On 19 Jul 2010, at 01:37, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 7/18/2010 1:38 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Assuming physicalism, the causal laws of our universe applied to a
suitable set of initial conditions will, in time, exhibit features
that we categorize as “evolutionary”. Some of these evolutionary
processes may give rise to entities that have conscious
and some of those conscious experiences will be of holding this,
or the other beliefs about logic. But those beliefs are a
fundamental laws acting on fundamental entities, and not
with any sort of independently existing platonic standard of
I don't understand that last sentence. Does "fundamental laws"
refer to those theories we use to explain physical processes. I
don't see how theories can act on entities? What fundamental
entities do you refer to? And why should not the beliefs we
experience be associated with logical reasoning. If we find a flaw
of logic in one of our theories it loses its power to explain or
even to have meaning.
I agree. Note that you are commenting on Rex text. I asked the same
I didn't cite Cooper as refuting anything. If the same physical
processes produce our brains as well as the rest of the world then
there is a connection between them which might cause our brains to
have somewhat accurate thoughts about the rest of the world. Cooper
explains why that should be so.
The idea that truth is independent of reasoning *is* classical
logic or Platonism. Physicalism is platonism with respect to
entities, which like the christian creator and creations are
posited at the start, and for which nobody has ever give
evidences (it is the only difference: to believe that there are
physical laws and fundamental substantial entities is an addition
to arithmetical realism). The very notion of "laws" necessitates
OK. So we agree that Cooper is more a thread for Rex view, and not at
all for mechanism and its immaterialist consequences. That was unclear
(I think there as been a "quoting" misinterpretation!). The ball is in
Rex's camp. I was indeed just asking Rex why he thinks that Cooper's
book is a thread for digital mechanism and/or its immaterialist
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