David: how about: we have our 1p and THINK about a 3p - only as adjusted (interpreted) by our 1p AS an imagined realistic 3p world? Nobody walks the shoes of another person (mentally, I mean). Even reading books or learning from lectures does not impart the message of the 'author', only the 1p-adjusted meaning acceptable for our 1p mentality (which is just as personal and quite individual as an immune system, a DNA or (maybe) a fingerprint, as resulting from the genetic built of the tool (brain) modified with past (personal) experience - AND who knows today, what else?)
I think the hard problem is not just 'hard to solve': it requires knowledge of necessary ingredients (steps in the 'process') still unknown - but cleverly spoken about in the sciences, within the framework of those portions we already (think) we know. The German proverb says: "des Menschen's Wille ist ein Himmelreich" (a man's will is a 'heavenly' extension) and so is his mentality. IMO we know only a fraction of it so far. That, too, in a 1p interpreted abridgement. John Mikes On 2/21/10, David Nyman <david.ny...@gmail.com> wrote: > > On 21 February 2010 23:25, Rex Allen <rexallen...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > So we know 1-p directly, while we only infer the existence of 3-p. > > However, you seem to start from the assumption that 1-p is in the > > weaker subordinate position of needing to be explained "in terms of" > > 3-p, while 3-p is implicitly taken to be unproblematic, fundamental, > > and needing no explanation. > > You're right that I'm starting from this assumption, but only because > it is indeed the default assumption in the sciences, and indeed in the > general consciousness, and my intention was to illustrate some of the > consequences of this assumption that are often waved away or simply > not acknowledged. Principal amongst these is the fact that the > existence of 1-p is not in any way computable - accessible, arrivable > at - from the closed assumptions of 3-p. But worse than that, if we > take this "default position" of assuming the 3-p mode to be both > complete and closed, we are thereby also committed to the position > that all our thoughts, beliefs and behaviours - not excluding those > apparently relating to the experiential states themselves - must be > solely a consequence of the 3-p account of things, and indeed would > proceed identically even in the complete absence of any such states! > > This, ISTM, is a paradoxical, or at the very least an extremely > puzzling, state of affairs, and it was to promote discussion of these > specific problems that I started the thread. Whether one starts from > the assumption of primacy of 1-p or 3-p (or neither) the principal > difficulty is making any sense of their relation - i.e. the Hard > Problem - and ISTM not only that it is Hard to solve, but even to > state in a way that doesn't mask its truly paradoxical nature. For > example, as I've mentioned, it's often waved away by some reference to > "identity", in the face of the manifest objection that the states of > affairs referred to could hardly, on the face of it, be less > identical, and in the total absence of any approach to reconciling > their radical differences, or their intelligible relations. Despite > the difficulty of the subject, I do cherish the hope that progress can > be made if we give up explaining-away from entrenched positions, > accept the seriousness of the challenge to our preconceptions, and > re-examine the real issues with an open mind. > > David > > > On Tue, Feb 16, 2010 at 1:07 PM, David Nyman <david.ny...@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> The only rationale for adducing the additional > >> existence of any 1-p experience in a 3-p world is the raw fact that we > >> possess it (or "seem" to, according to some). We can't "compute" the > >> existence of any 1-p experiential component of a 3-p process on purely > >> 3-p grounds. > > > > > > It seems to me that what we know is our subjective conscious > > experience. From this, we infer the existence of ourselves as > > individuals who persist through time, as well as the independent > > existence of an external world that in some way causes our conscious > > experience. > > > > So we know 1-p directly, while we only infer the existence of 3-p. > > However, you seem to start from the assumption that 1-p is in the > > weaker subordinate position of needing to be explained "in terms of" > > 3-p, while 3-p is implicitly taken to be unproblematic, fundamental, > > and needing no explanation. But why is that? The physical world > > doesn't explain it's own existence and nature, does it? So what > > caused it? What explains it's initial state? Why does it have it's > > current state? Why does it change in time the way that it does? > > > > If we're taking the existence and nature of things as a "given", why > > can't we instead say that 1-p is fundamental? What is lost? What > > makes this an unpalatable option? It seems to me that it should > > certainly be the default position. > > > > I like Philip Goff's idea of "Ghosts" as an alternative to Chalmers' > > Zombies: > http://consciousnessonline.files.wordpress.com/2010/02/philip-goff-paper.pdf > > > > First, from the introduction: > > > > "Zombies are bodies without minds: creatures that are physically > > identical to actual human beings, but which have no conscious > > experience. Much of the consciousness literature concerns how > > threatening philosophical reflection on such creatures is to > > physicalism. There is not much attention given to the converse > > possibility, the possibility of minds without bodies, that is, > > creatures who are conscious but whose nature is exhausted by their > > being conscious. We can call such a ‘purely conscious’ creature a > > ghost." > > > > Then on page 7: > > > > "The way into imagining your ghost twin is to go through the familiar > > Cartesian process of doubting everything that it is possible to doubt. > > For all you know for sure, the physical world around you might be a > > delusion, placed in you by an incredibly powerful evil demon. The arms > > and legs you seem to see in front of you, the heart you seem to feel > > beating beneath your breast, your body that feels solid and warm to > > the touch, all may be figments of a particularly powerful delusion. > > You might not even have a brain. > > > > The only state of affairs you know for certain to obtain is that you > > exist as a thing such that there is something that it is like to be > > that thing. You know for certain that you are a thing that has an > > experience as of having arms and legs, a beating heart, a warm, solid > > body. You know that you are a subject of experience. But you may not > > be a creature that exists in space, or has physical parts. It is by > > engaging in the process of Cartesian doubting that one arrives at a > > conception of one’s ghost twin. > > > > I am not suggesting that the process of Cartesian doubting > > demonstrates the possibility of ghosts, but I am suggesting that it > > goes a good way to demonstrating their conceivability. To entertain > > the possibility that I am the only thing that exists, and that I exist > > as a thing with no properties other than my conscious experience, just > > is to conceive of my ghost twin. Any philosopher who agrees with > > Descartes up to and including the Cogito has a strong prima facie > > obligation to accept the conceivability of ghosts." > > > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > > To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. > > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com<everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com> > . > > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com<everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com> > . > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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