On 20 Mar 2010, at 16:56, David Nyman wrote:

On 24 February 2010 17:57, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

Please, keep in mind I may miss your point, even if I prefer to say that you are missing something, for being shorter and keeping to the point. You really put your finger right on the hardest part of the mind-body problem.

Bruno, I've been continuing to think, and meditate, about our recent
discussions, and have been re-reading (insofar as I can follow it)
your on-line paper "Computation, Consciousness and the Quantum".  I
feel I have more of a sense of how the aspects I've been questioning
you about fit together in the comp view, but if I may, I would like to
press you on a couple of points.

My original post on "non-computability" was motivated by re-reading
Chalmers and struggling again with his assertion that a zombie (e.g.
including the "3-p Chalmers" that wrote The Conscious Mind!) could
nonetheless refer to "consciousness" and hence be behaviourally
indistinguishable from a conscious entity.

So you talk here on the philosophical zombie which is counterfactually correct. Well, if by 3-p Chalmers you mean some 'body', such a body *is* a zombie. The 1-p Chalmers is Chalmers, the person. Its body does not think, but makes higher the probability that the 1-p thoughts refers to the most probable computations you are sharing with him.




 I realise, by the way,
that when considering thought experiments, including your own, one
should not treat them in a naively realistic way, but rather focus on
their logical implications.

Indeed! Absolutely so. I thought this was obvious (it should be for deductive philosophers).



The problem with Chalmers' logic seems to
me to be that he has to assume that his zombie will have formal access
to what AFAICS are non-formalisable states.

Well, assuming comp, if the zombie has the "right" computer in its skull, it has access to the non formalisable propositions, notions, 1- states etc. (the 3-states are always formal). But if the zombie skull is empty, then its counterfactual correctness is just magical, and it makes no sense to say it accesses some states or not. There are no 1-person state (because it is a zombie), nor 3- person state, because there is no digital machine in its (local) body.



 Now, in CC&Q, and in
discussion, you appear to say that Lobian machines can in fact refer
formally to what is non-formalisable.  This could at first glance seem
to support Chalmers' argument (which I assume is not your intention)
unless you also mean that the formal consequences ("extensions") of
such non-formalisable references would somehow be characteristically
different in the absence of the non-formal aspect (i.e. zombie-land
would in fact look very different).  IOW, consciousness should give
the appearance of exerting a "causal influence" on the physical, in
(naive) everyday terms.

Yes indeed. Except that "appearance" applies on the "physical". The "causal" is the real thing, here, and it is incarnated, or implemented with infinite redundancy (like the M set) in elementary arithmetic.





In CC&Q you point out that "we must not forget that the extensions
must not only be consistent, but must also be accessible by the
universal dovetailer".  Hence, which extensions are accessible by a
conscious (non-formalisable) decision-maker would appear nonetheless
to be formalisable.

Indeed, by the UD, or by that tiny (but sigma_1 complete) fragment of arithmetic, like Robinson arithmetic. It does not need to be Löbian. The UD is NOT a Löbian entity. It is much logically poorer.



Again, my question is: how would the range of
accessible extensions for a zombie (purely formal) decision-maker be
characteristically different?  For example, you cite the
"self-speeding-up" effect of consciousness with respect to the
organism's relation to its "neighbourhood" as a pragmatic argument for
the selective utility of consciousness.  I assume this implies that a
conscious decision-maker would be likely to find itself in
characteristically different extensions to its "environment" as
compared with a non-conscious decision-maker, but some clarification
on this would be very helpful.

This is not entirely clear for me. For a non-conscious decision-maker, there is just no sense at all to say that he could find itself (in the first person sense) in some particular environment. There is a sense in which it can find itself in the third person sense, in some particular environment, but consciousness is a first person notion, and it makes sense only when you ascribe it to the (genuine) abstract computational states occurring infinitely often in the UD*. It makes sense for a first person to find itself in an infinite ensemble of computations/continuations.

Empirically we share a lot of very similar computations, and this makes us believe that physics describes some local 3-reality, but comp makes it describe only a sharable infinite set of computations: physics become a first person plural notion. The MWI confirms this by making the duplication contagious. Populations of machines are self- multiplied. The global 3-reality does not have to be more complex than numbers (with + and *). The physical reality is an internal first person plural aspect of the universal machine ignorance. (Modelized in AUDA by Bp & Dt (p sigma_1)).

