On 22 February 2010 21:03, John Mikes <jami...@gmail.com> wrote:

> I think the hard problem is not just 'hard to solve': it requires knowledge
> of necessary ingredients (steps in the 'process') still unknown - but
> cleverly spoken about in the sciences, within the framework of those
> portions we already (think) we know. The German proverb says:
> "des Menschen's Wille ist ein Himmelreich" (a man's will is a 'heavenly'
> extension) and so is his mentality. IMO we know only a fraction of it so
> far. That, too, in a 1p interpreted abridgement.

John, what you say above of course immediately puts me in mind of
Schopenhauer's ideas in "Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung".  I
sometimes have a sense of Schopenhauer's "will" - he really intended
something more like "power" or "force", I think - of the world (the
One, the Unnameable) as reflecting back via conscious states towards
the "objective" development of 3-p processes.  In this view, conscious
states would subsist in integrated 1-p world-states - i.e. "subjects"
- as distinct from the particular, differentiated 3-p events and
components that function to delimit and structure such states.  The
"will", in the sense that Schopenhauer conceived it, would then
achieve expression both in the form of the micro-level "physical laws"
we hypothesise from observing those 3-p events and processes, and also
as more general orchestrations of that same law-like behaviour,
correlated with overall experiential states-of-the-system.

In this view, the world as a whole would encompass both "unconscious"
(differentiated, analytical) and "conscious" (integrated, global)
correlations of such primitive "will" with "objective reality", thus
presenting both options for exploitation and selection by evolutionary
processes.  This in turn should mean that there is the possibility of
elucidating criteria to distinguish whatever has become capable of
generating conscious states and causal narratives (i.e.
subjectively-structured overall states of the system) from whatever is
still limited to the exploitation of purely "unconscious" physical
processes.  Whether this can make any sense in terms of either physics
or comp I have no idea, but personally I sometimes find this intuition
helpful.

