Bruno:
          Does the following relate at all to your theory of Comp?

Each life is an equation. Each person is given parts of the equation with many variables on both sides of the equals sign.

Most equations have only one solution which, however, can be solved in different ways: simple or complex. The solutions might allow for many variations: e.g. algebra, geometry, logic, psychology, language etc. The number of possible methods and steps might represent degrees of freedom. But freedom doesn't necessarily bring happiness. Any method can result in emotional experiences placed along a continuum between bliss and misery.

Some lives (like some equations) have two or more solutions. A person may devote his life to solving one or he may attempt to solve several or all. In any case the degrees of freedom are increased accordingly, but the chances of experiencing happiness or misery in the solving are the same as for the previous group.

A few lives (like some equations) have an infinite number of solutions. Infinite degrees of freedom offer vast creativity, but equal chances of pain or pleasure.

Some people never arrive at even one solution and their lives, even if pleasant, seem to them pointless and unfulfilled.

Some do find solutions but such as indicate that those lives had been trivial or meaningless. No sense of fulfillment here.

The luckiest both enjoy the quest and also arrive at solutions that prove their lives to have been meaningful and important. These people feel fulfilled no matter which group they come from.



marty a.







----- Original Message ----- From: "Bruno Marchal" <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
To: <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Wednesday, February 24, 2010 1:59 PM
Subject: Re: On the computability of consciousness



On 24 Feb 2010, at 08:22, Rex Allen wrote:

On Tue, Feb 23, 2010 at 8:02 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>  wrote:

On 23 Feb 2010, at 06:45, Rex Allen wrote:

It seems to me that there are two easy ways to get rid of the hard
problem.

1)  Get rid of 1-p.  (A la Dennettian eliminative materialism)

OR

2)  Get rid of 3-p.  (subjective idealism)

For the reasons I've touched on above I don't see that introducing  the
idea of a material world explains anything at all.  Therefore, I  vote
for getting rid of 3-p, except as a calculational device.

The idea of a material world that exists fundamentally and uncaused
while giving rise to conscious experience is no more coherent than  the
idea that conscious experience exists fundamentally and uncaused and
gives rise to the mere perception of a material world (as everyone
accepts happens in dreams).

What is the problem with this solution?

You forget "3)

3) get rid of physical-3-p, but keep mathematical (arithmetical) 3- p. That
is "objective idealism".

And this you need in any account ... if only as 'calculational  device'.
Then computer science solves the hard part of the mind problem, with the price of having to derive the physical laws from the belief that the numbers
develop naturally from self-introspection. And it is not so amazing  we
(re)find the type of theory developed by the greeks among those who  were
both mystic and rationalist. They did introspect themselves very  deeply,
apparently.

Wait my next post to David for how comp does solve the hard problem  of
consciousness.

Bruno Marchal


Hmmmm.  Well, I think that your proposal suffers from the same
explanatory gap as physicalism.

No. Physicist have not yet addressed really the problem of
consciousness.
With computationalism we can formulate the question.
And yes, there is also a gap.
But the gap is made precise, justified, and has a mathematical geometry.




So numbers and their relations and machines and whatnot exist
platonically.  Okay.  So far so good.

BUT I don't see why these things in any combination or standing in any
relation to each other should give rise to conscious experience - any
more than quarks and electrons stacked in certain arrangements should
do so.

You can do it with quark and electron, but if it works because those
quark and electron compute the releant digital number relation, then,
if you say yes to the doctor, I have to derive the observability of
quark and electrons from the number relations, of the combinator
relations (uda).




I believe you that there is some mathematical description or
representation of my experiences...

But I have never said that, although I am aware it may look
superficially like that. I will say "belief" for your representation
(and indeed beliefs are represented, it is roughly speaking the 'body'
of the person).

Then

experiments appear when beliefs cross consistency,
and experience appears when beliefs cross truth.

And I have no proof of consistency to offer, nor real name or
definition of truth. Except for more simpler (than us) Löbian machines.





but I don't see why the existence
of such a representation, platonic OR physically embodied, would
result in conscious experience...?


Conscious experience is an oxymoron. I think.

No representation is conscious. Nor any body (which are relative
representations).
Consciousness or knowledge, like truth, but unlike consistency, has no
finite representation whatsoever.
It is more the platonic and non representable person who is conscious.
Representations are only maps to prevent being completely lost when
entangled with other universal entities and histories. They guide the
soul, or channel the consciousness, in the normal coherent histories.
The soul intersects truth and representation, and may intersect
consistency too (and other variants). (and many other concept of
computer science can help to elaborate this approach).

When be bet on a substitution level, we bet on a coding, not on a
representation, and hopefully the coding level is at a lower level
than the level needed for the possible local representations in play,
relatively to our most probable histories.

The 3-self has a (local) name: it is your body, or a digital copy
(with comp), a relative "Gödel number".
The 1-self has no name. It inherits this feature from truth (which has
no name too, for the machine).

But comp and mathematical logic makes it possible to prove theorems
*about* those non nameable entities (associated to ideally correct
machines).

Comp prevents the possibility to give you publicly a name, or to solve
publicly the koan "Who am I?". It allows you to refute any normative
theory about you. As I said often, it is a vaccine against person
representation, categorization, etc.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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