On 21 March 2010 19:50, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

Bruno, I've been continuing to pummel my brain, on and off, about the
issues in this thread, and also reading and thinking about different
perspectives on the "knowledge paradox" (such as Gregg Rosenberg's).
If I may, let me put some thoughts to you in a slightly different way
than heretofore.

The apparent paradox, as we've discussed, seems to stem from the fact
that - whether we derive this insight from comp, or even from
mathematical physics - we seem as persons to be restricted to using
formal processes in respect of what we are able to represent, think or
communicate.  Nevertheless we are justifiably convinced, beyond this,
that we have first-person access to further non-formal properties of
our situation, despite the fact that these seem to be utterly
inexpressible, either to ourselves or to others ("Wovon man nicht
sprechen kann, darüber muß man schweigen.").  This seems to pose at
least the following questions:

1. How can the existence (though not the intrinsic nature) of putative
non-formal properties be recognisable - indeed representable - in some
way to otherwise purely formal reasoning mechanisms, and form the
basis of our apparent references to them?  This is a critical matter
that - in terms of comp - you appear to address with respect to the
characteristics of particular logical systems, an aspect that BTW
doesn't seem to be widely appreciated in the philosophical literature
in this connection.

2. How are we to regard the status of such "privileged" non-formal
properties, given that they don't appear directly to motivate our
apparent judgements about them (which presumably are actually about
their formal analogues)?  Is first-person consciousness of such
properties to be regarded as an aspect of epistemology (i.e. as
somehow adding to the knowledge, though apparently not the behavioural
repertoire, of the person); or is it more properly a fact of ontology
(i.e. reflecting in some way the "existential commitment" of the
person)?  Or does it somehow partake of both aspects?

3. Finally, are we to understand the totality of our experience as in
some way the convergence of the formal and non-formal aspects of our
situation in a mutually dependent relation?  That is, in the sense
that the formal aspect arises ultimately out of - or in terms of - a
non-formalisable background, which in turn only achieves
differentiation and "personalisation" when caught in the "net" of the
formal.

The above thoughts seem to me to go some way to resolving, at least in
my own mind, the knowledge "paradox", in a non-paradoxical way.  I'm
least clear, however, on the details of what is implied in point 1
above: i.e. the crucial aspect of how the non-formal gets caught in
the "net" of the formal).  It must be frustrating for you if you feel
you have already explained this on numerous occasions - but I suspect
there are very specific aspects of the logics you have mentioned
heretofore which must be absorbed in close detail to drive this point
home intuitively (as I say, there seems to be little appreciation of
this in the literature).  I feel this is the final step I need in
order to achieve a logically compelling solution to this nagging
problem.

David

>
> On 20 Mar 2010, at 21:34, David Nyman wrote:
>
>> On 20 March 2010 18:22, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>>
>>> Well, if by 3-p Chalmers you mean some 'body', such a body *is* a zombie.
>>> The 1-p Chalmers is Chalmers, the person. Its body does not think, but
>>> makes
>>> higher the probability that the 1-p thoughts refers to the most probable
>>> computations you are sharing with him.
>>
>> Well, if its body does not think (which of course Chalmers assumes
>> that it does, even though he says from his epiphenomenalist-dualist
>> standpoint that this does not logically entail consciousness), just
>> how does it increase the probabilities in the way you say above?
>
>
> That is what uda is all about. It shows that your current next 1-state is
> determined by all the universal UD-computations, which are going through the
> infinitely many 3-states corresponding (by comp) to that 1-state;
> equivalently, by an infinite set of number theoretical relations, which
> happen to be true.
>
>
>
>
>>  IOW,
>> what is the systematic correlation supposed to be between the
>> "physical events" in its brain and the 1-p thoughts of 1-p Chalmers?
>
> The 1-p thoughts are associated to the infinitely many computations (in UD*)
> leading to the 3-p states.
> The next 1-p thought depends on the most probable "type" of computations.
> Probably there is a special role for deep and linear computation, to make
> duplication contagious from individual to population of individuals. But
> this has to be confirmed from a reasonable definition of knowledge,
> observation, ... , like the Theaetetical variants of G and G*.
>
>
>
>> This, after all, is a major aspect of  the mind<-->body problem, and
>> it's one thing for the explanation to be counter-intuitive, but right
>> now I'm not sure I could claim any firm intuition about it at all.
>
>
> I am not sure at all what you still feel missing. Once you get the "local"
> 1-indeterminacy, steps 8 and 7, entails a global and constant
> 1-indeterminacy on all the UD states, or on all sigma_1 true sentences
> weighted by their proofs. Those states and computations are "there", like
> the little Mandebrot sets exists in the Mandelbrot set. It is a shock like
> DeWitt said that Everett is a "shock". "matter" here and now, as perceived,
> is determined by a limit on UD's work.
>
>
>
>>
>> Let me try to tease this out, giving your words, as you say, their
>> most favourable interpretation - for me, that is.  By "the
>> computations you are sharing with him" I assume you to refer to the
>> 1-p-plural computations (as you reserve 3-p for the arithmetical
>> reality).
>
> One "1-plural computation" is a  computation containing many interacting
> lobian machines. An emulation of heisenberg matrix or the universal wave
> provides examples. Note that the UD generates among its computations such
> quantum rational evolution, but the limit one we are confronted with may be
> define on the reals or complex numbers. The question becomes why does
> quantum computation or topology wins with respect to the observable
> world(s).
>
>
>
>>  IOW the UD generates (amongst everything else) the
>> 1-p-plural appearances that constitute all possible perceptions of our
>> "shared environment" in all its possible extensions.
>
> I would not say that. The UD generates none experience, for the experiences
> are statistically defined from inside, and bears on the whole "actual" UD*
> (or the Sigma_1 arithmetical truth with their proofs).
>
>
>
>
>> Included in
>> these, of course, are our bodies,
>
>
> or many relative state-bodies. But our 1-perception of those bodies are sum
> on all computations in UD*.
>
>
>
>
>
>> and we expect - pace white rabbits -
>> our bodily activities (including, naturally, our brains) to be
>> consistent with our thoughts and with the behaviour of the rest of the
>> environment.
>
> We hope to rely on some stable probable universal system.
> Comp makes it independent of the base phi_i (and thus independent of the
> choice quantum/classical). To choose the quantum one is treachery, as far as
> we are interested in the consciousnesss/reality problem.