David


> David:
>
> how about: we have our 1p and THINK about a 3p - only as adjusted
> (interpreted) by our 1p AS an imagined realistic 3p world? Nobody walks the
> shoes of another person (mentally, I mean).
> Even reading books or learning from lectures does not impart the message of
> the 'author', only the 1p-adjusted meaning acceptable for our 1p mentality
> (which is just as personal and quite individual as an immune system, a DNA
> or (maybe) a fingerprint, as resulting from the genetic built of the tool
> (brain) modified with past (personal) experience -  AND who knows today,
> what else?)
>
> I think the hard problem is not just 'hard to solve': it requires knowledge
> of necessary ingredients (steps in the 'process') still unknown - but
> cleverly spoken about in the sciences, within the framework of those
> portions we already (think) we know. The German proverb says:
> "des Menschen's Wille ist ein Himmelreich" (a man's will is a 'heavenly'
> extension) and so is his mentality. IMO we know only a fraction of it so
> far. That, too, in a 1p interpreted abridgement.
>
> John Mikes
>
>
>
> On 2/21/10, David Nyman <david.ny...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> On 21 February 2010 23:25, Rex Allen <rexallen...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> > So we know 1-p directly, while we only infer the existence of 3-p.
>> > However, you seem to start from the assumption that 1-p is in the
>> > weaker subordinate position of needing to be explained "in terms of"
>> > 3-p, while 3-p is implicitly taken to be unproblematic, fundamental,
>> > and needing no explanation.
>>
>> You're right that I'm starting from this assumption, but only because
>> it is indeed the default assumption in the sciences, and indeed in the
>> general consciousness, and my intention was to illustrate some of the
>> consequences of this assumption that are often waved away or simply
>> not acknowledged.  Principal amongst these is the fact that the
>> existence of 1-p is not in any way computable - accessible, arrivable
>> at - from the closed assumptions of 3-p.  But worse than that, if we
>> take this "default position" of assuming the 3-p mode to be both
>> complete and closed, we are thereby also committed to the position
>> that all our thoughts, beliefs and behaviours - not excluding those
>> apparently relating to the experiential states themselves - must be
>> solely a consequence of the 3-p account of things, and indeed would
>> proceed identically even in the complete absence of any such states!
>>
>> This, ISTM, is a paradoxical, or at the very least an extremely
>> puzzling, state of affairs, and it was to promote discussion of these
>> specific problems that I started the thread.  Whether one starts from
>> the assumption of primacy of 1-p or 3-p (or neither) the principal
>> difficulty is making any sense of their relation - i.e. the Hard
>> Problem - and ISTM not only that it is Hard to solve, but even to
>> state in a way that doesn't mask its truly paradoxical nature.  For
>> example, as I've mentioned, it's often waved away by some reference to
>> "identity", in the face of the manifest objection that the states of
>> affairs referred to could hardly, on the face of it, be less
>> identical, and in the total absence of any approach to reconciling
>> their radical differences, or their intelligible relations.  Despite
>> the difficulty of the subject, I do cherish the hope that progress can
>> be made if we give up explaining-away from entrenched positions,
>> accept the seriousness of the challenge to our preconceptions, and
>> re-examine the real issues with an open mind.
>>
>> David
>>
>> > On Tue, Feb 16, 2010 at 1:07 PM, David Nyman <david.ny...@gmail.com>
>> > wrote:
>> >> The only rationale for adducing the additional
>> >> existence of any 1-p experience in a 3-p world is the raw fact that we
>> >> possess it (or "seem" to, according to some).  We can't "compute" the
>> >> existence of any 1-p experiential component of a 3-p process on purely
>> >> 3-p grounds.
>> >
>> >
>> > It seems to me that what we know is our subjective conscious
>> > experience.  From this, we infer the existence of ourselves as
>> > individuals who persist through time, as well as the independent
>> > existence of an external world that in some way causes our conscious
>> > experience.
>> >
>> > So we know 1-p directly, while we only infer the existence of 3-p.
>> > However, you seem to start from the assumption that 1-p is in the
>> > weaker subordinate position of needing to be explained "in terms of"
>> > 3-p, while 3-p is implicitly taken to be unproblematic, fundamental,
>> > and needing no explanation.  But why is that?  The physical world
>> > doesn't explain it's own existence and nature, does it?  So what
>> > caused it?  What explains it's initial state?  Why does it have it's
>> > current state?  Why does it change in time the way that it does?
>> >
>> > If we're taking the existence and nature of things as a "given", why
>> > can't we instead say that 1-p is fundamental?  What is lost?  What
>> > makes this an unpalatable option?  It seems to me that it should
>> > certainly be the default position.
>> >
>> > I like Philip Goff's idea of "Ghosts" as an alternative to Chalmers'
>> >
>> > Zombies:  http://consciousnessonline.files.wordpress.com/2010/02/philip-goff-paper.pdf
>> >
>> > First, from the introduction:
>> >
>> > "Zombies are bodies without minds: creatures that are physically
>> > identical to actual human beings, but which have no conscious
>> > experience. Much of the consciousness literature concerns how
>> > threatening philosophical reflection on such creatures is to
>> > physicalism.  There is not much attention given to the converse
>> > possibility, the possibility of minds without bodies, that is,
>> > creatures who are conscious but whose nature is exhausted by their
>> > being conscious. We can call such a ‘purely conscious’ creature a
>> > ghost."
>> >
>> > Then on page 7:
>> >
>> > "The way into imagining your ghost twin is to go through the familiar
>> > Cartesian process of doubting everything that it is possible to doubt.
>> > For all you know for sure, the physical world around you might be a
>> > delusion, placed in you by an incredibly powerful evil demon. The arms
>> > and legs you seem to see in front of you, the heart you seem to feel
>> > beating beneath your breast, your body that feels solid and warm to
>> > the touch, all may be figments of a particularly powerful delusion.
>> > You might not even have a brain.
>> >
>> > The only state of affairs you know for certain to obtain is that you
>> > exist as a thing such that there is something that it is like to be
>> > that thing. You know for certain that you are a thing that has an
>> > experience as of having arms and legs, a beating heart, a warm, solid
>> > body. You know that you are a subject of experience. But you may not
>> > be a creature that exists in space, or has physical parts. It is by
>> > engaging in the process of Cartesian doubting that one arrives at a
>> > conception of one’s ghost twin.
>> >
>> > I am not suggesting that the process of Cartesian doubting
>> > demonstrates the possibility of ghosts, but I am suggesting that it
>> > goes a good way to demonstrating their conceivability.  To entertain
>> > the possibility that I am the only thing that exists, and that I exist
>> > as a thing with no properties other than my conscious experience, just
>> > is to conceive of my ghost twin. Any philosopher who agrees with
>> > Descartes up to and including the Cogito has a strong prima facie
>> > obligation to accept the conceivability of ghosts."
>> >
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