On 18 Mar 2010, at 07:01, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On 18 March 2010 16:36, Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com> wrote:

Is it coherent to say a black box "accidentally" reproduces the I/ O? It is over some relatively small number to of I/Os, but over a large enough number and range to sustain human behavior - that seems very doubtful. One would be tempted to say the black box was obeying a "natural law". It would be the same as the problem of induction. How do we know natural laws are
consistent - because we define them to be so.

Jack considers the case where the black box is empty and the remaining
neurological tissue just happens to continue responding as if it were
receiving normal input. That, of course, would be extremely unlikely
to happen, to the point where it could be called magic if it did
happen. But if there were such a magical black box, it would
contribute to consciousness.

It is here that we may differ, but perhaps not essentially. Because the movie of the boolean graph is like that. You can suppress part of the movie, it will not disrupt or have any causal effect on the other part of the graph. I prefer to say that consciousness does not supervene on the movie, given that the movie does not even execute a computation, but then consciousness does not any more supervene of the physical activity related to the special implementation of a computation (relatively to our most probable computations). We get the comp supervenience thesis, and this makes physics secondary on number (extensional and intensional) theory, or number/computer science. Jack seems to want to put the counterfactual in the physical, but then, keeping comp, the physical becomes computational, and it eliminates the body problem in an ad hoc way. It makes physics depending of the "base", when comp makes and derives physics from its invariance from the comp-base (even if the base "elementary arithmetic" may play some capital role for other more pedagogical or psychological reasons).

Bruno




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Stathis Papaioannou

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