----- Original Message ----- 
  From: Bruno Marchal 
  To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
  Sent: Tuesday, March 16, 2010 8:13 AM
  Subject: Re: Free will: Wrong entry.




  On 16 Mar 2010, at 02:55, m.a. wrote:


    Bruno
                 How can there be indeterminacy in comp when there are no 
material particles subject to Heisenberg's theory, only numbers? Is there an 
element of chance in the universal dovetailing of pure numbers?


  Of course. This results from the seven first step of UDA. There is a total 
3-determinacy , 

                By 3-determinacy I assume you mean 3rd person determinacy.

  which multiplies any of your state an infinity of UD-times, in an infinity of 
computations, which entails, from *your* first person point of view to a very 
strong form of indeterminacy. You cannot know in which computations you are, 
and the physical emerges from that statistics.

            So I gather from this (and what's written below) that "first-person 
I" cannot decide which alternative the UD will shuffle out of the deck. 
Therefore: no free will as we conceive of it.


  Comp provides the stronger form of subjective, or first person indeterminacy. 
If I am machine I am duplicable. Cf the Washington Moscow self-duplication. You 
cannot predict in advance if you will feel to be the one reconstituted in 
Moscow, or he one reconstituted in Washington.
  Then, the way you quantify that indeterminacy does not depend on the time and 
delays of the reconstitutions, nor of the virtual, real, or eventually 
arithmetical reconstitution. So your future states depend on all the 
arithmetical consistent extension states, of your current state, existing in 
the UD platonic execution.


  The Universal Dovetailer (or just elementary arithmetic) generates you 
current states infinitely often, belonging to an infinity of possible 
computational histories. The physical laws have to be justified by that 
indeterminacy of your relative states/histories existing in arithmetic.


  You may (re)read cautiously the UDA (from SAN04). The key is that a third 
person determinacy (like the UD works) generates from the point if view of the 
subjects a very strong form of  indeterminacy due notably on the fact that 
below their s-comp substitution level, there are an infinity of histories going 
through their states; and measurement at that level have to be given by a 
distribution of probabilities on the computations, as seen from inside (that is 
with respect of memories).

                  Or, are you saying here that choices made by the (3rd person) 
UD tend to be influenced by one's life-history to the extent of (often) 
providing the very alternatives that the (1st) person would have chosen? That 
would be close enough to free will for me. 


  The key relies in the understanding of the 1 and 3 person distincts points of 
view.

                   I'm trying to.       m.a.


  Bruno


  http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/







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