----- Original Message ----- From: Bruno Marchal To: email@example.com Sent: Tuesday, March 16, 2010 8:13 AM Subject: Re: Free will: Wrong entry.
On 16 Mar 2010, at 02:55, m.a. wrote: Bruno How can there be indeterminacy in comp when there are no material particles subject to Heisenberg's theory, only numbers? Is there an element of chance in the universal dovetailing of pure numbers? Of course. This results from the seven first step of UDA. There is a total 3-determinacy , By 3-determinacy I assume you mean 3rd person determinacy. which multiplies any of your state an infinity of UD-times, in an infinity of computations, which entails, from *your* first person point of view to a very strong form of indeterminacy. You cannot know in which computations you are, and the physical emerges from that statistics. So I gather from this (and what's written below) that "first-person I" cannot decide which alternative the UD will shuffle out of the deck. Therefore: no free will as we conceive of it. Comp provides the stronger form of subjective, or first person indeterminacy. If I am machine I am duplicable. Cf the Washington Moscow self-duplication. You cannot predict in advance if you will feel to be the one reconstituted in Moscow, or he one reconstituted in Washington. Then, the way you quantify that indeterminacy does not depend on the time and delays of the reconstitutions, nor of the virtual, real, or eventually arithmetical reconstitution. So your future states depend on all the arithmetical consistent extension states, of your current state, existing in the UD platonic execution. The Universal Dovetailer (or just elementary arithmetic) generates you current states infinitely often, belonging to an infinity of possible computational histories. The physical laws have to be justified by that indeterminacy of your relative states/histories existing in arithmetic. You may (re)read cautiously the UDA (from SAN04). The key is that a third person determinacy (like the UD works) generates from the point if view of the subjects a very strong form of indeterminacy due notably on the fact that below their s-comp substitution level, there are an infinity of histories going through their states; and measurement at that level have to be given by a distribution of probabilities on the computations, as seen from inside (that is with respect of memories). Or, are you saying here that choices made by the (3rd person) UD tend to be influenced by one's life-history to the extent of (often) providing the very alternatives that the (1st) person would have chosen? That would be close enough to free will for me. The key relies in the understanding of the 1 and 3 person distincts points of view. I'm trying to. m.a. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.