I know the picture is counter-intuitive. Löbian machine can explain why, assuming comp, it *has* to be counterintuitive. There is a natural (explainable) tension between all the hypostases, including some unbridgeable gaps. That's why souls fall, and eventually build 'matter'. It is not yet clear to me if 'matter' prevents them or helps them to go back to their natural harmonic "divine" (true, original) state. Probably both are correct.

Bruno



On 23 Feb 2010, at 22:05, David Nyman wrote:

Bruno, I want to thank you for such a complete commentary on my recent
posts - I will need to spend quite a bit of time thinking carefully
about everything you have said before I respond at length.

Thanks for your attention, David.
Please, keep in mind I may miss your point, even if I prefer to say that you are missing something, for being shorter and keeping to the point. You really put your finger right on the hardest part of the mind-body problem.


 I'm sure
that I'm quite capable of becoming confused between a theory and its
subject, though I am of course alive to the distinction.  In the
meantime, I wonder if you could respond to a supplementary question in
"grandmother" mode, or at least translate for grandma, into a more
every-day way of speaking, the parts of your commentary that are most
relevant to her interest in this topic.

I am a bit panicking, because you may be asking for something impossible. How to explain in *intuitive every-day terms* (cf grandmother) what is
provably counter-intuitive for any ideally perfect Löbian entity?
Bohr said that to say we understand quantum mechanics, means that we don't
understand.
Comp says this with a revenge: it proves that there is necessarily an
unbridgeable gap. You will not believe it, not understand it, nor know it to be true, without losing consistency and soundness. But you may understand
completely while assuming comp it has to be like that.
But I will try to help grandma.

Let us suppose that, to use the example I have already cited, that
grandma puts her hand in a flame, feels the unbearable agony of
burning, and is unable to prevent herself from withdrawing her hand
with a shriek of pain.

OK.


 Let us further suppose (though of course this
may well be ambiguous in the current state of neurological theory)
that a complete and sufficient 3-p description of this (partial)
history of events is also possible in terms of nerve firings,
cognitive and motor processing, etc. (the details are not so important
as the belief that such a complete history could be given).

OK. (for the moment)




From the
point of view of the reversal of the relation between 1-p and 3-p in
comp, is there some way to help grandma how to understand the
*necessary relation* (i.e. what she would conventionally understand as
"causal relation") between her 1-p *experience* of the pain (as
distinct from our observation of her reaction) and whatever 3-p events
are posterior to this in the history?  For example, what would be
distinctively missing from the causal sequence had she been
unconscious and had merely withdrawn her hand reflexively?

Your example may not be so good, because in such situation, the withdrawning
of the hand is in general done by reflex. But let us assume, she
concentrates and decide to remove the hand by "her own will".




I suppose this amounts to a repetition of the question - how is the
*painful experience* itself causally indispensable to the 3-p events
we associate with it?

In other discussions I have often criticize the notion of causality (but not
of will).
But as far as the local physics is explained by comp, causal relations can
have some local sense. In the big picture, wher we are NOT living,
eventually such causal relations are just shortening of arithmetical
relation, where the only cause can be reduced to formal implications.


 I seem to see that in a sense, given the comp
reversal of the relation between physics and consciousness, the 3-p
events do indeed "emerge" out of the pain.

Hmm... OK.
I could say to grandmother that pain and sensation itself exists in
platonia, indeed it is when a representation intersects with truth.
In a sense, a G* sense, only God (Truth) "feels pain", and the infinitely many grandmother's bodies makes it possible for God to lessen the pain
relatively to the normal stories, if all goes well ...



But this still seems to
beg the question: how do the 3-p events depend on the brute fact of
the *painfulness* of the pain, as opposed to the objective *existence*
of an infinity of computations?

Because in the infinity of computations, infinitely many self- referential entities emerges, and that, from their first person (sensible) point of view (Bp & p & Dt, their beliefs intersects the truth (God, "p"), and matter
(Dt)). This makes consciousness channeling on the normal story.
Pain, in that story, is intuitively "self-referentially" correct. I would say to grandmother pain is God's message to Itself: Ouch. Or to Grandma: "Don't do that, do anything you can to extract your self (and body) from
that situation, etc.
A pathological pain, like feeling burned by water, would diminished your probability to survive in a normal story. Like a pathological pleasure. If someone feel exquisitely well in a *very* hot bath, it may diminish its
"probability of normal life".