>
>
>
>>
>> Nonetheless, presumably it is the case that there are "white rabbit"
>> extensions in which my response to the pain of being burned is to do
>> something pathological such as thrust my hand further into the flame.
>> But the effect in experience of even a high measure of divergent
>> pathological extensions is hypothesised as being damped by the
>> convergence of "normal" behavioural extensions (maybe corresponding to
>> some version of the least action principle, a la Feynman - and perhaps
>> illuminating also the unreasonable a posteriori effectiveness of
>> Occam).
>
> Yes, Feynman solved the "white rabbit" quantum problem. But with comp it
> remains to be solve. Does the S4Grz1, Z1* and X1* logic impose some Gleason
> theorem and unicity of measure? Open problems (only encouraging results in
> that direction).
>
>
>
>> So the effect is to make it very much more likely that my
>> actions will be consistent with my thoughts, including the actions of
>> my brain.
>
> Basically this is why we have to postulate Dt or ~Bf. In the Kripke
> semantics, this consists in abstracting oneself from the cul-de-sac worlds.
> By incompleteness it make truth (t) already not observable: Bt & Dt is not
> proved by G (PA, Löbian machine). But it is true by G*. The ideally correct
> machine observes truth but cannot assert it.
>
>
>
>>  Does this mean that there may be "white rabbit" extensions
>> in which the behaviour of my brain is grossly inconsistent with my
>> thoughts?  I suppose so.
>
> This does not make sense. You are where an infinity of computations
> transported you. Those are real objects (that you can see as numbers or
> infinite sequence of numbers,  + random oracle may be (by dovetailing on the
> reals).
>
> Your probable brains cannot be inconsistent with your thought, because you
> are where your brains obtained those thoughts, by comp definition (or
> comp-supervenience). A computation is not an a trivial object, and the UD
> contains many "malin génies". The observable is a sum on all those fictions.
>
> To hunt those 'génies' away, the "Matter exists" of the Aristotelian is not
> more convincing than the "God is good" of Descartes. It *is* the correct
> basic idea though, but it is exactly that good idea that comp makes computer
> science the tool for expressing (if only) the problem.
>
>>
>> In this view, the concept of causation, if it is valid at all, must be
>> reserved for the 3-p arithmetical operators - for the internal
>> computational relations themselves.
>
> OK. So there is no causation in the usual sense, but relations among
> numbers, and some relations makes some universal numbers describing their
> probable histories in term of causations, correctly, above their
> substitution level.
>
>
>
>> The higher-order relations
>> between computations are rather correlative, and the appearance of
>> causation in the correlative domain that we inhabit is that of
>> consistency with expectation - normal, or non-pathological behaviour,
>
> Yes. Thanks to the 1-indeterminacy and the ultra redundancy of the Universal
> Dovetailing.
>
>
>
>
>> IOW.  So it isn't a case of the brain causing thoughts, or thoughts
>> causing the brain, but rather a question of which thoughts emerge as
>> being consistent with which brains.
>
> You can say so. There is indeed a sort of Galois connection between
> consciousness/computations; like there is between, models/theories and
> surfaces/equations. The UD defines an implicit consciousness flow, and we
> live in the limit of it (by first person invariance with respect to the
> UD-time-steps).
>
>
>
>
>>  The remarkable thing then would
>> be that we seem to find ourselves only in situations where most
>> (perhaps all) brains are consistent with most (perhaps all) thoughts.
>> The dreams of the machines, finally, seem to have converged on shared
>> "physical" universes of staggering complexity and consistency.
>
> Indeed. And then computability theory and self-reference logic explains the
> how and why, and also makes things consistent and more precise, even if a
> bit of the type "toy". It is the ideal case of the self-referentially
> correct machine, and its universality (and lobianity) entails already quite
> a mess in arithmetical platonia.
>
>
>
>>
>> Is this anything like what you were trying to convey (interpreted
>> favourably, of course)?
>
> I think so. My point is that once you say "yes" to the digital doctor, it
> has to be like that. We have to extend darwinism to derive physics from the
> arithmetical self-referential abilities of the numbers swarm.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>>> On 20 Mar 2010, at 16:56, David Nyman wrote:
>>>
>>>> On 24 February 2010 17:57, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Please, keep in mind I may miss your point, even if I prefer to say
>>>>> that
>>>>> you
>>>>> are missing something, for being shorter and keeping to the point. You
>>>>> really put your finger right on the hardest part of the mind-body
>>>>> problem.
>>>>
>>>> Bruno, I've been continuing to think, and meditate, about our recent
>>>> discussions, and have been re-reading (insofar as I can follow it)
>>>> your on-line paper "Computation, Consciousness and the Quantum".  I
>>>> feel I have more of a sense of how the aspects I've been questioning
>>>> you about fit together in the comp view, but if I may, I would like to
>>>> press you on a couple of points.
>>>>
>>>> My original post on "non-computability" was motivated by re-reading
>>>> Chalmers and struggling again with his assertion that a zombie (e.g.
>>>> including the "3-p Chalmers" that wrote The Conscious Mind!) could
>>>> nonetheless refer to "consciousness" and hence be behaviourally
>>>> indistinguishable from a conscious entity.
>>>
>>> So you talk here on the philosophical zombie which is counterfactually
>>> correct.
>>> Well, if by 3-p Chalmers you mean some 'body', such a body *is* a zombie.
>>> The 1-p Chalmers is Chalmers, the person. Its body does not think, but
>>> makes
>>> higher the probability that the 1-p thoughts refers to the most probable
>>> computations you are sharing with him.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>  I realise, by the way,
>>>> that when considering thought experiments, including your own, one
>>>> should not treat them in a naively realistic way, but rather focus on
>>>> their logical implications.
>>>
>>> Indeed! Absolutely so. I thought this was obvious (it should be for
>>> deductive philosophers).
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> The problem with Chalmers' logic seems to
>>>> me to be that he has to assume that his zombie will have formal access
>>>> to what AFAICS are non-formalisable states.
>>>
>>> Well, assuming comp, if the zombie has the "right" computer in its skull,
>>> it
>>> has access to the non formalisable propositions, notions, 1-states etc.
>>> (the
>>> 3-states are always formal).
>>> But if the zombie skull is empty, then its counterfactual correctness is
>>> just magical, and it makes no sense to say it accesses some states or
>>> not.
