David:

how about: we have our 1p and THINK about a 3p - only as adjusted
(interpreted) by our 1p AS an imagined realistic 3p world? Nobody walks the
shoes of another person (mentally, I mean).
Even reading books or learning from lectures does not impart the message of
the 'author', only the 1p-adjusted meaning acceptable for our 1p mentality
(which is just as personal and quite individual as an immune system, a DNA
or (maybe) a fingerprint, as resulting from the genetic built of the tool
(brain) modified with past (personal) experience -  AND who knows today,
what else?)

I think the hard problem is not just 'hard to solve': it requires knowledge
of necessary ingredients (steps in the 'process') still unknown - but
cleverly spoken about in the sciences, within the framework of those
portions we already (think) we know. The German proverb says:
"des Menschen's Wille ist ein Himmelreich" (a man's will is a 'heavenly'
extension) and so is his mentality. IMO we know only a fraction of it so
far. That, too, in a 1p interpreted abridgement.

John Mikes




On 2/21/10, David Nyman <david.ny...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> On 21 February 2010 23:25, Rex Allen <rexallen...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > So we know 1-p directly, while we only infer the existence of 3-p.
> > However, you seem to start from the assumption that 1-p is in the
> > weaker subordinate position of needing to be explained "in terms of"
> > 3-p, while 3-p is implicitly taken to be unproblematic, fundamental,
> > and needing no explanation.
>
> You're right that I'm starting from this assumption, but only because
> it is indeed the default assumption in the sciences, and indeed in the
> general consciousness, and my intention was to illustrate some of the
> consequences of this assumption that are often waved away or simply
> not acknowledged.  Principal amongst these is the fact that the
> existence of 1-p is not in any way computable - accessible, arrivable
> at - from the closed assumptions of 3-p.  But worse than that, if we
> take this "default position" of assuming the 3-p mode to be both
> complete and closed, we are thereby also committed to the position
> that all our thoughts, beliefs and behaviours - not excluding those
> apparently relating to the experiential states themselves - must be
> solely a consequence of the 3-p account of things, and indeed would
> proceed identically even in the complete absence of any such states!
>
> This, ISTM, is a paradoxical, or at the very least an extremely
> puzzling, state of affairs, and it was to promote discussion of these
> specific problems that I started the thread.  Whether one starts from
> the assumption of primacy of 1-p or 3-p (or neither) the principal
> difficulty is making any sense of their relation - i.e. the Hard
> Problem - and ISTM not only that it is Hard to solve, but even to
> state in a way that doesn't mask its truly paradoxical nature.  For
> example, as I've mentioned, it's often waved away by some reference to
> "identity", in the face of the manifest objection that the states of
> affairs referred to could hardly, on the face of it, be less
> identical, and in the total absence of any approach to reconciling
> their radical differences, or their intelligible relations.  Despite
> the difficulty of the subject, I do cherish the hope that progress can
> be made if we give up explaining-away from entrenched positions,
> accept the seriousness of the challenge to our preconceptions, and
> re-examine the real issues with an open mind.
>
> David
>
> > On Tue, Feb 16, 2010 at 1:07 PM, David Nyman <david.ny...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> >> The only rationale for adducing the additional
> >> existence of any 1-p experience in a 3-p world is the raw fact that we
> >> possess it (or "seem" to, according to some).  We can't "compute" the
> >> existence of any 1-p experiential component of a 3-p process on purely
> >> 3-p grounds.
> >
> >
> > It seems to me that what we know is our subjective conscious
> > experience.  From this, we infer the existence of ourselves as
> > individuals who persist through time, as well as the independent
> > existence of an external world that in some way causes our conscious
> > experience.
> >
> > So we know 1-p directly, while we only infer the existence of 3-p.
> > However, you seem to start from the assumption that 1-p is in the
> > weaker subordinate position of needing to be explained "in terms of"
> > 3-p, while 3-p is implicitly taken to be unproblematic, fundamental,
> > and needing no explanation.  But why is that?  The physical world
> > doesn't explain it's own existence and nature, does it?  So what
> > caused it?  What explains it's initial state?  Why does it have it's
> > current state?  Why does it change in time the way that it does?
> >
> > If we're taking the existence and nature of things as a "given", why
> > can't we instead say that 1-p is fundamental?  What is lost?  What
> > makes this an unpalatable option?  It seems to me that it should
> > certainly be the default position.
> >
> > I like Philip Goff's idea of "Ghosts" as an alternative to Chalmers'
> > Zombies:
> http://consciousnessonline.files.wordpress.com/2010/02/philip-goff-paper.pdf
> >
> > First, from the introduction:
> >
> > "Zombies are bodies without minds: creatures that are physically
> > identical to actual human beings, but which have no conscious
> > experience. Much of the consciousness literature concerns how
> > threatening philosophical reflection on such creatures is to
> > physicalism.  There is not much attention given to the converse
> > possibility, the possibility of minds without bodies, that is,
> > creatures who are conscious but whose nature is exhausted by their
> > being conscious. We can call such a ‘purely conscious’ creature a
> > ghost."
> >
> > Then on page 7:
> >
> > "The way into imagining your ghost twin is to go through the familiar
> > Cartesian process of doubting everything that it is possible to doubt.
> > For all you know for sure, the physical world around you might be a
> > delusion, placed in you by an incredibly powerful evil demon. The arms
> > and legs you seem to see in front of you, the heart you seem to feel
> > beating beneath your breast, your body that feels solid and warm to
> > the touch, all may be figments of a particularly powerful delusion.
> > You might not even have a brain.
> >
> > The only state of affairs you know for certain to obtain is that you
> > exist as a thing such that there is something that it is like to be
> > that thing. You know for certain that you are a thing that has an
> > experience as of having arms and legs, a beating heart, a warm, solid
> > body. You know that you are a subject of experience. But you may not
> > be a creature that exists in space, or has physical parts. It is by
> > engaging in the process of Cartesian doubting that one arrives at a
> > conception of one’s ghost twin.
> >
> > I am not suggesting that the process of Cartesian doubting
> > demonstrates the possibility of ghosts, but I am suggesting that it
> > goes a good way to demonstrating their conceivability.  To entertain
> > the possibility that I am the only thing that exists, and that I exist
> > as a thing with no properties other than my conscious experience, just
> > is to conceive of my ghost twin. Any philosopher who agrees with
> > Descartes up to and including the Cogito has a strong prima facie
> > obligation to accept the conceivability of ghosts."
> >
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