On 18 March 2010 04:34, Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com> wrote:

> However I think there is something in the above that creates the "just a
> recording problem".  It's the hypothesis that the black box reproduces the
> I/O behavior.  This implies the black box realizes a function, not a
> recording.  But then the argument slips over to replacing the black box with
> a recording which just happens to produce the same I/O and we're led to an
> absurdum that a recording is conscious.  But what step of the argument
> should we reject?  The plausible possibility is that it is the different
> response to counterfactuals that the functional box and the recording
> realize.  That would seem like magic - a different response depending on all
> the things that don't happen - except in the MWI of QM all those
> counterfactuals are available to make a difference..

I think that was Jack's problem with the fading qualia argument: it
would imply that a recording or random process could be conscious,
which is a no-no. He therefore contrives to explain how fading qualia
(with identical behaviour) could in fact happen. But I don't buy it: I
still think the idea of the partial zombie is incoherent.

If a chunk were removed out of my computer's CPU and replaced with a
black box which accidentally reproduces the I/O behaviour of the
missing part the computer would function perfectly normally. We would
not say that it isn't "really" running Windows and Firefox. Why do we
say this about consciousness?

Stathis Papaioannou

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