On 24 Feb 2010, at 08:22, Rex Allen wrote:

On Tue, Feb 23, 2010 at 8:02 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

On 23 Feb 2010, at 06:45, Rex Allen wrote:

It seems to me that there are two easy ways to get rid of the hard

1)  Get rid of 1-p.  (A la Dennettian eliminative materialism)


2)  Get rid of 3-p.  (subjective idealism)

For the reasons I've touched on above I don't see that introducing the idea of a material world explains anything at all. Therefore, I vote
for getting rid of 3-p, except as a calculational device.

The idea of a material world that exists fundamentally and uncaused
while giving rise to conscious experience is no more coherent than the
idea that conscious experience exists fundamentally and uncaused and
gives rise to the mere perception of a material world (as everyone
accepts happens in dreams).

What is the problem with this solution?

You forget "3)

3) get rid of physical-3-p, but keep mathematical (arithmetical) 3- p. That
is "objective idealism".

And this you need in any account ... if only as 'calculational device'. Then computer science solves the hard part of the mind problem, with the price of having to derive the physical laws from the belief that the numbers develop naturally from self-introspection. And it is not so amazing we (re)find the type of theory developed by the greeks among those who were both mystic and rationalist. They did introspect themselves very deeply,

Wait my next post to David for how comp does solve the hard problem of

Bruno Marchal

Hmmmm.  Well, I think that your proposal suffers from the same
explanatory gap as physicalism.

No. Physicist have not yet addressed really the problem of consciousness.
With computationalism we can formulate the question.
And yes, there is also a gap.
But the gap is made precise, justified, and has a mathematical geometry.

So numbers and their relations and machines and whatnot exist
platonically.  Okay.  So far so good.

BUT I don't see why these things in any combination or standing in any
relation to each other should give rise to conscious experience - any
more than quarks and electrons stacked in certain arrangements should
do so.

You can do it with quark and electron, but if it works because those quark and electron compute the releant digital number relation, then, if you say yes to the doctor, I have to derive the observability of quark and electrons from the number relations, of the combinator relations (uda).

I believe you that there is some mathematical description or
representation of my experiences...

But I have never said that, although I am aware it may look superficially like that. I will say "belief" for your representation (and indeed beliefs are represented, it is roughly speaking the 'body' of the person).


experiments appear when beliefs cross consistency,
and experience appears when beliefs cross truth.

And I have no proof of consistency to offer, nor real name or definition of truth. Except for more simpler (than us) Löbian machines.

but I don't see why the existence
of such a representation, platonic OR physically embodied, would
result in conscious experience...?

Conscious experience is an oxymoron. I think.

No representation is conscious. Nor any body (which are relative representations). Consciousness or knowledge, like truth, but unlike consistency, has no finite representation whatsoever. It is more the platonic and non representable person who is conscious. Representations are only maps to prevent being completely lost when entangled with other universal entities and histories. They guide the soul, or channel the consciousness, in the normal coherent histories. The soul intersects truth and representation, and may intersect consistency too (and other variants). (and many other concept of computer science can help to elaborate this approach).

When be bet on a substitution level, we bet on a coding, not on a representation, and hopefully the coding level is at a lower level than the level needed for the possible local representations in play, relatively to our most probable histories.

The 3-self has a (local) name: it is your body, or a digital copy (with comp), a relative "Gödel number". The 1-self has no name. It inherits this feature from truth (which has no name too, for the machine).

But comp and mathematical logic makes it possible to prove theorems *about* those non nameable entities (associated to ideally correct machines).

Comp prevents the possibility to give you publicly a name, or to solve publicly the koan "Who am I?". It allows you to refute any normative theory about you. As I said often, it is a vaccine against person representation, categorization, etc.



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