On 22 February 2010 07:37, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

> What do you mean by "implicit" here? What is implicit is that the
> subjectivity (1-p), to make sense, has to be referentially correct
> relatively to the most probable histories/consistent extensions.

What I mean by implicit is "already accounted for", at least according
to the assumptions of the closed 3-p hypothesis, which of course is
what I'm questioning.

> Then the incommunicable and private aspect of those knowledge and qualia is
> provided by the theory of knowledge and the quale logic, provided by the
> respective intensional variant of G and G*. The difference between G and G*
> (provable and true) is reflected in those intensional variant.

Yes, but G and G*, and indeed all formally expressible logics, are
themselves closed 3-p (i.e. objective) notions - i.e. they would exist
and possess the same explanatory power in the absence of any
accompanying *qualitative* component.  This is just another way of
gesturing towards the Really Hard Problem - that the qualitative
component, per se, is seemingly redundant to the account if we assume
we already have a closed, or sufficient, non-qualitative explanation.
Consequently these logics AFAICS lead to the same paradoxical
conclusions as the closed 3-p physical hypothesis - i.e. that the
references to qualitative experiences - even those references we
ourselves produce - would occur even in the absence of any such
experiences.  This would leave us in the position of doubting the
basis even of our own statements that we are conscious!

I want to seriously discuss the proposition that certain behaviours
are actually contingent on qualitative experience, as distinguished
from any accompanying 3-p phenomena.  That is, for example, that my
withdrawing my hand from the fire because it hurts indispensably
requires the qualitative *experience* of pain to mediate between 1-p
and 3-p narratives.  This would of course mean in turn that the
explanatory arc from stimulus, through cognitive processing, to
response would be, without the qualitative component, in some way
demonstrably incomplete as an explanation.  ISTM that this would make
it impossible to ignore the implication that the context in which we
conceive 3-p processes to be situated (whether we are talking in terms
of their physical or mathematical-logical expression) would itself be
capable of taking on "personal" characteristics in apparent
interaction with such processes.

Something related to this, ISTM, is already implied in the background
to 1-p indeterminacy, observer moments, the "solipsism of the One"
etc, because all these notions implicitly contain the idea of some
general context capable of embodying and individuating "personal"
qualitative experience - given relevant 3-p-describable structure and
function.  But in order for that personhood not to be vacuous - i.e.
redundant to the supposedly primary 3-p narrative - such personal
qualitative states must be conceived as having consequences, otherwise
inexplicable, in the 3-p domain, and not merely vice-versa.  How to
incorporate such consequences in the overall account is indeed a
puzzle.

>> Not only can't we prove it, but we couldn't, from a 3-p pov, even
>> predict or in any way characterise such 1-p notions, if we didn't know
>> from a 1-p perspective that they exist (or seem to know that they seem
>> to exist).
>
> This is not true I think. Already with the uda duplication experience, you
> can see predict the difference, for example, the apparition of first person
> indeterminacy despite the determinacy in the 3d description. This is
> captured by the difference between (Bp and p) and Bp, and that difference is
> a consequence of incompleteness, when self-observing occurs.

I don't deny what you're saying per se, but I'm commenting on this
because it brings out, I hope, the distinction between purely formal
descriptions of 1-p notions, and actual first-personal acquaintance
with qualitative experience.  It's the latter that I'm claiming is
non-computable from any formal premise (which, as I think we'd both
agree, is the essence of the HP).  It's one thing to say that
"self-observing occurs", and quite another to actually experience
self-observing.  But beyond this, ISTM that we must also believe that
the *experience* of self-observing entails consequences that the mere
*description* of "self-observing" would not, to avoid the paradoxes
contingent on the idea that qualitative experiences are somehow
redundant or merely "epiphenomenal".

>> One of the
>> places it leads (which ISTM some are anxious not to acknowledge)) is
>> the kind of brute paradox I've referred to.  So what I'm asking you is
>> how is this different from a comp perspective?  Can our 3-p references
>> to 1-p phenomena escape paradox in the comp analysis?
>
> Yes, because we do accept the truth of elementary arithmetic. We can study
> the theology of simple (and thus *intuitively* correct) Löbian machine. We
> *know* in that setting that the machine will be aware of an explanation gap,
> etc.
> Again, the price is that we have to recover physics without introducing a
> 3-p physical world.

I see that it is already important that comp predicts the *existence*
of an explanatory gap.  But what does it say about how that gap is to
be bridged: i.e. about the relevance of the *experience* - as distinct
from the bare description - of the 1-p notions, to the unfolding of
the integrated 1-p + 3-p narrative?

