On 18 March 2010 17:06, L.W. Sterritt <lannysterr...@comcast.net> wrote:

> Perhaps more progress can be made by avoiding self referential problems and
> viewing this issue mechanistically.

Undoubtedly.

> I guess I'm in the QM camp
> that believes that  what you can measure is what you can know.

But if all that you could know was indeed limited to what you could
measure, there would have to be an infinite regress of measurement.
Before you can "know" anything in the sense of measuring it, it must
already have appeared in your consciousness.  This is just one of the
ways that the "hardness" of the problem of consciousness can be
discerned, if it isn't waved away linguistically (or indeed
mathematically).

Whether a TM can ever come to "know" anything, as opposed to measuring
aspects of its environment, is an open question.  An adequately
ingenious Turing test should indeed be capable of assessing whether a
machine is capable of measuring relevant aspects of its environment
well enough to deal appropriately with a given problem space.  Whether
this counts as evidence that human beings navigate the same problem
space with the same resources and methods is moot.  ISTM that, in
addition to the test, a comprehensive theory of mind for both machine
and human intelligences would be a prerequisite.  But this, of course,
is somewhat more problematic.

David

> Bruno and others,
> Perhaps more progress can be made by avoiding self referential problems and
> viewing this issue mechanistically.  Where I start:  Haim Sompolinsky,
> "Statistical Mechanics of Neural Networks," Physics Today (December 1988).
> He discussed "emergent computational properties of large highly connected
> networks of simple neuron-like processors," HP has recently succeeded in
> making titanium dioxide "memristors" which behave very like the synapses in
> our brains,  i.e. the memristor's resistance at any time depends upon the
> last signal passing through it.  Work is underway to make brain-like
> computers with these devices; see Wei Lu, Nano letters,
> DOI:10.1021/nl904092h.  It seems that there is a growing consensus that
> conscious machines will be built, and perhaps with the new Turing test
> proposed by Koch and Tonini, their consciousness may be verified. Then we
> can measure properties that are now speculative.  I guess I'm in the QM camp
> that believes that  what you can measure is what you can know.
> William
>
>
> On Mar 18, 2010, at 1:44 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 17 Mar 2010, at 19:12, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> On 3/17/2010 10:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 17 Mar 2010, at 13:47, HZ wrote:
>
> I'm quite confused about the state of zombieness. If the requirement
>
> for zombiehood is that it doesn't understand anything at all but it
>
> behaves as if it does what makes us not zombies? How do we not we are
>
> not? But more importantly, are there known cases of zombies? Perhaps a
>
> silly question because it might be just a thought experiment but if
>
> so, I wonder on what evidence one is so freely speaking about,
>
> specially when connected to cognition for which we now (should) know
>
> more. The questions seem related because either we don't know whether
>
> we are zombies or one can solve the problem of zombie identification.
>
> I guess I'm new in the zombieness business.
>
>
>
> I know I am conscious, and I can doubt all content of my consciousness,
> except this one, that I am conscious.
>
> I cannot prove that I am conscious, neither to some others.
>
> Dolls and sculptures are, with respect to what they represent, if human in
> appearance sort of zombie.
>
> Tomorrow, we may be able to put in a museum an artificial machine imitating
> a humans which is sleeping, in a way that we may be confused and believe it
> is a dreaming human being ...
>
> The notion of zombie makes sense (logical sense). Its existence may depend
> on the choice of theory.
>
> With the axiom of comp, a counterfactually correct relation between numbers
> define the channel through which consciousness flows (select the consistent
> extensions). So with comp we could argue that as far as we are bodies, we
> are zombies, but from our first person perspective we never are.
>
>
> But leaving the zombie definition and identification apart, I think
>
> current science would/should see no difference between consciousness
>
> and cognition, the former is an emergent property of the latter,
>
>
> I would have said the contrary:
>
> consciousness -> sensibility -> emotion -> cognition -> language ->
> recognition -> self-consciousness -> ...
>
> (and: number -> universal number -> consciousness -> ...)
>
> Something like that, follows, I argue, from the assumption that we are
