On 18 March 2010 04:34, Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com> wrote:

> However I think there is something in the above that creates the "just a
> recording problem".  It's the hypothesis that the black box reproduces the
> I/O behavior.  This implies the black box realizes a function, not a
> recording.  But then the argument slips over to replacing the black box with
> a recording which just happens to produce the same I/O and we're led to an
> absurdum that a recording is conscious.  But what step of the argument
> should we reject?  The plausible possibility is that it is the different
> response to counterfactuals that the functional box and the recording
> realize.  That would seem like magic - a different response depending on all
> the things that don't happen - except in the MWI of QM all those
> counterfactuals are available to make a difference..

I think that was Jack's problem with the fading qualia argument: it
would imply that a recording or random process could be conscious,
which is a no-no. He therefore contrives to explain how fading qualia
(with identical behaviour) could in fact happen. But I don't buy it: I
still think the idea of the partial zombie is incoherent.

If a chunk were removed out of my computer's CPU and replaced with a
black box which accidentally reproduces the I/O behaviour of the
missing part the computer would function perfectly normally. We would
not say that it isn't "really" running Windows and Firefox. Why do we
say this about consciousness?


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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