>>> There are no 1-person state (because it is a zombie), nor 3-person state,
>>> because there is no digital machine in its (local) body.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>  Now, in CC&Q, and in
>>>> discussion, you appear to say that Lobian machines can in fact refer
>>>> formally to what is non-formalisable.  This could at first glance seem
>>>> to support Chalmers' argument (which I assume is not your intention)
>>>> unless you also mean that the formal consequences ("extensions") of
>>>> such non-formalisable references would somehow be characteristically
>>>> different in the absence of the non-formal aspect (i.e. zombie-land
>>>> would in fact look very different).  IOW, consciousness should give
>>>> the appearance of exerting a "causal influence" on the physical, in
>>>> (naive) everyday terms.
>>>
>>> Yes indeed. Except that "appearance" applies on the "physical". The
>>> "causal"
>>> is the real thing, here, and it is incarnated, or implemented with
>>> infinite
>>> redundancy (like the M set) in elementary arithmetic.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>> In CC&Q you point out that "we must not forget that the extensions
>>>> must not only be consistent, but must also be accessible by the
>>>> universal dovetailer".  Hence, which extensions are accessible by a
>>>> conscious (non-formalisable) decision-maker would appear nonetheless
>>>> to be formalisable.
>>>
>>> Indeed, by the UD, or by that tiny (but sigma_1 complete) fragment of
>>> arithmetic, like Robinson arithmetic. It does not need to be Löbian. The
>>> UD
>>> is NOT a Löbian entity. It is much logically poorer.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> Again, my question is: how would the range of
>>>> accessible extensions for a zombie (purely formal) decision-maker be
>>>> characteristically different?  For example, you cite the
>>>> "self-speeding-up" effect of consciousness with respect to the
>>>> organism's relation to its "neighbourhood" as a pragmatic argument for
>>>> the selective utility of consciousness.  I assume this implies that a
>>>> conscious decision-maker would be likely to find itself in
>>>> characteristically different extensions to its "environment" as
>>>> compared with a non-conscious decision-maker, but some clarification
>>>> on this would be very helpful.
>>>
>>> This is not entirely clear for me. For a non-conscious decision-maker,
>>> there
>>> is just no sense at all to say that he could find itself (in the first
>>> person sense) in some particular environment.
>>> There is a sense in which it can find itself in the third person sense,
>>> in
>>> some particular environment, but consciousness is a first person notion,
>>> and
>>> it makes sense only when you ascribe it to the (genuine) abstract
>>> computational states occurring infinitely often in the UD*. It makes
>>> sense
>>> for a first person to find itself in an infinite ensemble of
>>> computations/continuations.
>>>
>>> Empirically we share a lot of very similar computations, and this makes
>>> us
>>> believe that physics describes some local 3-reality, but comp makes it
>>> describe only a sharable infinite set of computations: physics become a
>>> first person plural notion. The MWI confirms this by making the
>>> duplication
>>> contagious. Populations of machines are self-multiplied.  The global
>>> 3-reality does not have to be more complex than numbers (with + and *).
>>> The
>>> physical reality is an internal first person plural aspect of the
>>> universal
>>> machine ignorance. (Modelized in AUDA by Bp & Dt (p sigma_1)).
>>>
>>> I know the picture is counter-intuitive. Löbian machine can explain why,
>>> assuming comp, it *has* to be counterintuitive. There is a natural
>>> (explainable) tension between all the hypostases, including some
>>> unbridgeable gaps. That's why souls fall, and eventually build 'matter'.
>>> It
>>> is not yet clear to me if 'matter' prevents them or helps them to go back
>>> to
>>> their natural harmonic "divine" (true, original) state. Probably both are
>>> correct.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>> On 23 Feb 2010, at 22:05, David Nyman wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Bruno, I want to thank you for such a complete commentary on my recent
>>>>> posts - I will need to spend quite a bit of time thinking carefully
>>>>> about everything you have said before I respond at length.
>>>>>
>>>>> Thanks for your attention, David.
>>>>> Please, keep in mind I may miss your point, even if I prefer to say
>>>>> that
>>>>> you
>>>>> are missing something, for being shorter and keeping to the point. You
>>>>> really put your finger right on the hardest part of the mind-body
>>>>> problem.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>  I'm sure
>>>>> that I'm quite capable of becoming confused between a theory and its
>>>>> subject, though I am of course alive to the distinction.  In the
>>>>> meantime, I wonder if you could respond to a supplementary question in
>>>>> "grandmother" mode, or at least translate for grandma, into a more
>>>>> every-day way of speaking, the parts of your commentary that are most
>>>>> relevant to her interest in this topic.
>>>>>
>>>>> I am a bit panicking, because you may be asking for something
>>>>> impossible.
>>>>> How to explain in *intuitive every-day terms* (cf grandmother) what is
>>>>> provably counter-intuitive for any ideally perfect Löbian entity?
>>>>> Bohr said that to say we understand quantum mechanics, means that we
>>>>> don't
>>>>> understand.
>>>>> Comp says this with a revenge: it proves that there is necessarily an
>>>>> unbridgeable gap. You will not believe it, not understand it, nor know
>>>>> it
>>>>> to
>>>>> be true, without losing consistency and soundness. But you may
>>>>> understand
>>>>> completely while assuming comp it has to be like that.
>>>>> But I will try to help grandma.
>>>>>
>>>>> Let us suppose that, to use the example I have already cited, that
>>>>> grandma puts her hand in a flame, feels the unbearable agony of
>>>>> burning, and is unable to prevent herself from withdrawing her hand
>>>>> with a shriek of pain.
>>>>>
>>>>> OK.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>  Let us further suppose (though of course this
>>>>> may well be ambiguous in the current state of neurological theory)
>>>>> that a complete and sufficient 3-p description of this (partial)
>>>>> history of events is also possible in terms of nerve firings,
>>>>> cognitive and motor processing, etc. (the details are not so important
>>>>> as the belief that such a complete history could be given).
>>>>>
>>>>> OK. (for the moment)
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> From the
>>>>> point of view of the reversal of the relation between 1-p and 3-p in
>>>>> comp, is there some way to help grandma how to understand the
>>>>> *necessary relation* (i.e. what she would conventionally understand as
>>>>> "causal relation") between her 1-p *experience* of the pain (as
>>>>> distinct from our observation of her reaction) and whatever 3-p events
>>>>> are posterior to this in the history?  For example, what would be
>>>>> distinctively missing from the causal sequence had she been
>>>>> unconscious and had merely withdrawn her hand reflexively?
