On 18 March 2010 06:32, Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net> wrote:
> As I have been following this conversation a question > occurred to me, how is a Zombie (as defined by Chalmers et al.) any > different functionally from the notion of other persons (dogs, etc.) that a > Solipsist might have? They seem equivalent, both behaving exactly as a “real > person would” yet having no consciousness or 1-p reality of their own. What > am I missing here? The problem of zombies is a version of the problem of other minds. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