>> Do you
>> believe that such a "closed" explanation is fundamentally unable to
>> account seriously for consciousness for the reasons I've cited?  Is
>> there any way to "re-open" it outside of comp?
>
> Not in a way which is not already provided by comp. But unless you weaken
> comp so much as becoming "God", weakening comp does not provide different
> clue for solving the consciousness/reality problem.
> You may try, but 1500 years of materialism seems to lead only to person
> eliminativism. Where comp and its weakening reintroduce automatically a
> knower, a feeler, a better, etc.

Can you say anything about the way in which the knower/feeler/better's
actual *experiences* (as distinct from their bare description) make a
difference to the unfolding of histories in the comp hypothesis?  Can
it be shown that qualitative experience is per se indispensable to
giving an adequate account of persons and their histories, thus
avoiding the paradoxes which result from the assumption of the
independent sufficiency of the purely formal descriptions?

> In a sense, this is correct. Materialist seems to be able to use the same
> self-reference logic than the one used by the computationalist. But then,
> the point is that we are confronted to the measure problem, and the problem
> of the relation between 1-p and 3-p is transformed into a reduction of the
> physical 3-p from and only from the self-reference logic and the restriction
> of 3-p possibilities to the accessible state by the UD. And this works
> indeed. In that sense, at the propositional level, it makes sense to say
> that the mind-body problem is solved by comp. It remains to see how far this
> works. Is the comp first order logic of the hypostases compatible with the
> empirically observable facts.
>
> Keep in mind that, by the self-reference logic (or even just
> self-multiplication), we *already* know why a machine comes to differentiate
> quanta and qualia, and the math describes this precisely. (By the
> G*\G-equivalence of Bp with Bp & p, etc). If those comp quanta are the
> "real" quanta remains to be assessed, and if it is case, as it seems at the
> propositional level (already mathematically studied) this would support this
> theory of qualia.

Again, the formal differentiation of quanta and qualia, and the math
descriptions thereof, must be distinguished from any possible
consequential role of qualitative experience per se.  If we are to
take qualia seriously as part of our explanations, they must have a
role distinct from their mere description.  If they do not, we're
faced with a situation in which the same histories are describable in
terms of "qualia" whether actual qualitative states are present or
not.  AFAICS this is the unavoidable crux of the HP, and I don't at
this juncture see that it is addressed by comp or indeed any other
approach I've encountered (please forgive me if this is just my
missing the point as usual).  Somehow we need to be able to entertain
a "non-formal" component in the histories to accommodate this issue,
or else conclude that we don't recognise any distinction of role
between formal description and actuality.