>>>>>
>>>>> Your example may not be so good, because in such situation, the
>>>>> withdrawning
>>>>> of the hand is in general done by reflex. But let us assume, she
>>>>> concentrates and decide to remove the hand by "her own will".
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I suppose this amounts to a repetition of the question - how is the
>>>>> *painful experience* itself causally indispensable to the 3-p events
>>>>> we associate with it?
>>>>>
>>>>> In other discussions I have often criticize the notion of causality
>>>>> (but
>>>>> not
>>>>> of will).
>>>>> But as far as the local physics is explained by comp,  causal relations
>>>>> can
>>>>> have some local sense. In the big picture, wher we are NOT living,
>>>>> eventually such causal relations are just shortening of arithmetical
>>>>> relation, where the only cause can be reduced to formal implications.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>  I seem to see that in a sense, given the comp
>>>>> reversal of the relation between physics and consciousness, the 3-p
>>>>> events do indeed "emerge" out of the pain.
>>>>>
>>>>> Hmm... OK.
>>>>> I could say to grandmother that pain and sensation itself exists in
>>>>> platonia, indeed it is when a representation intersects with truth.
>>>>> In a sense, a G* sense, only God (Truth) "feels pain", and the
>>>>> infinitely
>>>>> many grandmother's bodies makes it possible for God to lessen the pain
>>>>> relatively to the normal stories, if all goes well ...
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> But this still seems to
>>>>> beg the question: how do the 3-p events depend on the brute fact of
>>>>> the *painfulness* of the pain, as opposed to the objective *existence*
>>>>> of an infinity of computations?
>>>>>
>>>>> Because in the infinity of computations, infinitely many
>>>>> self-referential
>>>>> entities emerges, and that, from their first person (sensible) point of
>>>>> view
>>>>> (Bp & p & Dt, their beliefs intersects the truth (God, "p"), and matter
>>>>> (Dt)). This makes consciousness channeling on the normal story.
>>>>> Pain, in that story,  is intuitively "self-referentially" correct. I
>>>>> would
>>>>> say to grandmother pain is God's message to Itself: Ouch. Or to
>>>>> Grandma:
>>>>> "Don't do that, do anything you can to extract your self (and body)
>>>>> from
>>>>> that situation, etc.
>>>>> A pathological pain, like feeling burned by water, would diminished
>>>>> your
>>>>> probability to survive in a normal story. Like a pathological pleasure.
>>>>> If
>>>>> someone feel exquisitely well in a *very* hot bath, it may diminish its
>>>>> "probability of normal life".
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>  I realise that this is a very strange
>>>>> question, and it may indeed stem from some confusion of theory and
>>>>> topic as you suggest.  Could you possibly mean - perhaps this is
>>>>> implied in the term "objective idealism" - that the indescribable
>>>>> background of the infinity of computations ultimately has no
>>>>> independently "objective" existence - i.e. that it is fundamentally
>>>>> the very same kind of existent that ultimately emerges in the
>>>>> qualitative experience of subjects?  And then that the 3-p histories
>>>>> are the "quasi-objective" component of this subjectivity (with the
>>>>> crucial caveat that access to such "objectivity" can't in itself ever
>>>>> give any subject complete *knowledge* of their situation)?
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> By interpreting favorably all your terms, it makes sense, yes.
>>>>>
>>>>> Instead of "quasi-objective", for the "3-p histories", I think
>>>>> "inter-subjective" is more adequate. Instead of 3-p, I would say here
>>>>> 1-p-p
>>>>> (first person plural). (Usually I use 3-p histories for the
>>>>> computations,
>>>>> not necessarily viewed from some perspective. The "3-p physical" is
>>>>> internal
>>>>> to the 1-1-p)
>>>>> Also, when you say "is the very same kind of existent that ultimately
>>>>> emerge", well, you are right at the G* level, but wrong, if you think
>>>>> this
>>>>> is a theorem or even an admissible axiom. If we lift the Löbian
>>>>> theology
>>>>> on
>>>>> us, we can understand why that equivalence need an act of faith, which
>>>>> I
>>>>> think, is entailed by the conscientious choice to say yes - qua
>>>>> computatio"
>>>>> to a mechanist doctor.
>>>>> The belief that 17 is prime, is a subjective experience? You get by
>>>>> playing
>>>>> with IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII, and trying to cut it in equal part.
>>>>> You can consider that an axiomatic theory, or an ideally correct löbian
>>>>> machine is a reservoir, a set, of subjective beliefs. You can see 0, 1
>>>>> 2,
>>>>> 3,
>>>>> ... as elementary ideas, the axioms as elementary subjective
>>>>> constructions
>>>>> or primitive beliefs, the rules of inference as beliefs preserving
>>>>> transformations, and the model(s) or Truth(s) are what those beliefs
>>>>> are
>>>>> all
>>>>> about.
>>>>> The self-reference logics provide then tools for finding the fixed
>>>>> point
>>>>> of
>>>>> self-introspection by (Löbian) machines. Qualia appears at the
>>>>> intersection
>>>>> of the (Löbian) Belief, with (Löbian) truth and (Löbian) consistency,
>>>>> or,
>>>>> in
>>>>> Plotinus term, Man, God and and the Indeterminate. (Via the
>>>>> arithmetical
>>>>> interpretation of Plotinus).
>>>>> It seems to me you get the point or are very near. You explain it very
>>>>> well
>>>>> to grandmother.
>>>>> Don't hesitate to criticize my favorable interpretation of the terms,
>>>>> or
>>>>> to
>>>>> ask for precision. It is very helpful.
>>>>> Bruno
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On 23 February 2010 14:18, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> David,
>>>>>
>>>>> First of all, as I have already said, you seem to be well aware of the
>>>>>
>>>>> hardest part of the hard problem of consciousness. And this gives me
>>>>> the
>>>>>
>>>>> opportunity to try to explain what you are missing. Indeed, in this
>>>>> post,
>>>>> I
>>>>>
>>>>> will try to explain how comp does solve completely the conceptual hard
>>>>>
>>>>> problem of consciousness. (With the usual price that physics  becomes a
>>>>>
>>>>> branch of machine's theology).
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On 22 Feb 2010, at 15:00, David Nyman wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> On 22 February 2010 07:37, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> What do you mean by "implicit" here? What is implicit is that the
>>>>>
>>>>> subjectivity (1-p), to make sense, has to be referentially correct
>>>>>
>>>>> relatively to the most probable histories/consistent extensions.