 I realise that this is a very strange
question, and it may indeed stem from some confusion of theory and
topic as you suggest.  Could you possibly mean - perhaps this is
implied in the term "objective idealism" - that the indescribable
background of the infinity of computations ultimately has no
independently "objective" existence - i.e. that it is fundamentally
the very same kind of existent that ultimately emerges in the
qualitative experience of subjects?  And then that the 3-p histories
are the "quasi-objective" component of this subjectivity (with the
crucial caveat that access to such "objectivity" can't in itself ever
give any subject complete *knowledge* of their situation)?



By interpreting favorably all your terms, it makes sense, yes.

Instead of "quasi-objective", for the "3-p histories", I think
"inter-subjective" is more adequate. Instead of 3-p, I would say here 1-p-p (first person plural). (Usually I use 3-p histories for the computations, not necessarily viewed from some perspective. The "3-p physical" is internal
to the 1-1-p)
Also, when you say "is the very same kind of existent that ultimately
emerge", well, you are right at the G* level, but wrong, if you think this is a theorem or even an admissible axiom. If we lift the Löbian theology on us, we can understand why that equivalence need an act of faith, which I think, is entailed by the conscientious choice to say yes - qua computatio"
to a mechanist doctor.
The belief that 17 is prime, is a subjective experience? You get by playing
with IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII, and trying to cut it in equal part.
You can consider that an axiomatic theory, or an ideally correct löbian machine is a reservoir, a set, of subjective beliefs. You can see 0, 1 2, 3, ... as elementary ideas, the axioms as elementary subjective constructions
or primitive beliefs, the rules of inference as beliefs preserving
transformations, and the model(s) or Truth(s) are what those beliefs are all
about.
The self-reference logics provide then tools for finding the fixed point of self-introspection by (Löbian) machines. Qualia appears at the intersection of the (Löbian) Belief, with (Löbian) truth and (Löbian) consistency, or, in Plotinus term, Man, God and and the Indeterminate. (Via the arithmetical
interpretation of Plotinus).
It seems to me you get the point or are very near. You explain it very well
to grandmother.
Don't hesitate to criticize my favorable interpretation of the terms, or to
ask for precision. It is very helpful.
Bruno


On 23 February 2010 14:18, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

David,

First of all, as I have already said, you seem to be well aware of the

hardest part of the hard problem of consciousness. And this gives me the

opportunity to try to explain what you are missing. Indeed, in this post, I

will try to explain how comp does solve completely the conceptual hard

problem of consciousness. (With the usual price that physics becomes a

branch of machine's theology).


On 22 Feb 2010, at 15:00, David Nyman wrote:

On 22 February 2010 07:37, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

What do you mean by "implicit" here? What is implicit is that the

subjectivity (1-p), to make sense, has to be referentially correct

relatively to the most probable histories/consistent extensions.

What I mean by implicit is "already accounted for", at least according

to the assumptions of the closed 3-p hypothesis, which of course is

what I'm questioning.

Then the incommunicable and private aspect of those knowledge and qualia

is

provided by the theory of knowledge and the quale logic, provided by the

respective intensional variant of G and G*. The difference between G and

G*

(provable and true) is reflected in those intensional variant.

Yes, but G and G*, and indeed all formally expressible logics, are

themselves closed 3-p (i.e. objective) notions - i.e. they would exist

and possess the same explanatory power in the absence of any

accompanying *qualitative* component.


I am not sure what you mean exactly by closed 3-p or even objective. But it

is OK (I see it is a minor question of vocabulary).

G and G* are formal modal logics, and it happens that they describe

completely (at some level) the self-referential discourse of ideally

self-referentially correct machines.

We have no interest in those formal theories per se, if it were not for

their semantics, including their interpretations in arithmetic, and their

intensional variants.

I come back on this below.





 This is just another way of

gesturing towards the Really Hard Problem - that the qualitative

component, per se, is seemingly redundant to the account if we assume

we already have a closed, or sufficient, non-qualitative explanation.

Consequently these logics AFAICS lead to the same paradoxical

conclusions as the closed 3-p physical hypothesis - i.e. that the

references to qualitative experiences - even those references we

ourselves produce - would occur even in the absence of any such

experiences.  This would leave us in the position of doubting the

basis even of our own statements that we are conscious!


And this would be very paradoxical indeed. But you are wrong in saying that

those logics lead to those paradoxes. Probably because you are wrong in

saying that those logics are "closed". Those logic are tools or systems

talking about *something*, provably in some correct sense. More below. I

prefer to read first your whole post, so that I can avoid confusing

repetitions.




