On 15 March 2010 07:28, Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com> wrote:
> I don't think that's so clear. Everett's relative state interpretation > implies consciousness is not unitary but continually "splits" just as the > states of other quantum systems. So while these counterfactual states > (realized in the multiple worlds) may be significant for instantiating > consciousness, I don't think it would follow that the consciousness'es thus > instantiated would be aware of the splitting, i.e. decoherence. So if you > are subject to a probabilistic event which would cause a change in your > consciousness if it eventuated there would be a change in your consciousness > *in another branch of the multiple worlds*. If your brain were constructed > so there was no such chance (or it had much lower probability) what would be > the difference? Maybe you would have faded qualia, e.g. if you were color > blind you aren't aware of colors because there's zero probability of sensing > them and your consciousness is slightly diminished by this because you > aren't conscious of things being "not red" or "not blue". I'm still not clear on what you mean. If I almost have an accident which could have left me in terrible pain should I feel something in this world as a result of the near miss? Surely I would if the counterfactuals have an effect on consciousness. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