>>>>>
>>>>> What I mean by implicit is "already accounted for", at least according
>>>>>
>>>>> to the assumptions of the closed 3-p hypothesis, which of course is
>>>>>
>>>>> what I'm questioning.
>>>>>
>>>>> Then the incommunicable and private aspect of those knowledge and
>>>>> qualia
>>>>>
>>>>> is
>>>>>
>>>>> provided by the theory of knowledge and the quale logic, provided by
>>>>> the
>>>>>
>>>>> respective intensional variant of G and G*. The difference between G
>>>>> and
>>>>>
>>>>> G*
>>>>>
>>>>> (provable and true) is reflected in those intensional variant.
>>>>>
>>>>> Yes, but G and G*, and indeed all formally expressible logics, are
>>>>>
>>>>> themselves closed 3-p (i.e. objective) notions - i.e. they would exist
>>>>>
>>>>> and possess the same explanatory power in the absence of any
>>>>>
>>>>> accompanying *qualitative* component.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I am not sure what you mean exactly by closed 3-p or even objective.
>>>>> But
>>>>> it
>>>>>
>>>>> is OK (I see it is a minor question of vocabulary).
>>>>>
>>>>> G and G* are formal modal logics, and it happens that they describe
>>>>>
>>>>> completely (at some level) the self-referential discourse of ideally
>>>>>
>>>>> self-referentially correct machines.
>>>>>
>>>>> We have no interest in those formal theories per se, if it were not for
>>>>>
>>>>> their semantics, including their interpretations in arithmetic, and
>>>>> their
>>>>>
>>>>> intensional variants.
>>>>>
>>>>> I come back on this below.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>  This is just another way of
>>>>>
>>>>> gesturing towards the Really Hard Problem - that the qualitative
>>>>>
>>>>> component, per se, is seemingly redundant to the account if we assume
>>>>>
>>>>> we already have a closed, or sufficient, non-qualitative explanation.
>>>>>
>>>>> Consequently these logics AFAICS lead to the same paradoxical
>>>>>
>>>>> conclusions as the closed 3-p physical hypothesis - i.e. that the
>>>>>
>>>>> references to qualitative experiences - even those references we
>>>>>
>>>>> ourselves produce - would occur even in the absence of any such
>>>>>
>>>>> experiences.  This would leave us in the position of doubting the
>>>>>
>>>>> basis even of our own statements that we are conscious!
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> And this would be very paradoxical indeed. But you are wrong in saying
>>>>> that
>>>>>
>>>>> those logics lead to those paradoxes. Probably because you are wrong in
>>>>>
>>>>> saying that those logics are "closed".  Those logic are tools or
>>>>> systems
>>>>>
>>>>> talking about *something*, provably in some correct sense. More below.
>>>>> I
>>>>>
>>>>> prefer to read first your whole post, so that I can avoid confusing
>>>>>
>>>>> repetitions.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I want to seriously discuss the proposition that certain behaviours
>>>>>
>>>>> are actually contingent on qualitative experience, as distinguished
>>>>>
>>>>> from any accompanying 3-p phenomena.  That is, for example, that my
>>>>>
>>>>> withdrawing my hand from the fire because it hurts indispensably
>>>>>
>>>>> requires the qualitative *experience* of pain to mediate between 1-p
>>>>>
>>>>> and 3-p narratives.  This would of course mean in turn that the
>>>>>
>>>>> explanatory arc from stimulus, through cognitive processing, to
>>>>>
>>>>> response would be, without the qualitative component, in some way
>>>>>
>>>>> demonstrably incomplete as an explanation.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Indeed. May be it would help to remember that with comp, we already
>>>>> know
>>>>>
>>>>> that the physical world is a 1-p construct; It is not 3-p (as amazing
>>>>> as
>>>>>
>>>>> this could seem for a materialist). The only 3-p is given by
>>>>>
>>>>> arithmetic/logic/computer science.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>  ISTM that this would make
>>>>>
>>>>> it impossible to ignore the implication that the context in which we
>>>>>
>>>>> conceive 3-p processes to be situated (whether we are talking in terms
>>>>>
>>>>> of their physical or mathematical-logical expression) would itself be
>>>>>
>>>>> capable of taking on "personal" characteristics in apparent
>>>>>
>>>>> interaction with such processes.
>>>>>
>>>>> Something related to this, ISTM, is already implied in the background
>>>>>
>>>>> to 1-p indeterminacy, observer moments, the "solipsism of the One"
>>>>>
>>>>> etc, because all these notions implicitly contain the idea of some
>>>>>
>>>>> general context capable of embodying and individuating "personal"
>>>>>
>>>>> qualitative experience - given relevant 3-p-describable structure and
>>>>>
>>>>> function.  But in order for that personhood not to be vacuous - i.e.
>>>>>
>>>>> redundant to the supposedly primary 3-p narrative - such personal
>>>>>
>>>>> qualitative states must be conceived as having consequences, otherwise
>>>>>
>>>>> inexplicable, in the 3-p domain, and not merely vice-versa.  How to
>>>>>
>>>>> incorporate such consequences in the overall account is indeed a
>>>>>
>>>>> puzzle.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> A puzzle? No more ... (see below).
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Not only can't we prove it, but we couldn't, from a 3-p pov, even
>>>>>
>>>>> predict or in any way characterise such 1-p notions, if we didn't know
>>>>>
>>>>> from a 1-p perspective that they exist (or seem to know that they seem
>>>>>
>>>>> to exist).
>>>>>
>>>>> This is not true I think. Already with the uda duplication experience,
>>>>>
>>>>> you
>>>>>
>>>>> can see predict the difference, for example, the apparition of first
>>>>>
>>>>> person
>>>>>
>>>>> indeterminacy despite the determinacy in the 3d description. This is
>>>>>
>>>>> captured by the difference between (Bp and p) and Bp, and that
>>>>> difference
>>>>>
>>>>> is
>>>>>
>>>>> a consequence of incompleteness, when self-observing occurs.
>>>>>
>>>>> I don't deny what you're saying per se, but I'm commenting on this
>>>>>
>>>>> because it brings out, I hope, the distinction between purely formal
>>>>>
>>>>> descriptions of 1-p notions, and actual first-personal acquaintance
>>>>>
>>>>> with qualitative experience.
