On 01 Mar 2010, at 05:40, Rex Allen wrote:

On Sun, Feb 28, 2010 at 10:59 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

On 28 Feb 2010, at 07:33, Rex Allen wrote:

What would the causal mechanism for natural selection be?  A
"selection field"?  "Selection particles"?  Spooky "selection at a
distance"???




No, it is (mainly) Sex.

Selection by individual seduction. On some level.

Chatting universal chromosomes. On some other level.

The quantum wave or matrix. On some yet different level.

Consciousness selection on universal machine histories. On a yet deeper
level. (Frankly, you should appreciate!)

Elementary arithmetic. At the deepest level with the comp. hyp.).


But if causal laws are "real"

Assuming comp "causal laws" is never "real". It is the main interest of comp that we don't have to rely on any notion of causality, other than logical implication A -> B, that is: ~A v B satisfied by Platonia, or by the "standard model" of arithmetic. Causality is a multiform levels-intricate emerging concept. It has no ontological sense, it is always an epistemological notion.



then I would think that they could only
"really" operate at one level.

Each time a universal machine or entity generates another universal entity, it create a new level of autonomy, and a new explanatory realm.



 At most (!) one of those levels is
what really exists - the other levels are just ways that we think
about what really exists or ways that things *seem* to us.

The point is that such a seeming is what we can call real from our points of view. Remember that with comp, the whole physicalness is a higher level first person (plural) machine coherent-dream type of notion.

Note that all your present remarks in this thread seems to contradict your "consciousness is fundamental" posts. It looks you are searching for a reductionist explanation. But comp is incoherent with such reductionist programs (which explains why such reductionist account fails on the mind-body problem and leads to consciousness elimination). In a sense, with comp the appearance is derived by the many levels, not by any one level, except for the ontology, which needs only to be anything Sigma_1 complete (Turing universal). A big variety of causality and responsibility emerge from that. It is like in computer science: a high level program can be buggy, without any bug at the low level. It is like with human psychology: quark and even neuron may be 100% irrelevant in the explanation why someone commit some action. The Universal Machine concepts define their own explanatory-independence level, and below our level of substitution, mechanism entails indeterminacy among them all to justify what is observable. Somehow, we need a sum on all explanations there. If someone asks you why you appreciate some movie, any mention of the low level functioning of your brain will be irrelevant. A good thing, because you would have to justified why you even believe in that brain, and this by referring to that brain, and all explanations would become circular. I am astonished that someone who seems to want that consciousness (high level person notion) is fundamental, invokes the type of physicalist reductive explanation which does not even work in applied computer science, and leads to person and consciousness elimination. With comp epistemology can be said more real than the ontology. Plotinus is aware of this: his God is beyond being, like matter is somehow below being: only intelligible ideas are real or existing, and God is what make those ideas possibly "real", and it cannot be "real" itself. The same for matter which is just the symptom of the limiting competence of "God".

Bruno




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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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