On 19 Jul 2010, at 01:37, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 7/18/2010 1:38 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Assuming physicalism, the causal laws of our universe applied to a
suitable set of initial conditions will, in time, exhibit features
that we categorize as “evolutionary”.  Some of these evolutionary
processes may give rise to entities that have conscious experiences, and some of those conscious experiences will be of holding this, that, or the other beliefs about logic. But those beliefs are a result of fundamental laws acting on fundamental entities, and not associated with any sort of independently existing platonic standard of “logical

I don't understand that last sentence. Does "fundamental laws" refer to those theories we use to explain physical processes. I don't see how theories can act on entities? What fundamental entities do you refer to? And why should not the beliefs we experience be associated with logical reasoning. If we find a flaw of logic in one of our theories it loses its power to explain or even to have meaning.

I agree. Note that you are commenting on Rex text. I asked the same question.

The idea that truth is independent of reasoning *is* classical logic or Platonism. Physicalism is platonism with respect to entities, which like the christian creator and creations are posited at the start, and for which nobody has ever give evidences (it is the only difference: to believe that there are physical laws and fundamental substantial entities is an addition to arithmetical realism). The very notion of "laws" necessitates arithmetical realism.

I didn't cite Cooper as refuting anything. If the same physical processes produce our brains as well as the rest of the world then there is a connection between them which might cause our brains to have somewhat accurate thoughts about the rest of the world. Cooper explains why that should be so.

OK. So we agree that Cooper is more a thread for Rex view, and not at all for mechanism and its immaterialist consequences. That was unclear (I think there as been a "quoting" misinterpretation!). The ball is in Rex's camp. I was indeed just asking Rex why he thinks that Cooper's book is a thread for digital mechanism and/or its immaterialist consequences.



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