On 3/17/2010 9:28 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 18 March 2010 04:34, Brent Meeker<meeke...@dslextreme.com> wrote:
However I think there is something in the above that creates the "just a
recording problem". It's the hypothesis that the black box reproduces the
I/O behavior. This implies the black box realizes a function, not a
recording. But then the argument slips over to replacing the black box with
a recording which just happens to produce the same I/O and we're led to an
absurdum that a recording is conscious. But what step of the argument
should we reject? The plausible possibility is that it is the different
response to counterfactuals that the functional box and the recording
realize. That would seem like magic - a different response depending on all
the things that don't happen - except in the MWI of QM all those
counterfactuals are available to make a difference..
I think that was Jack's problem with the fading qualia argument: it
would imply that a recording or random process could be conscious,
which is a no-no. He therefore contrives to explain how fading qualia
(with identical behaviour) could in fact happen. But I don't buy it: I
still think the idea of the partial zombie is incoherent.
If a chunk were removed out of my computer's CPU and replaced with a
black box which accidentally reproduces the I/O behaviour of the
missing part the computer would function perfectly normally. We would
not say that it isn't "really" running Windows and Firefox. Why do we
say this about consciousness?
Is it coherent to say a black box "accidentally" reproduces the I/O? It
is over some relatively small number to of I/Os, but over a large enough
number and range to sustain human behavior - that seems very doubtful.
One would be tempted to say the black box was obeying a "natural law".
It would be the same as the problem of induction. How do we know
natural laws are consistent - because we define them to be so.
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