On Wed, Feb 24, 2010 at 1:59 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> No representation is conscious. Nor any body (which are relative
> representations).
> Consciousness or knowledge, like truth, but unlike consistency, has no
> finite representation whatsoever.
> It is more the platonic and non representable person who is conscious.
> Representations are only maps to prevent being completely lost when
> entangled with other universal entities and histories. They guide the soul,
> or channel the consciousness, in the normal coherent histories. The soul
> intersects truth and representation, and may intersect consistency too (and
> other variants). (and many other concept of computer science can help to
> elaborate this approach).
> When be bet on a substitution level, we bet on a coding, not on a
> representation, and hopefully the coding level is at a lower level than the
> level needed for the possible local representations in play, relatively to
> our most probable histories.
> The 3-self has a (local) name: it is your body, or a digital copy (with
> comp), a relative "Gödel number".
> The 1-self has no name. It inherits this feature from truth (which has no
> name too, for the machine).
> But comp and mathematical logic makes it possible to prove theorems *about*
> those non nameable entities (associated to ideally correct machines).
> Comp prevents the possibility to give you publicly a name, or to solve
> publicly the koan "Who am I?". It allows you to refute any normative theory
> about you. As I said often, it is a vaccine against person representation,
> categorization, etc.

To quote your earlier response to David:  "By interpreting favorably
all your terms, it makes sense, yes."


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