> Turing emulable at some (necessarily unknown) level of description.
>
> and
>
> just as there are levels of cognition there are levels of
>
> consciousness. Between the human being and other animals there is a
>
> wide gradation of levels, it is not that any other animal lacks of
>
> 'qualia'. Perhaps there is an upper level defined by computational
>
> limits and as such once reached that limit one just remains there, but
>
> consciousness seems to depend on the complexity of the brain (size,
>
> convolutions or whatever provides the full power) but not disconnected
>
> to cognition. In this view only damaging the cognitive capacities of a
>
> person would damage its 'qualia', while its 'qualia' could not get
>
> damaged but by damaging the brain which will likewise damage the
>
> cognitive capabilities. In other words, there seems to be no
>
> cognition/consciousness duality as long as there is no brain/mind one.
>
> The use of the term 'qualia' here looks like a remake of the mind/body
>
> problem.
>
>
> Qualia is the part of the mind consisting in the directly apprehensible
> subjective experience. Typical examples are pain, seeing red, smell, feeling
> something, ... It is roughly the non transitive part of cognition.
>
> The question here is not the question of the existence of degrees of
> consciousness, but the existence of a link between a possible variation of
> consciousness in presence of non causal perturbation during a particular run
> of a brain or a machine.
>
> If big blue wins a chess tournament without having used the register 344, no
> doubt big blue would have win in case the register 344 would have been
> broken.
>
> Not with probability 1.0, because given QM the game might have (and in other
> worlds did) gone differently and required register 344.
>
> Correct but irrelevant. We don't assume QM at the start, and if you use QM,
> you have to reason on the QM normal words to make the point relevant. Or you
> assume QM-comp, and not comp. It is physicalism. And you beg the point,
> which is that comp -> QM-comp. (assuming QM is correct on the "physical
> world").
>
>
>
>
> Some people seems to believe that if big blue was conscious in the first
> case, it could loose consciousness in the second case. I don't think this is
> tenable when we assume that we are Turing emulable.
>
> But the world is only Turing emulable if it is deterministic and it's only
> deterministic if "everything" happens as in MWI QM.
>
> Newton mechanics is a counter-example. You lost me. I don't know in which
> theory you reason.
>
> Also, arithmetical truth is "deterministic" although only a tiny part of it
> is computable. Consciousness, matter are higher order notion, some nameable
> (by numbers), some not. Most, by comp, are not computable. Computable things
> can have non computable qualities. By incompleteness, this is a very general
> phenomenon.
>
> The full first order arithmetical "Noûs", that first order G*, is Pi_1
> complete *in* the oracle of Arithmetical Truth.
> It means that even with an oracle capable of answering any sigma_i or pi_i
> questions, some intellectual truth about machine our numbers remain de type
> Pi_i difficult! The first order G is Pi_2-complete. Quite above the
> computable, which is the Sigma_1 complete. The mystery with comp is why does
> the appearance seems computable, given the radical first person
> indeterminacy which occurs at some level.
>
> The whole many coupling consciousness/realities arises through the attempt
> of a swarm of numbers to understand themselves. At least I show why it has
> to be like that once we say "yes" to the doctor.
>
> Is it so astonishing? It explains where the laws of physics come from, and
> why it hurts. It is just more near Pythagorus, Plato, Plotinus than
> Aristotle.
>
> A physicalist who, like *some* radical atheist, makes physicalism a given of
> science illustrates a lack of rigor in ontology or theology.
>
> Scientists does not know, and will never (publicly) know. (As scientist).
>
> But if you believe you are Post-Church-Turing emulable, then you have to
> believe that 0, the successor, addition and multiplication are enough to
> explain why eventually universal numbers believe in e, i, pi, 24, and in
> some relatively winning universal numbers (like probably modular functors,
> quantum topologies, non commutative geometry). And why it hurts. Thanks to
> the Gödel-Solovay gap between proof (G) and truth (G*), which is inherited
> by the intensional variants of the logics of self-reference, we get a theory
> of quanta *and* of the qualia.
>
> It is math, of course.
>
> Bruno
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
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