>>>>>
>>>>> I think you are confusing a theory or a machine discourse WITH the
>>>>> subject
>>>>>
>>>>> matter of the theory, or the object of discourse of the machine. In
>>>>> that
>>>>>
>>>>> sense formal theory (sufficiently rich to talk on numbers) are already
>>>>> NEVER
>>>>>
>>>>> closed in your sense. Arithmetical TRUTH, which plays a key role here
>>>>> is
>>>>> NOT
>>>>>
>>>>> a formal object. Indeed it is a provably non formalizable object.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>  It's the latter that I'm claiming is
>>>>>
>>>>> non-computable from any formal premise
>>>>>
>>>>> You are entirely right here. Both "I", and the Löbian machine agree
>>>>> with
>>>>>
>>>>> you.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> (which, as I think we'd both
>>>>>
>>>>> agree, is the essence of the HP).
>>>>>
>>>>> OK. In which case you will see how that problem is solved.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> It's one thing to say that
>>>>>
>>>>> "self-observing occurs", and quite another to actually experience
>>>>>
>>>>> self-observing.  But beyond this, ISTM that we must also believe that
>>>>>
>>>>> the *experience* of self-observing entails consequences that the mere
>>>>>
>>>>> *description* of "self-observing" would not, to avoid the paradoxes
>>>>>
>>>>> contingent on the idea that qualitative experiences are somehow
>>>>>
>>>>> redundant or merely "epiphenomenal".
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> OK.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> One of the
>>>>>
>>>>> places it leads (which ISTM some are anxious not to acknowledge)) is
>>>>>
>>>>> the kind of brute paradox I've referred to.  So what I'm asking you is
>>>>>
>>>>> how is this different from a comp perspective?  Can our 3-p references
>>>>>
>>>>> to 1-p phenomena escape paradox in the comp analysis?
>>>>>
>>>>> Yes, because we do accept the truth of elementary arithmetic. We can
>>>>>
>>>>> study
>>>>>
>>>>> the theology of simple (and thus *intuitively* correct) Löbian machine.
>>>>>
>>>>> We
>>>>>
>>>>> *know* in that setting that the machine will be aware of an explanation
>>>>>
>>>>> gap,
>>>>>
>>>>> etc.
>>>>>
>>>>> Again, the price is that we have to recover physics without introducing
>>>>> a
>>>>>
>>>>> 3-p physical world.
>>>>>
>>>>> I see that it is already important that comp predicts the *existence*
>>>>>
>>>>> of an explanatory gap.
>>>>>
>>>>> It is a part of the solution. But not the entire solution indeed.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>  But what does it say about how that gap is to
>>>>>
>>>>> be bridged:
>>>>>
>>>>> Le me anticipate. It says that the gap cannot be bridged in any
>>>>> experiential
>>>>>
>>>>> way. No more than you can bridge the gap between any axiomatic theory
>>>>> on
>>>>>
>>>>> numbers, and the informal arithmetical truth.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> i.e. about the relevance of the *experience* - as distinct
>>>>>
>>>>> from the bare description - of the 1-p notions, to the unfolding of
>>>>>
>>>>> the integrated 1-p + 3-p narrative?
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Actually the *experiences* are so much relevant that without them, the
>>>>>
>>>>> physical world would not even exist. Of course I am NOT talking of the
>>>>> human
>>>>>
>>>>> experiences, but really on all the experiences of all Löbian machines.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Do you
>>>>>
>>>>> believe that such a "closed" explanation is fundamentally unable to
>>>>>
>>>>> account seriously for consciousness for the reasons I've cited?  Is
>>>>>
>>>>> there any way to "re-open" it outside of comp?
>>>>>
>>>>> Not in a way which is not already provided by comp. But unless you
>>>>> weaken
>>>>>
>>>>> comp so much as becoming "God", weakening comp does not provide
>>>>> different
>>>>>
>>>>> clue for solving the consciousness/reality problem.
>>>>>
>>>>> You may try, but 1500 years of materialism seems to lead only to person
>>>>>
>>>>> eliminativism. Where comp and its weakening reintroduce automatically a
>>>>>
>>>>> knower, a feeler, a better, etc.
>>>>>
>>>>> Can you say anything about the way in which the knower/feeler/better's
>>>>>
>>>>> actual *experiences* (as distinct from their bare description) make a
>>>>>
>>>>> difference to the unfolding of histories in the comp hypothesis?
>>>>>
>>>>> Yes. The histories emerge from those experiences, and none are formal
>>>>>
>>>>> object. They are not generated by the UD, only filtered by persons. But
>>>>> like
>>>>>
>>>>> 'meaning' we can approximate them by infinite formal structures.
>>>>> Infinite
>>>>>
>>>>> structures may look locally syntactical, but they are not. Infinity is
>>>>>
>>>>> before all things a quale itself. No finite formal things can describe
>>>>> them.
>>>>>
>>>>> But we can have some informal intuition.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Can
>>>>>
>>>>> it be shown that qualitative experience is per se indispensable to
>>>>>
>>>>> giving an adequate account of persons and their histories, thus
>>>>>
>>>>> avoiding the paradoxes which result from the assumption of the
>>>>>
>>>>> independent sufficiency of the purely formal descriptions?
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Yes. Those experiences are indispensable already in the same sense that
>>>>> the
>>>>>
>>>>> number 4564310089 is indispensable in arithmetic. It is there. You
>>>>> cannot
>>>>>
>>>>> say that number theory make sense without that number. Likewise, comp
>>>>>
>>>>> explains why the experience are there, and why we cannot eliminate
>>>>> them.
>>>>> But
>>>>>
>>>>> comp provides also a major role to those experiences. Not only they
>>>>> provide
>>>>>
>>>>> the logic of physics (and the whole physical realities after that), but
>>>>> they
>>>>>
>>>>> define what persons are, mainly the owner of those experiences. It can
>>>>> give
>>>>>
>>>>> a role of consciousness: relative self-speeding up of a universal
>>>>> machine
>>>>>
>>>>> relatively to another probable universal machine. Comp explains why the
>>>>>
>>>>> consciousness (quale) is needed in that process. See below.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> In a sense, this is correct. Materialist seems to be able to use the
>>>>> same
>>>>>
>>>>> self-reference logic than the one used by the computationalist. But
>>>>> then,
>>>>>
>>>>> the point is that we are confronted to the measure problem, and the
>>>>>
>>>>> problem
>>>>>
>>>>> of the relation between 1-p and 3-p is transformed into a reduction of
>>>>>
>>>>> the
>>>>>
>>>>> physical 3-p from and only from the self-reference logic and the
>>>>>
>>>>> restriction
>>>>>
>>>>> of 3-p possibilities to the accessible state by the UD. And this works
>>>>>
>>>>> indeed. In that sense, at the propositional level, it makes sense to
>>>>> say
>>>>>
>>>>> that the mind-body problem is solved by comp. It remains to see how far
>>>>>
>>>>> this
>>>>>
>>>>> works. Is the comp first order logic of the hypostases compatible with
>>>>>
>>>>> the
>>>>>
>>>>> empirically observable facts.
