On 09 Dec 2010, at 20:43, Brian Tenneson wrote:

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Is there any first order formula true in only one of R and R*? I would think that if the answer is NO then R < R*. What I'm exploring is the connection of < to [=], with the statement that < implies [=].

`The elementary embeddings preserve the truth of all first order`

`formula. So it should be obvious that if A < B, then A [=] B.`

`In B there might be elements or objects or set of objects obeying`

`relations which are not consequences of the first order relations.`

`I think that all standard models of first order theories of finite`

`structures (like numbers, hereditarily finites sets, rational numbers,`

`etc.) are elementary equivalent with their non standard models. You`

`need second order logic to describe what happens in those models.`

But I have not invest on model theory since some time.

Are there any other comparitive relations besides elementary embedding that would fit with what I'm trying to do? What I'm trying to do is one major "leg" of my paper: there is a "superstructure" to all structures.

`But sets and categories have been seen that way. This leads to`

`reductionism in math, in my opinion. Yet category theory provides`

`ubiquitous non trivial relations between many mathematical objects.`

`But Lawvere failed to found mathematics on the category of categories.`

`And categories with partial objects, like those which populate so much`

`computer science, are, well, quite close to abstract unintelligibility`

`(for me, but who knows). Category impresses me the most in knot`

`theory, and the buildings of models for weak logics (linear logic,`

`intuitionist logics, quantum linear logic).`

What super means could be any comparitive relation. But what relation is 'good'?

`You ask a very difficult question. You might appreciate morphism of`

`categories (functor), or of morphism of bicategories, or n-categories,`

`if you want powerful abstractions.`

`But assuming mechanism, and the 'everything goal': I would insist on`

`the relations of 'dreaming', or partial emulation between numbers`

`relatively to universal numbers.`

`The infinite dynamical mirroring of the universal numbers. That just`

`exist if we assume the axiom of Robinson arithmetic, and we are`

`embedded or better: distributed, or multi-dreamed by or in it (with`

`our richer axioms!) and all, this with notions of neighborhoods and`

`accessibility between our consistent extensions (that you can extract`

`from studying what can and cannot prove sound lĂ¶bian numbers about`

`themselves. See my papers for more on that, and good basic books are`

`Boolos 1979, 1993, Smullyan, Rogers, etc).`

`It depends on what you are searching for. If you want to include`

`psychology and theology, expect some universal mess diagonalizing`

`against all complete reductions.`

Bruno

On Dec 9, 8:12 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:On 09 Dec 2010, at 05:12, Brian Tenneson wrote:On Dec 5, 12:02 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:On 04 Dec 2010, at 18:50, Brian Tenneson wrote:That means that R (standard model of the first order theory of thereals + archimedian axiom, without the term "natural number") isnotelementary embeddable in R*, given that such an embedding has topreserve all first order formula (purely first order formula, andsowithout notion like "natural number").I'm a bit confused. Is R < R* or not? I thought there was a fairly natural way to elementarily embed R in R*.I would say that NOT(R < R*). *You* gave me the counter example. The archimedian axiom. You are confusing (like me when I read your draft the first time) an algebraical injective morphism with an elementary embedding. But elementary embedding conserves the truth of all first order formula, and then the archimedian axiom (without natural numbers) is true in R but not in R*. Elementary embeddings are *terribly* conservator, quite unlike algebraical monomorphism or categorical arrows, or Turing emulations. Bruno-- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group athttp://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en .http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/--You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com.To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

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