On 15 March 2010 07:28, Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com> wrote:

> I don't think that's so clear.  Everett's relative state interpretation
> implies consciousness is not unitary but continually "splits" just as the
> states of other quantum systems.  So while these counterfactual states
> (realized in the multiple worlds) may be significant for instantiating
> consciousness, I don't think it would follow that the consciousness'es thus
> instantiated would be aware of the splitting, i.e. decoherence.  So if you
> are subject to a probabilistic event which would cause a change in your
> consciousness if it eventuated there would be a change in your consciousness
> *in another branch of the multiple worlds*.  If your brain were constructed
> so there was no such chance (or it had much lower probability) what would be
> the difference?  Maybe you would have faded qualia, e.g. if you were color
> blind you aren't aware of colors because there's zero probability of sensing
> them and your consciousness is slightly diminished by this because you
> aren't conscious of things being "not red" or "not blue".

I'm still not clear on what you mean. If I almost have an accident
which could have left me in terrible pain should I feel something in
this world as a result of the near miss? Surely I would if the
counterfactuals have an effect on consciousness.

Stathis Papaioannou

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
For more options, visit this group at 

Reply via email to