David

>
> On 21 Feb 2010, at 17:31, David Nyman wrote:
>
>> On 17 February 2010 18:08, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>>
>>> You may already understand (by uda) that the first person notions are
>>> related to infinite sum of computations (and this is not obviously
>>> computable, not even partially).
>>
>> Yes, I do understand that.  What I'm particularly interested in, with
>> respect to comp is what is the relation between the 1-p notions  and
>> the 3-p ones, from the point of view of causality (which you can put
>> in scare quotes if you prefer).  IOW, any 1-p notion, such as pain, is
>> not only non-computable (as opposed to inferrable by analogy) from any
>> 3-p perspective, but is seemingly irrelevant to the unfolding of the
>> 3-p account with which it is (somehow) associated.  What scope is
>> there, in the unfolding of the infinity of computations by the UD, for
>> 1-p experience to be viewed as having any consequences beyond those
>> already implicit in the 3-p describable nature of the computations
>> themselves?  Does this question make any sense from a comp
>> perspective?
>
> What do you mean by "implicit" here? What is implicit is that the
> subjectivity (1-p), to make sense, has to be referentially correct
> relatively to the most probable histories/consistent extensions.
> This make possible to associate a "knower" (Bp & p) to a "believer" (Bp),
> and a "feeler" (Bp & Dp & p) to an observer (Bp & Dp). This makes it not
> just possible, but necessary, to attach a first person (who will have a
> logic of first person associate to him/she in a third person describable
> way) to a 3-person "body" (except that the price to pay is that such a body
> is an immaterial collection of number relations).
> Then the incommunicable and private aspect of those knowledge and qualia is
> provided by the theory of knowledge and the quale logic, provided by the
> respective intensional variant of G and G*. The difference between G and G*
> (provable and true) is reflected in those intensional variant.
>
>
>
>
>>
>>> I guess you mean that we cannot "prove" the existence of the 1-p from the
>>> 3-p grounds. That's correct (both intuitively with UDA, and it is a
>>> theorem
>>> of machine's theology (AUDA).
>>
>> Not only can't we prove it, but we couldn't, from a 3-p pov, even
>> predict or in any way characterise such 1-p notions, if we didn't know
>> from a 1-p perspective that they exist (or seem to know that they seem
>> to exist).
>
> This is not true I think. Already with the uda duplication experience, you
> can see predict the difference, for example, the apparition of first person
> indeterminacy despite the determinacy in the 3d description. This is
> captured by the difference between (Bp and p) and Bp, and that difference is
> a consequence of incompleteness, when self-observing occurs.
>
>
>
>>
>>>> But doesn't this lead to paradox?  For example, how are we able to
>>>> refer to these phenomena if they are causally disconnected from our
>>>> behaviour - i.e. they are uncomputable (i.e. inaccessible) from the 3-
>>>> p perspective?
>>>
>>> Good point. But you are lead to this because you still believe that
>>> matter
>>> is a primitive 3-p notion.
>>
>> No, I don't "believe" it, but I'm able to entertain it (as an
>> alternative to comp) to see where this hypothesis leads.
>
> It leads to non comp. Notably. And to the current insolubility of the
> mind-body problem.
>
>
>
>> One of the
>> places it leads (which ISTM some are anxious not to acknowledge)) is
>> the kind of brute paradox I've referred to.  So what I'm asking you is
>> how is this different from a comp perspective?  Can our 3-p references
>> to 1-p phenomena escape paradox in the comp analysis?
>
> Yes, because we do accept the truth of elementary arithmetic. We can study
> the theology of simple (and thus *intuitively* correct) Löbian machine. We
> *know* in that setting that the machine will be aware of an explanation gap,
> etc.
> Again, the price is that we have to recover physics without introducing a
> 3-p physical world.
>
>
>>
>>> But the physical 3-p notions are just NOT closed for explanation. It
>>> collapses all the points of view. It explains consciousness away!
>>
>> I understand that you take this view from a comp perspective, but what
>> about from a primitive-materialist pov in its own terms?
>
> You will have to introduce infinities in the 3-p description of whatever the
> consciousness supervene on. And then it is an open problem to see if this
> provide any help to solve the mind body problem. Infinity and ad hoc imposed
> indeterminacy looks like red herring. It blocks the comp hyp, but does not
> seem to give new clue in the mind-body problem, other than the one extract
> from lobianity (infinite machine are mostly lobian too, when
> self-referentially correct).
>
>
>> Do you
>> believe that such a "closed" explanation is fundamentally unable to
>> account seriously for consciousness for the reasons I've cited?  Is
>> there any way to "re-open" it outside of comp?
>
> Not in a way which is not already provided by comp. But unless you weaken
> comp so much as becoming "God", weakening comp does not provide different
> clue for solving the consciousness/reality problem.
> You may try, but 1500 years of materialism seems to lead only to person
> eliminativism. Where comp and its weakening reintroduce automatically a
> knower, a feeler, a better, etc.
>
>
>
>>
>> (In reply to Stathis):
>>
>>>>> Consciousness could be computable in the sense that if you are the
>>>>> computation, you have the experience.
>>>
>>>
>>> I think you have the correct intuition, but the phrasing is really
>>> misleading. I am not a computation, I am a person.
>>
>> If this is the correct intuition, then the computations already
>> contain every possibility from the 3-p perspective, and the additional
>> existence, nature and possible consequences of 1-p notions are as
>> inaccessible as they are from a primitive-materialist pov, AFAICS.
>
> In a sense, this is correct. Materialist seems to be able to use the same
> self-reference logic than the one used by the computationalist. But then,
> the point is that we are confronted to the measure problem, and the problem
> of the relation between 1-p and 3-p is transformed into a reduction of the
> physical 3-p from and only from the self-reference logic and the restriction
> of 3-p possibilities to the accessible state by the UD. And this works
> indeed. In that sense, at the propositional level, it makes sense to say
> that the mind-body problem is solved by comp. It remains to see how far this
> works. Is the comp first order logic of the hypostases compatible with the
> empirically observable facts.
>
> Keep in mind that, by the self-reference logic (or even just
> self-multiplication), we *already* know why a machine comes to differentiate
> quanta and qualia, and the math describes this precisely. (By the
> G*\G-equivalence of Bp with Bp & p, etc). If those comp quanta are the
> "real" quanta remains to be assessed, and if it is case, as it seems at the
> propositional level (already mathematically studied) this would support this
> theory of qualia.
>
> Bruno
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
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