On 08 Mar 2010, at 10:08, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

It's perhaps just a matter of definition but I would have thought the
requirement for a hypercomputer was not compatible with
computationalism, but potentially could still come under

Putnam(*) is responsible for introducing functionalism, and he defines it explicitly in term of emulability by Turing Machines. The only difference with computationalism is that computationalism explicitly refer to the (unknown) level of substitution, something which remains implicit in Putnam's paper.

Now, if UDA is simpler with computationalism (or comp +oracle), AUDA, and thus machine theology, works for a vast set of weakening of computationalism (from machine with oracles, to abstract highly non effective notion of probability defined in terms of subset of models of theories, like in Solovay paper).

(*) PUTNAM H., 1960, Minds and Machines, Dimensions of Mind : A Symposium, Sidney Hook (Ed.), New-York University Press, New-York. Repris dans Anderson A. R. (Ed.),1964.

ANDERSON A.R. (ed.), 1964, Minds and Machine, Prentice Hall inc. New Jersey.



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