On 23 Feb 2010, at 06:45, Rex Allen wrote:

It seems to me that there are two easy ways to get rid of the hard problem.

1)  Get rid of 1-p.  (A la Dennettian eliminative materialism)


2)  Get rid of 3-p.  (subjective idealism)

For the reasons I've touched on above I don't see that introducing the
idea of a material world explains anything at all.  Therefore, I vote
for getting rid of 3-p, except as a calculational device.

The idea of a material world that exists fundamentally and uncaused
while giving rise to conscious experience is no more coherent than the
idea that conscious experience exists fundamentally and uncaused and
gives rise to the mere perception of a material world (as everyone
accepts happens in dreams).

What is the problem with this solution?

You forget "3)

3) get rid of physical-3-p, but keep mathematical (arithmetical) 3-p. That is "objective idealism".

And this you need in any account ... if only as 'calculational device'. Then computer science solves the hard part of the mind problem, with the price of having to derive the physical laws from the belief that the numbers develop naturally from self-introspection. And it is not so amazing we (re)find the type of theory developed by the greeks among those who were both mystic and rationalist. They did introspect themselves very deeply, apparently.

Wait my next post to David for how comp does solve the hard problem of consciousness.

Bruno Marchal


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