is there a reason why we keep
>>> trying to derive 1-p from 3-p?
>
>
> This is a reasonable question. But with comp it is both 1-p and physical-3-p
> which are derived from arithmetical 3-p, yet it forces us to attribute
> personhood for machine (but this is comp, after all, and the logic of
> self-refrence justifies such an idea).
>
> It leads to a form of neutral monism à-la Spinoza. There is arithmetical
> truth, and then all the different internal arithmetical number or machine
> points of views.
>
> I will not answer Brent's post (sorry Brent) because I think you have
> already well answered and I have nothing to add. It looks like you do good
> work when you sleep :)
>
>
>> On 16 Feb 2010, at 23:21, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>>> Consciousness could be computable in the sense that if you are the
>>> computation, you have the experience.
>
>
> I think you have the correct intuition, but the phrasing is really
> misleading. I am not a computation, I am a person.
>
> Of course we are dialoguing on the most difficult part of the mind-body
> problem (so-called hard problem of consciousness).
>
> A more correct phrasing of your sentence could be:
>
> The machine M can be conscious of p, because the machine M can prove that
> the machine M believes p, and the machine M is indeed the machine M. Then
> the appearance of a mind-body paradox can be explained by the (non trivial)
> fact that the machine M does not know, and cannot know, that she is the
> machine M. She can only bet on it.
>
> Again this is exactly:
>
> G* proves Bp <-> Kp
> G cannot prove Bp <-> Kp.
>
> With Kp = p & Bp, or Dp & Bp, or p & Bp & Dp.  (nuance between first person
> plural, intelligible, sensible, etc.).
>
>
>
> On 17 Feb 2010, at 08:28, Diego Caleiro wrote:
>
>> You guys should Read Chalmers: Philosophy of Mind, Classical and
>> contemporary Readings
>> and
>>
>> Philosophy and the mirror of nature.  Richard Rorty
>>
>> In particular "The Concepts of Counsciousness" By Ned Block and "Mental
>> Causation" by stephen Yablo will get you nearer to where you are trying to
>> get.
>
>
> You may search on "Chalmers" in the archive to have an idea of the critical
> view developed here. As Chalmers confirmed (personal communication), his
> dualism forces him to accept that a first person will feel to be at two
> places at once in the self-duplication experiment (he rejects first person
> indeterminacy). This means he needs some form of telepathy among duplicated
> machines. This explains also why he is obligated to reintroduce dualism in
> quantum mechanics, even without the collapse of the wave packet, which
> deprives Everett on its strongest if only motivation.
> You may perhaps be more specific and elaborate your thought.
>
> Bruno Marchal
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
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