>>>>>
>>>>> Keep in mind that, by the self-reference logic (or even just
>>>>>
>>>>> self-multiplication), we *already* know why a machine comes to
>>>>>
>>>>> differentiate
>>>>>
>>>>> quanta and qualia, and the math describes this precisely. (By the
>>>>>
>>>>> G*\G-equivalence of Bp with Bp & p, etc). If those comp quanta are the
>>>>>
>>>>> "real" quanta remains to be assessed, and if it is case, as it seems at
>>>>>
>>>>> the
>>>>>
>>>>> propositional level (already mathematically studied) this would support
>>>>>
>>>>> this
>>>>>
>>>>> theory of qualia.
>>>>>
>>>>> Again, the formal differentiation of quanta and qualia, and the math
>>>>>
>>>>> descriptions thereof, must be distinguished from any possible
>>>>>
>>>>> consequential role of qualitative experience per se.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I explain below, but the qualitative experiences have a huge impact on
>>>>>
>>>>> reality, not on the 3-p reality (arithmetic) but on the 1-p (hopefully
>>>>>
>>>>> plural) realities (intelligible and sensible): they make them appear
>>>>>
>>>>> relatively to the persons, and they make them stable (right relative
>>>>> measure
>>>>>
>>>>> (to be sure this remains to be verified)).
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>  If we are to
>>>>>
>>>>> take qualia seriously as part of our explanations, they must have a
>>>>>
>>>>> role distinct from their mere description.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Absolutely so.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>  If they do not, we're
>>>>>
>>>>> faced with a situation in which the same histories are describable in
>>>>>
>>>>> terms of "qualia" whether actual qualitative states are present or
>>>>>
>>>>> not.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Yes, but this cannot happen.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>  AFAICS this is the unavoidable crux of the HP, and I don't at
>>>>>
>>>>> this juncture see that it is addressed by comp or indeed any other
>>>>>
>>>>> approach I've encountered (please forgive me if this is just my
>>>>>
>>>>> missing the point as usual).
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I forgive you. It seems to me that we can understand the comp solution
>>>>> with
>>>>>
>>>>> just UDA, but it is far more easy with AUDA, where the complexity is
>>>>> reduced
>>>>>
>>>>> to the understanding of some "known" results in mathematical logic. See
>>>>>
>>>>> below.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Somehow we need to be able to entertain
>>>>>
>>>>> a "non-formal" component in the histories to accommodate this issue,
>>>>>
>>>>> or else conclude that we don't recognise any distinction of role
>>>>>
>>>>> between formal description and actuality.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Very well said.
>>>>>
>>>>> We need indeed to entertain such a non formal component, and may be
>>>>> even
>>>>>
>>>>> many of them.
>>>>>
>>>>> So here is the solution (in AUDA, I may try later to explain this with
>>>>> just
>>>>>
>>>>> UDA, but it is more confusing, given the highly counter-intuitive
>>>>> frame).
>>>>>
>>>>> Actually, there are many non formal components. Let us consider the
>>>>> first
>>>>>
>>>>> three (primary) 'hypostases" or 'machine-points-of view':
>>>>>
>>>>> p    (meaning p is true: this will appear to be NON FORMAL)
>>>>>
>>>>> Bp  (meaning "I can prove p", asserted by the machine: this will appear
>>>>> to
>>>>>
>>>>> be FORMAL)
>>>>>
>>>>> Bp & p (Meaning "I can prove p, and it is the case that p": this will
>>>>> appear
>>>>>
>>>>> to be NON FORMAL).
>>>>>
>>>>> It may looks like a paradox. The logic of (Bp & p) is, at the
>>>>> propositional
>>>>>
>>>>> level, entirely captured by the formal system S4Grz. Yet, what is
>>>>> captured,
>>>>>
>>>>> is not a formal object, and it cannot be made formal. It describes the
>>>>>
>>>>> necessary formal logic of knowledge, but knowledge itself is NOT a
>>>>> formal,
>>>>>
>>>>> nor formalizable, notion. Yoou can define Bp in the lngauge of the
>>>>> machine,
>>>>>
>>>>> but you cannot even just define Bp & p in the language of the machine
>>>>> (this
>>>>>
>>>>> would lead to "0 = 1", by using the diagonalization lemma of Gödel).
>>>>>
>>>>> It is hard, I think, to be clearer than that. S4Grz is an incredible
>>>>> logic
>>>>>
>>>>> capturing the formal structure of a concept which is NOT formalizable
>>>>> at
>>>>>
>>>>> all, nor even nameable, except by a reference to truth, which is itself
>>>>> not
>>>>>
>>>>> formalizable.
>>>>>
>>>>> Now, we can restrict 'p' on the sigma_1 true sentences (which
>>>>> correspond
>>>>> to
>>>>>
>>>>> the accessible state of the machine), and the logic of observability
>>>>> will
>>>>> be
>>>>>
>>>>> captured by the following logic and their interplay:
>>>>>
>>>>> Bp & p (again)
>>>>>
>>>>> Bp & Dt  (the logic of the measure 1 on the consistent extension: it
>>>>> can
>>>>> be
>>>>>
>>>>> made formal, and corresponds roughly to Ploitinus intelligible matter).
>>>>>
>>>>> Bp & Dt & p (the logic of sensible matter, physical sensation: it
>>>>> cannot
>>>>>
>>>>> been made formal).
>>>>>
>>>>> How can we understand those non formal things? Because we are
>>>>> ourselves,
>>>>>
>>>>> from our first person point of view, non formal things. We are not our
>>>>> body,
>>>>>
>>>>> nor our Gödel number, still less our indentity cart number, and trough
>>>>>
>>>>> introspection, perhaps on the Ramana Maharsi koan "Who am I", we can
>>>>> have
>>>>>
>>>>> some glimpse of how much "we" are really different from any possible
>>>>>
>>>>> description.
