On 14 Jun 2010, at 09:09, Colin Hales wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
I think things are more subtle than this...... I assume nothing,
especially 'digital anything'. In reality there's no such thing as
'digital' (do not conflate this with 'quantisation'!). There's
brains that make statements or kind (A) and (B). That's all.
I think we have always agreed on this conclusion. We may differ on
It just happen that I am using a special hypothesis, which is very
common, but not so well understood, and which is the digital
If I am digital, then quantization is given by the logic of BDp in
Z1*. I make the realtion between digital and quantization quite
When you say "there are brains", what do you mean?. Do you mean that
there are primitively material or physical brain?
Actually I have no idea by what you mean by "I assume nothing". We
always assume a theory, implicetly or explicitly.
Unfortunately, because of our conceptual divide
Which conceptual divide? We may have a different theory. I study just
the hypothesis that the brain is Turing emulable.
I cannot give meaningful answers to any of the subsequent questions
you ask - because to answer them at all means I have to agree with
the starting point.
I don't see why. My point is a point of logic. Unless you make
explicit that we are not machine, in which case we have different
Your questions are of the same kind as "when did you first start
beating your dog?" - the presupposition is that I beat my dog and
the only undecided issue is 'when?'.
Where do I presuppose that "you beat your dog"?
The issues you discuss presuppose something that fundamentally
violates science approaches in the same way that 'strings', 'loops',
'branes', 'froth' etc etc violate it and get sidelined.
On the contrary. In theoretical science we make explicit the theory we
are using. Unlike "string theory", the hypothesis I am using is the
most common one among scientists.
You have added the UTM and its variants to the pile. Any of these
could be just as right as you think COMP is.
I have no idea about the truth status of Digital Mechanism, except
nothing in nature suggest it to be false. On the contrary, the main
startling consequence of digital mechanism (non locality, first person
indeterminacy, symmetry at the bottom, etc.) are confirmed by the
empirical study of nature. But I am open to the idea that comp may be
false. That is why I study it: to show it falsifiable and thus
scientific in Popper sense.
The (A)/(B) framework is parsimonious/empirically tractable
(requires nothing extra in the Occam's razor sense) and COMP isn't
because it requires invocation of a form of unseen abstract computer
Don't attribute to me what is just elementary theoretical computer
science. You are the one postulating something concrete and material
apparently (but this is too vague in your paper).
none of which lead to predictions that implement/explain the
observer. You seem to think that my (A)/(B) framework must address
issues in Bruno/COMP terms. I need none of it. Your framework is a
preemptive generalisation of (A)/(B).
In the end, once (A)/(B) candidates have been found and explored,
Bruno/COMP may be able to be used as an abstract generalisation of
the Hales/(A)/(B) framework. When that realisation happens, we can
all go down to the pub and declare "Bruno was right" and drink to
your insights....However, this will not happen until (A)/(B) is
adopted in a self-consistent manner and followed to its logical
I was just mentioning that this is provided by the comp theory.
How will you develop your self-consistent frame without postulating
literal, verifiable neuroscience predictions of an observer (not by
pointing to "what is believed corresponds to observation" within in
an abstract hypostase framework on a presupposed
computer)........Then and only then will we understand the
relationship between the natural world and formal/artificial
computation of the COMP kind.....so we can then make informed
Yes. Why not?
IMO this is the way that you can ultimately be right, Bruno. Your
work is an uber-framework within which sits mine as a special case.
Your assumptions are unclear. You seem just to accept that qualia and
consciousness exist, I too. Then I work in the mechanist theory. You
can see that as a special case. I said exactly that.
It's not either/or.
Between you and proof of COMP is type (B) science of claims and
I don't prove comp, I start from comp. I prove only that comp forces
physics to be retrieved from number theory. It makes precise an
intuition running through all the post in this list: the relative
measure problem. I tackle the measure one. It is not a lot, yet it
explains the existence of both qualia and quanta.
The instant that a (B) makes a verified prediction of brain
material, you can then provide an abstract 'generalised theoretical
neuroscience' that can, under suitable constraints, become the
specific (B) that is us. At that time (A)/(B) will be able to be
calibrated in terms of 'digital doctors', 'white rabibits',
hypostases etc etc. In this way, Bruno/COMP can be quite right but
devoid of practical utility, at least at this stage. (Right now...if
I believe in COMP or I don't believe...changes nothing ....
Well, up to the quantity of work, the reasoning I propose works with
quite strong weakening of comp. The argument is valid for almost all
generalization of comp. The argument is invalid only if "I" am a very
special sort of infinite analog non Turing emulable machine (in which
case a theory of mind can be almost anything).
I still do (A)/(B), making predictive claims) Note that at the same
time, the equally sidelined. 'strings', 'loops', 'branes', 'froth'
etc etc will also get their validity sorted ... because all of them
will be required to predict/explain the observer or go away.
I can see how it must be very frustrating for you to see the overall
? (i don't see what makes you think I am frustated. On the contrary I
told you I do agree with your conclusion. I just show that we can make
them utterly precise once we work in the computationalist theory).
but not how we are actually implemented as a particular version of
it. At least my assessment of your position looks like that. This is
how I think the COMP proposition could be viewed in the
future....we'll see, I suppose.
:-) Meanwhile I have a broken, neurotic, deluded (A) science to fix.
That's enough work!
That is a consequence of comp too. It forces us to come back to Plato
kind of theology. With comp, alias mechanism, and modern computer
science, we know that we are more ignorant on those question than
materialist or naturalist theories seems to realize. This shows the
implicit Aristotelian presupposition existing in today's science, and
so it makes sense to insist that they are incompatible with another
widespread hypothesis (that the brain functions like a (digital)
The main interest of comp is that it explains where the laws of
physics come from, and this by explaining both the qualia and quanta.
What may be a bit frustrating perhaps is that you seem unaware of the
explanation I gave on this in this list. The A/B difference seems to
me entirely justified in the "B"-way. Indeed, we eventually find six
other variants, and some gives the logic of the observable-assertions
(quantum logic). If you are not interested in the comp hypothesis, it
is your choice, of course. The main advantage of comp is that it makes
possible to translate question in philosophy-of-mind/theology in
mathematics. It shows that all universal machine have a very rich
May be you could elaborate about our conceptual divide? I do agree
with your (A)/(B). Where is the problem? If I remember well, we did
agree on this in older conversation.
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