On Tue, Aug 31, 2010 at 6:15 PM, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com> wrote:
> I should just add that "idealist accidentalism" is *exactly* as irrefutable
> as solipsism.
> Hence by that it has no value... but it's not refuted.
What would refute physicalism? It would seem to me that quantum
mechanics is sufficiently flexible to account for nearly any
observation, especially since the many worlds interpretation and the
possibility of multiverses would seem likely to give rise to so many
Even probabilistic physical laws and a single infinite universe would
still seem likely to give rise to some pretty bizarre scenarios,
Now, maybe quantum mechanics will be replaced by a different theory,
but can you imagine any possible feature of such a theory that would
rule out a physicalist interpretation?
And, again, any rule-based framework for explaining our conscious
experiences means, by definition, that don’t present or believe
arguments for reasons of logic or rationality. Instead, the arguments
that we present and believe are those entailed by the rules that
underlie our experiences.
That these rules generate rational beliefs is a leap of faith, and can
neither be refuted nor proven.
If the underlying process *didn’t* cause us to present and believe
rational arguments, there would be no way to detect this, since there
is no way to step outside of the process’s control of one’s beliefs to
independently verify the "reasonableness" of the beliefs it generates.
A physicalist may be correct about the physical nature of reality, but
if so, this is solely due to his improbable good luck in existing in a
rare "honest" physical universe whose initial conditions and causal
laws resulted in his holding true beliefs about his universe's initial
conditions and causal laws.
Given all that, ultimately I doubt your beliefs are any better footing
than solipsism either.
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