I am going to do this in two posts. The first is my interpretation
of your UDA. Since the Brain is a Turing emulatable program running on
a biological platform(to start), steps 1-5 are not controversal. Step
6 scan(and annilates) the body and only places the program on another
physical hardware platform, for a finite amount of time. Step 7 is the
usual scan and annihilate, and then looks for the program in the UD
still on some physical platform? Step 8 removes the physical universe
and had the UD "running" in Arithmetical Platonia?
If I basically understand this correctly, then I will interpret UDA
from my(physicla scineces POV).
On Dec 2, 10:55 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 02 Dec 2010, at 15:51, ronaldheld wrote:
> > Bruno:
> > I looked at UDA via the SANE paper. I am not certain the the mind is
> > Turing emulatable, but will move onward.
> OK. It is better to say brain instead of mind. The doctor proposes an
> artificial digital brain, and keep silent on what is the mind, just
> that it will be preserved locally through the running of the adequate
> > Using Star Trek transporter
> > concepts, I can accept steps 1 through 5.
> Nice. Note that the Star trek transporter usually annihilates the
> original (like in quantum teleportation), but if I am a "program" (a
> natural program) then it can be duplicated (cut, copy and paste apply
> to it).
> > Step 6 takes only the mind
> (the program, or the digital instantaneous state of a program)
> > and sends it to a finite computational device or the entire person
> > into a device similar to a Holodeck,
> It is just a computer. A physical embodiment of a (Turing) Universal
> Machine. Assuming the "mind state" (here and now) can be captured as
> an instantaneous description of a digital program, nobody can feel the
> difference between "reality" and its physical digital emulation, at
> least for a period (which is all what is needed for the probability or
> credibility measure).
> > where the person is a
> > Holocharacter?
> A person is what appears when the correct program (which exists by the
> mechanist assumption) is executed ('runned') in a physical computer.
> > I am not certain a UD is physically possible in a
> > finite resource Universe.
> You don't need this to get the indeterminacy, non-locality and even
> the non clonability, unless you add that the resource are finite and
> enough little (in which case you still have the indeterminacy and non-
> locality in case of self-duplication in that little universe of course).
> After UDA 1-7, you know that if you make a physical experiment, the
> result that you will perceive depend on the absence of similar state
> of "your body" in the (physical) universe.
> Then, with step 8, you can realize that even that move toward a little
> physical universe will not help to throw away the 1-indterminacy, non-
> locality and non clonability. The reason is that Arithmetical Platonia
> becomes the universal "Holodeck", if you want.
> UDA 1-7 shows that the mind (the first person) cannot distinguish a
> physical reality from a physical emulation of it (for a short time),
> but after step 8, we can see that the person cannot even feel the
> difference between a physical emulation and an arithmetical emulation,
> which exists out of space and time independently of any observers (by
> Church thesis, arithmetic and computer science). That is subtler than
> UDA 1-7, but it makes the argument a proof, i.e. a proof that physics
> just cannot be the fundamental theory, once we assume digital
> mechanism. The physical laws have a reason, and even a
> "space" (arithmetical truth) where, from the point of view of the
> observers, they have been selected.
> Thanks for your reply, and ask any supplementary questions if
> interested. I am trying to work on the official "english" papers.
> After that I will write a book. I have succeeded in explaining step 8
> to many different publics now, so that I think I have the whole thing
> AUDA, on the contrary, is well understood only by logicians, but
> physicists have still problem with basic logic. There is a real big
> gap between logicians and physicists. I was hoping that quantum
> computations would make a bridge, but that will still take a long
> time. Anyway, UDA is enough to understand the main point.
> AUDA is cute, because it shows that the intelligent machine are
> already here. It shows also that intelligence is mainly a right, not a
> gift (but many people dislike this, and that is hardly astonishing
> when you look at the history of humanity: it is the sempiternal fear
> of the others).
> > On Nov 28, 5:52 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> >> On 27 Nov 2010, at 19:05, ronaldheld wrote:
> >>> Jason(and any others)
> >>> Both. Level IV Universe is hard to explain even if real. Bruno's
> >>> reality is equally hard to convincing present.
> >>> Ronald
> >> Do you agree/understand that if we are machine then we are in
> >> principle duplicable? This entails subjective indeterminacy.
> >> All the rest follows from that, and few people have problems to
> >> understand UDA 1-7.
> >> UDA-8, which justifies immateriality, is slightly more subtle, but if
> >> you have followed the last conversation on it on the list (with
> >> Jacques Mallah, Stathis, ..) you could understand than to block the
> >> movie graph argument you have to attribute a computational role to
> >> the
> >> physical activity of something having non physical activity, and I
> >> don't see how we could still accept a digital brain in this case.
> >> With
> >> just UDA 1-7 you could already understand that most of quantum
> >> weirdness (indeterminacy, non-locality, non-clonability) is a
> >> qualitative almost direct consequence of digital mechanism (even in
> >> presence of a primitively material universe).
> >> AUDA, the Löbian interview, is another matter because you need
> >> familiarity with mathematical logic and recursion theory.
> >> Tell me please what you don't understand in the first steps of UDA. I
> >> am always interested to have an idea of what is it that people don't
> >> grasp. I am writing some "official" papers now, and that could help.
> >> Up to now the results are more ignored than criticized, or is
> >> considered as crap by religious atheist/materialist, without rational
> >> arguments. Tell me if you have a problem with the subjective (first
> >> person) indeterminacy. Thanks.
> >> Bruno
> >>> On Nov 26, 12:02 am, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote:
> >>>> On Wed, Nov 24, 2010 at 1:50 PM, ronaldheld <ronaldh...@gmail.com>
> >>>> wrote:
> >>>>> Jason:
> >>>>> I see what you are saying up at our level of understanding, I do
> >>>>> not
> >>>>> know how to present that in a technically convincing matter.
> >>>>> Ronald
> >>>> Which message in particular do you think is difficult to
> >>>> present convincingly? Tegmark's ideas that everything is real, or
> >>>> the
> >>>> suggestion that computer simulation might be a legitimate tool for
> >>>> exploration?
> >>>> Jason
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