I want to seriously discuss the proposition that certain behaviours

are actually contingent on qualitative experience, as distinguished

from any accompanying 3-p phenomena.  That is, for example, that my

withdrawing my hand from the fire because it hurts indispensably

requires the qualitative *experience* of pain to mediate between 1-p

and 3-p narratives.  This would of course mean in turn that the

explanatory arc from stimulus, through cognitive processing, to

response would be, without the qualitative component, in some way

demonstrably incomplete as an explanation.


Indeed. May be it would help to remember that with comp, we already know

that the physical world is a 1-p construct; It is not 3-p (as amazing as

this could seem for a materialist). The only 3-p is given by

arithmetic/logic/computer science.




 ISTM that this would make

it impossible to ignore the implication that the context in which we

conceive 3-p processes to be situated (whether we are talking in terms

of their physical or mathematical-logical expression) would itself be

capable of taking on "personal" characteristics in apparent

interaction with such processes.

Something related to this, ISTM, is already implied in the background

to 1-p indeterminacy, observer moments, the "solipsism of the One"

etc, because all these notions implicitly contain the idea of some

general context capable of embodying and individuating "personal"

qualitative experience - given relevant 3-p-describable structure and

function.  But in order for that personhood not to be vacuous - i.e.

redundant to the supposedly primary 3-p narrative - such personal

qualitative states must be conceived as having consequences, otherwise

inexplicable, in the 3-p domain, and not merely vice-versa.  How to

incorporate such consequences in the overall account is indeed a

puzzle.


A puzzle? No more ... (see below).




Not only can't we prove it, but we couldn't, from a 3-p pov, even

predict or in any way characterise such 1-p notions, if we didn't know

from a 1-p perspective that they exist (or seem to know that they seem

to exist).

This is not true I think. Already with the uda duplication experience,

you

can see predict the difference, for example, the apparition of first

person

indeterminacy despite the determinacy in the 3d description. This is

captured by the difference between (Bp and p) and Bp, and that difference

is

a consequence of incompleteness, when self-observing occurs.

I don't deny what you're saying per se, but I'm commenting on this

because it brings out, I hope, the distinction between purely formal

descriptions of 1-p notions, and actual first-personal acquaintance

with qualitative experience.

I think you are confusing a theory or a machine discourse WITH the subject

matter of the theory, or the object of discourse of the machine. In that

sense formal theory (sufficiently rich to talk on numbers) are already NEVER

closed in your sense. Arithmetical TRUTH, which plays a key role here is NOT

a formal object. Indeed it is a provably non formalizable object.



 It's the latter that I'm claiming is

non-computable from any formal premise

You are entirely right here. Both "I", and the Löbian machine agree with

you.



(which, as I think we'd both

agree, is the essence of the HP).

OK. In which case you will see how that problem is solved.



It's one thing to say that

"self-observing occurs", and quite another to actually experience

self-observing.  But beyond this, ISTM that we must also believe that

the *experience* of self-observing entails consequences that the mere

*description* of "self-observing" would not, to avoid the paradoxes

contingent on the idea that qualitative experiences are somehow

redundant or merely "epiphenomenal".


OK.




One of the

places it leads (which ISTM some are anxious not to acknowledge)) is

the kind of brute paradox I've referred to. So what I'm asking you is

how is this different from a comp perspective? Can our 3-p references

to 1-p phenomena escape paradox in the comp analysis?

Yes, because we do accept the truth of elementary arithmetic. We can

study

the theology of simple (and thus *intuitively* correct) Löbian machine.

We

*know* in that setting that the machine will be aware of an explanation

gap,

etc.

Again, the price is that we have to recover physics without introducing a

3-p physical world.

I see that it is already important that comp predicts the *existence*

of an explanatory gap.

It is a part of the solution. But not the entire solution indeed.



 But what does it say about how that gap is to

be bridged:

Le me anticipate. It says that the gap cannot be bridged in any experiential

way. No more than you can bridge the gap between any axiomatic theory on

numbers, and the informal arithmetical truth.




i.e. about the relevance of the *experience* - as distinct

from the bare description - of the 1-p notions, to the unfolding of

the integrated 1-p + 3-p narrative?


Actually the *experiences* are so much relevant that without them, the

physical world would not even exist. Of course I am NOT talking of the human

experiences, but really on all the experiences of all Löbian machines.





Do you

believe that such a "closed" explanation is fundamentally unable to

account seriously for consciousness for the reasons I've cited?  Is

there any way to "re-open" it outside of comp?

