On 18 March 2010 06:32, Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net> wrote:
> As I have been following this conversation a question
> occurred to me, how is a Zombie (as defined by Chalmers et al.) any
> different functionally from the notion of other persons (dogs, etc.) that a
> Solipsist might have? They seem equivalent, both behaving exactly as a “real
> person would” yet having no consciousness or 1-p reality of their own. What
> am I missing here?
The problem of zombies is a version of the problem of other minds.
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