On 7/18/2010 1:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 17 Jul 2010, at 05:51, Allen Rex wrote:

The thesis posited by the book(*) is a bigger problem for Bruno's theory that mine.


(*)c.f. "The Evolution of
Reason" by William S. Cooper.


Are you saying that the book provides evidences that we are not Turing emulable?
Or that the prime character of the number 17 evolves in time/space?

No, I'm saying it explains why we think of numbers and physical objects.

Brent


There is an evolution of human reason, no doubt. But this does not mean the reason why we are here does evolve. Such a position would make the humans the reason of the big bang, or the reason of evolution. It would be comparable to the belief that God single out the humans from all creature, or a form of solipsism.


Assuming physicalism, the causal laws of our universe applied to a
suitable set of initial conditions will, in time, exhibit features
that we categorize as “evolutionary”.  Some of these evolutionary
processes may give rise to entities that have conscious experiences,
and some of those conscious experiences will be of holding this, that,
or the other beliefs about logic.  But those beliefs are a result of
fundamental laws acting on fundamental entities, and not associated
with any sort of independently existing platonic standard of “logical
reasoning”.


The idea that truth is independent of reasoning *is* classical logic or Platonism. Physicalism is platonism with respect to entities, which like the christian creator and creations are posited at the start, and for which nobody has ever give evidences (it is the only difference: to believe that there are physical laws and fundamental substantial entities is an addition to arithmetical realism). The very notion of "laws" necessitates arithmetical realism.


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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