On 08 Mar 2010, at 10:08, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
It's perhaps just a matter of definition but I would have thought the
requirement for a hypercomputer was not compatible with
computationalism, but potentially could still come under
Putnam(*) is responsible for introducing functionalism, and he defines
it explicitly in term of emulability by Turing Machines.
The only difference with computationalism is that computationalism
explicitly refer to the (unknown) level of substitution, something
which remains implicit in Putnam's paper.
Now, if UDA is simpler with computationalism (or comp +oracle), AUDA,
and thus machine theology, works for a vast set of weakening of
computationalism (from machine with oracles, to abstract highly non
effective notion of probability defined in terms of subset of models
of theories, like in Solovay paper).
(*) PUTNAM H., 1960, Minds and Machines, Dimensions of Mind : A
Hook (Ed.), New-York University Press, New-York. Repris dans Anderson
A. R. (Ed.),1964.
ANDERSON A.R. (ed.), 1964, Minds and Machine, Prentice Hall inc. New
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at