To me, the Many-Minds interpretation requires significant changes in frames
of reference.  Suppose you view a particular world out of many as a
2-dimensional surface.  Layers of surfaces comprise the local environment of
a particular section of Many Worlds.  Now think of a behavior pattern as a
set of elements and interactions between elements.  Each of the many-worlds
is associated with a "snapshot" of your individual behavior pattern unique
to that world.  But suppose there are similarities between your behavior
patterns in worlds A B and C-that set of similar configurations forms what
can be described as a fibre bundle through multiple surfaces.  If so, this
may suggest that at some level consciousness experiences more than one world
"surface" at a time.   If the ratio of interactions to elements decreases
(you enter a darkened room) then the similarities in the behavior system
config should result in an increase in the "depth" of the many world
surfaces.  Increase the ratio of interactions to elements and the complexity
of your behavior set increases-linking you to a particular world "surface."
It would seem that, like relativity, the frame of reference is not
absolute-and in fact changes as rapidly as perception changes.   From others
inhabiting the single world surface, it would appear that the behavior
system is changing without cause; but if we could somehow view the entire
group of world surfaces associated with the core group of a particular
behavioral system configuration, then we would be more likely to understand
the "reasons" for the behavior.  Unfortunately, any single nervous system
has any number of configurations associated with multiple world layers---and
anyone attempting to perceive it has their own particular sets of
configurations (and world layers.)  The best we can do is arrive at a
general consensus of what is perceived and agree to label that the local
shared reality.  The Copenhagen theorists infamously suggested that nothing
exists unless it is perceived (measured)-and as far as it goes, that would
be absolutely true.  One cannot perceive what doesn't exist in that world
layer.  But if the perception process naturally involved multiple world
layers, then the Copenhagen Interpretation would be true, but trivially so
(as Hawking said about Many Worlds.)   David Deutsch claims we all inhabit
multiple worlds, but can't communicate between the worlds.  I think Many
Minds, Fibre Bundle topology, and Neodissociationist (Hilgardian) psychology
will prove him wrong.





[] On Behalf Of Jason Resch
Sent: Sunday, February 21, 2010 6:28 PM
To: Everything List
Subject: Many-worlds vs. Many-Minds


On the many-worlds FAQ:

It states that many-worlds implies that worlds split rather than multiple,
identical, pre-existing worlds differentiate:

"Q19 Do worlds differentiate or split?
Can we regard the separate worlds that result from a measurement-like
interaction (See "What is a measurement?") as having previous existed
distinctly and merely differentiated, rather than the interaction as
having split one world into many? This is definitely not permissable
in many-worlds or any theory of quantum theory consistent with
experiment. Worlds do not exist in a quantum superposition
independently of each other before they decohere or split. The
splitting is a physical process, grounded in the dynamical evolution of
the wave vector, not a matter of philosophical, linguistic or mental
convenience (see "Why do worlds split?" and "When do worlds split?") 
If you try to treat the worlds as pre-existing and separate then the
maths and probabilistic behaviour all comes out wrong."

However, just below, in the Many-minds question:

"Q20 What is many-minds?
Many-minds proposes, as an extra fundamental axiom, that an infinity of
separate minds or mental states be associated with each single brain
state. When the single physical brain state is split into a quantum
superposition by a measurement (See "What is a measurement?") the
associated infinity of minds are thought of as differentiating rather
than splitting. The motivation for this brain-mind dichotomy seems
purely to avoid talk of minds splitting and talk instead about the
differentiation of pre-existing separate mental states."

Based on the answers provided in this FAQ, it sounds as though many-minds
permits differentiation of pre-existing observers whereas many-worlds does
not permit differentiation.  The many-minds interpretation also sounds much
more similar to computationalism as described by Bruno.  Computationalism +
arithmetical realism supposes that all possible computations exist, and
yield all possible observers.  Therefore, the consciousness of these
observers would differentiate, rather than split, since they all existed
beforehand.  What are others thoughts on this FAQ or reasoning?  Is there
something many-minds offers over many-worlds?  How exactly does
differentiation conflict with experimental evidence and the predicted
probabilities?  How does many-minds lead to interference patterns, or only
allow a photon one exit path from an interferometer?  Is this the primary
question for computationalism to answer?


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