>>>>>
>>>>> Of course G* proves that all the hypostases are equivalent in the sense
>>>>> that
>>>>>
>>>>> they access (trivially for the CORRECT machine) the same set of
>>>>> arithmetical
>>>>>
>>>>> true propositions, but, the machine CANNOT know that, cannot believe
>>>>> that,
>>>>>
>>>>> cannot feel that, and this G* can also prove. That is why those non
>>>>> formal
>>>>>
>>>>> components, which are the on-bject of study of the hypostases in which
>>>>> "&
>>>>> p"
>>>>>
>>>>> appears, plays a so big role in the definition of both sensible person
>>>>> and
>>>>>
>>>>> sensible realities.
>>>>>
>>>>> So what I think you may be missing, is that a formal theory (or a
>>>>> machine)
>>>>>
>>>>> can refer correctly (without knowing that!) to informal notions, and
>>>>> those
>>>>>
>>>>> informal notions can and does play a role in the very apparition of the
>>>>>
>>>>> coupling consciousness/realities.
>>>>>
>>>>> This appears, but less clearly, already in UDA. The non formal
>>>>> components
>>>>> is
>>>>>
>>>>> bring up at the start, in both Church thesis, which refers to
>>>>> arithmetical
>>>>>
>>>>> truth, and in the "you" who accepts, or not, the proposition of the
>>>>> doctor.
>>>>>
>>>>> But UDA does not explain consciousness. It explains only that linking
>>>>> the
>>>>>
>>>>> non formal notion of consciousness to a formal object (the
>>>>> computations)
>>>>>
>>>>> entails the reversal physics/machine-theology/psychology. AUDA,
>>>>> eliminates
>>>>>
>>>>> somehow the indexical reference to "you", and replace it by a universal
>>>>>
>>>>> (Löbian) machine. But then the incompleteness phenomena, shows that the
>>>>>
>>>>> logic of consciousness (or first person) will be different of the logic
>>>>> of
>>>>>
>>>>> what you link the consciousness too. This appears in UDA at step 7,
>>>>> where
>>>>>
>>>>> you see that the physical machine (brain) is eventually provided by a
>>>>>
>>>>> measure on 1-person notions, which cannot be formalizable at all, and
>>>>> bear
>>>>>
>>>>> on infinities of computations.
>>>>>
>>>>> It remains only one mystery: the informal notion of number theoretical
>>>>>
>>>>> truth. But this again, accepting the truth (non formal) of elementary
>>>>>
>>>>> arithmetical proposition, provides an explanation why, we will never
>>>>> been
>>>>>
>>>>> able to solve that mystery. So comp solves the consciousness reality
>>>>> problem
>>>>>
>>>>> as far as it is possible to solve it.
>>>>>
>>>>> This can also be tackled formally, and it can be shown that the whole
>>>>> of
>>>>>
>>>>> physics (assuming comp) is eventually PI_2 complete IN arithmetical
>>>>> truth
>>>>>
>>>>> (that is, with Arithmetical truth as oracle). This is far beyond any
>>>>>
>>>>> effective complete theory. Even "God" (arithmetical truth) cannot
>>>>> answer
>>>>> all
>>>>>
>>>>> physical questions!
>>>>>
>>>>> Now, given that most Löban machine are as clever as you and me, you may
>>>>>
>>>>> still believe that there is a paradox. After all, when studying the
>>>>> theology
>>>>>
>>>>> of a correct machine, we know that Bp and Bp & p are equivalent. But
>>>>> the
>>>>> key
>>>>>
>>>>> point is that no machine can know this about herself, so its qualia
>>>>> will
>>>>>
>>>>> obey a different logic from its quanta. We just don't know our own
>>>>> truth
>>>>>
>>>>> notion, we cannot even name it. That is why we can only lift the
>>>>> theology
>>>>> of
>>>>>
>>>>> the correct machine on ourselves through an act of faith (like betting
>>>>> on
>>>>> a
>>>>>
>>>>> substitution level). But it remains a theology, which is of course not
>>>>>
>>>>> "close" syntactically. It points on three informal things God (truth),
>>>>> the
>>>>>
>>>>> universal soul (Bp & p) and the sensible matter (Bp & Dt & p). from
>>>>> this
>>>>>
>>>>> emerge the fabric of reality, in a sufficiently precise way as to be
>>>>> tested.
>>>>>
>>>>> I think you are confusing simply a theory and what a theory is about.
>>>>> It
>>>>> is
>>>>>
>>>>> very rare that a theory captures the thing it talks about. It capture
>>>>> tiny
>>>>>
>>>>> aspects of it. The comp theory is conceptually complete by referring to
>>>>>
>>>>> those (mathematically necessarily INFORMAL) notions, in both UDA and
>>>>> AUDA.
>>>>>
>>>>> I hope this help. I think your confusion is simple, but we use the
>>>>>
>>>>> distinction theory/model in a very complex setting, where simple
>>>>> confusion
>>>>>
>>>>> can easily be obscured by the complexity of the subject. I tend to
>>>>> believe
>>>>>
>>>>> that almost all errors in philosophy or theology comes either from a
>>>>>
>>>>> confusion between the hypostases, or from between theories and their
>>>>>
>>>>> intended semantics.
>>>>>
>>>>> Did this helped?
>>>>>
>>>>> Bruno
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> --
>>>>>
>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
>>>>> Groups
>>>>>
>>>>> "Everything List" group.
>>>>>
>>>>> To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com.
>>>>>
>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
>>>>>
>>>>> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
>>>>>
>>>>> For more options, visit this group at
>>>>>
>>>>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> --
>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
>>>>> Groups
>>>>> "Everything List" group.
>>>>> To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com.
>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
>>>>> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
>>>>> For more options, visit this group at
>>>>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> --
>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
>>>>> Groups
>>>>> "Everything List" group.
>>>>> To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com.
>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
>>>>> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
>>>>> For more options, visit this group at
>>>>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> --
>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
>>>> Groups
>>>> "Everything List" group.
>>>> To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com.
>>>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
>>>> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
>>>> For more options, visit this group at
>>>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
>>>>
>>>
>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> --
>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
>>> "Everything List" group.
>>> To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com.
>>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
>>> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
>>> For more options, visit this group at
>>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
>>>
>>>
>>
>> --
>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
>> "Everything List" group.
>> To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com.
>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
>> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
>> For more options, visit this group at
>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
>>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com.
> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> For more options, visit this group at
> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
>
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Reply via email to