Not in a way which is not already provided by comp. But unless you weaken

comp so much as becoming "God", weakening comp does not provide different

clue for solving the consciousness/reality problem.

You may try, but 1500 years of materialism seems to lead only to person

eliminativism. Where comp and its weakening reintroduce automatically a

knower, a feeler, a better, etc.

Can you say anything about the way in which the knower/feeler/ better's

actual *experiences* (as distinct from their bare description) make a

difference to the unfolding of histories in the comp hypothesis?

Yes. The histories emerge from those experiences, and none are formal

object. They are not generated by the UD, only filtered by persons. But like

'meaning' we can approximate them by infinite formal structures. Infinite

structures may look locally syntactical, but they are not. Infinity is

before all things a quale itself. No finite formal things can describe them.

But we can have some informal intuition.


Can

it be shown that qualitative experience is per se indispensable to

giving an adequate account of persons and their histories, thus

avoiding the paradoxes which result from the assumption of the

independent sufficiency of the purely formal descriptions?


Yes. Those experiences are indispensable already in the same sense that the

number 4564310089 is indispensable in arithmetic. It is there. You cannot

say that number theory make sense without that number. Likewise, comp

explains why the experience are there, and why we cannot eliminate them. But

comp provides also a major role to those experiences. Not only they provide

the logic of physics (and the whole physical realities after that), but they

define what persons are, mainly the owner of those experiences. It can give

a role of consciousness: relative self-speeding up of a universal machine

relatively to another probable universal machine. Comp explains why the

consciousness (quale) is needed in that process. See below.




In a sense, this is correct. Materialist seems to be able to use the same

self-reference logic than the one used by the computationalist. But then,

the point is that we are confronted to the measure problem, and the

problem

of the relation between 1-p and 3-p is transformed into a reduction of

the

physical 3-p from and only from the self-reference logic and the

restriction

of 3-p possibilities to the accessible state by the UD. And this works

indeed. In that sense, at the propositional level, it makes sense to say

that the mind-body problem is solved by comp. It remains to see how far

this

works. Is the comp first order logic of the hypostases compatible with

the

empirically observable facts.

Keep in mind that, by the self-reference logic (or even just

self-multiplication), we *already* know why a machine comes to

differentiate

quanta and qualia, and the math describes this precisely. (By the

G*\G-equivalence of Bp with Bp & p, etc). If those comp quanta are the

"real" quanta remains to be assessed, and if it is case, as it seems at

the

propositional level (already mathematically studied) this would support

this

theory of qualia.

Again, the formal differentiation of quanta and qualia, and the math

descriptions thereof, must be distinguished from any possible

consequential role of qualitative experience per se.


I explain below, but the qualitative experiences have a huge impact on

reality, not on the 3-p reality (arithmetic) but on the 1-p (hopefully

plural) realities (intelligible and sensible): they make them appear

relatively to the persons, and they make them stable (right relative measure

(to be sure this remains to be verified)).




 If we are to

take qualia seriously as part of our explanations, they must have a

role distinct from their mere description.


Absolutely so.


 If they do not, we're

faced with a situation in which the same histories are describable in

terms of "qualia" whether actual qualitative states are present or

not.


Yes, but this cannot happen.



 AFAICS this is the unavoidable crux of the HP, and I don't at

this juncture see that it is addressed by comp or indeed any other

approach I've encountered (please forgive me if this is just my

missing the point as usual).


I forgive you. It seems to me that we can understand the comp solution with

just UDA, but it is far more easy with AUDA, where the complexity is reduced

to the understanding of some "known" results in mathematical logic. See

below.



Somehow we need to be able to entertain

a "non-formal" component in the histories to accommodate this issue,

or else conclude that we don't recognise any distinction of role

between formal description and actuality.


Very well said.

We need indeed to entertain such a non formal component, and may be even

many of them.

So here is the solution (in AUDA, I may try later to explain this with just

UDA, but it is more confusing, given the highly counter-intuitive frame).

Actually, there are many non formal components. Let us consider the first

three (primary) 'hypostases" or 'machine-points-of view':

p    (meaning p is true: this will appear to be NON FORMAL)

Bp (meaning "I can prove p", asserted by the machine: this will appear to

be FORMAL)

Bp & p (Meaning "I can prove p, and it is the case that p": this will appear

to be NON FORMAL).

It may looks like a paradox. The logic of (Bp & p) is, at the propositional

level, entirely captured by the formal system S4Grz. Yet, what is captured,

is not a formal object, and it cannot be made formal. It describes the

necessary formal logic of knowledge, but knowledge itself is NOT a formal,

nor formalizable, notion. Yoou can define Bp in the lngauge of the machine,

but you cannot even just define Bp & p in the language of the machine (this

would lead to "0 = 1", by using the diagonalization lemma of Gödel).

It is hard, I think, to be clearer than that. S4Grz is an incredible logic

capturing the formal structure of a concept which is NOT formalizable at

all, nor even nameable, except by a reference to truth, which is itself not

formalizable.

Now, we can restrict 'p' on the sigma_1 true sentences (which correspond to

the accessible state of the machine), and the logic of observability will be

captured by the following logic and their interplay:

Bp & p (again)

Bp & Dt (the logic of the measure 1 on the consistent extension: it can be

made formal, and corresponds roughly to Ploitinus intelligible matter).

Bp & Dt & p (the logic of sensible matter, physical sensation: it cannot

been made formal).

How can we understand those non formal things? Because we are ourselves,

from our first person point of view, non formal things. We are not our body,

nor our Gödel number, still less our indentity cart number, and trough

introspection, perhaps on the Ramana Maharsi koan "Who am I", we can have

some glimpse of how much "we" are really different from any possible

description.

Of course G* proves that all the hypostases are equivalent in the sense that

they access (trivially for the CORRECT machine) the same set of arithmetical

true propositions, but, the machine CANNOT know that, cannot believe that,

cannot feel that, and this G* can also prove. That is why those non formal

components, which are the on-bject of study of the hypostases in which "& p"

appears, plays a so big role in the definition of both sensible person and

sensible realities.

So what I think you may be missing, is that a formal theory (or a machine)

can refer correctly (without knowing that!) to informal notions, and those

informal notions can and does play a role in the very apparition of the

coupling consciousness/realities.

This appears, but less clearly, already in UDA. The non formal components is

bring up at the start, in both Church thesis, which refers to arithmetical

truth, and in the "you" who accepts, or not, the proposition of the doctor.

But UDA does not explain consciousness. It explains only that linking the

non formal notion of consciousness to a formal object (the computations)

entails the reversal physics/machine-theology/psychology. AUDA, eliminates

somehow the indexical reference to "you", and replace it by a universal

(Löbian) machine. But then the incompleteness phenomena, shows that the

logic of consciousness (or first person) will be different of the logic of

what you link the consciousness too. This appears in UDA at step 7, where

you see that the physical machine (brain) is eventually provided by a

measure on 1-person notions, which cannot be formalizable at all, and bear

on infinities of computations.

It remains only one mystery: the informal notion of number theoretical

truth. But this again, accepting the truth (non formal) of elementary

arithmetical proposition, provides an explanation why, we will never been

able to solve that mystery. So comp solves the consciousness reality problem

as far as it is possible to solve it.

This can also be tackled formally, and it can be shown that the whole of

physics (assuming comp) is eventually PI_2 complete IN arithmetical truth

(that is, with Arithmetical truth as oracle). This is far beyond any

effective complete theory. Even "God" (arithmetical truth) cannot answer all

physical questions!

Now, given that most Löban machine are as clever as you and me, you may

still believe that there is a paradox. After all, when studying the theology

of a correct machine, we know that Bp and Bp & p are equivalent. But the key

point is that no machine can know this about herself, so its qualia will

obey a different logic from its quanta. We just don't know our own truth

notion, we cannot even name it. That is why we can only lift the theology of

the correct machine on ourselves through an act of faith (like betting on a

substitution level). But it remains a theology, which is of course not

"close" syntactically. It points on three informal things God (truth), the

universal soul (Bp & p) and the sensible matter (Bp & Dt & p). from this

emerge the fabric of reality, in a sufficiently precise way as to be tested.

I think you are confusing simply a theory and what a theory is about. It is

very rare that a theory captures the thing it talks about. It capture tiny

aspects of it. The comp theory is conceptually complete by referring to

those (mathematically necessarily INFORMAL) notions, in both UDA and AUDA.

I hope this help. I think your confusion is simple, but we use the

distinction theory/model in a very complex setting, where simple confusion

can easily be obscured by the complexity of the subject. I tend to believe

that almost all errors in philosophy or theology comes either from a

confusion between the hypostases, or from between theories and their

intended semantics.

Did this helped?

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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