On 15 Dec 2010, at 14:57, ronaldheld wrote:

Jason:
  I do not think a neutron take more trhan a finite amount of voltage
to be able to fire. I do wonder if merely replacing the bio parts by
processing hardware, do you lose the part of the complexity of the
mind? Np problem with an antimatter man and mind.

If you estimate that our mechanist level of substitution is so low that we have to emulate the internal complexity of the neutron, it means that the substitution level is very low, but the UDA reasoning would still go through. Only if the complexity of the neutron behavior is both infinite (or non Turing emulable) AND relevant for the computation on which your mind relies "here and now" would the reasoning stop to go through.

To be sure, I really doubt that we have to take into account the internal aspect of the particles which constitutes our flesh. But the point is that to stop the working of the UD argument you have to put infinities in both mind and flesh, and say "no" to the digitalist surgeon.

Bruno








On Dec 14, 10:30 am, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote:
Ron,

I think the path to seeing the mind as a program is easier in this way: 1. It's not what the parts of the brain are made of its how they function
which determines behavior
2. This leads to the idea of multiple realizabilityhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multiple_realizability(Brains can be made in
different ways so long as the parts function the same)
3. Accordingly, one could replace each neuron, or each atom, (or whatever) with a device that behaved like what it was replacing (A man made out of
antimatter and antiparticles would still be a man)
4. Philosophical zombies (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie ) are not possible,
their brain/mind would have all the same beliefs, and
all the same information as the equivalently organized and behaving brain it replaced, but in what sense could one say this one's beliefs are wrong but this one's beliefs are right? There would be no way to ever prove that one is conscious and one is not, it would be wrong for no reason at all. This is what it takes for the idea of zombies to be consistent. Further, the real brain and zombie brain could never even report feeling any different, since both brains contain the same information and same knowledge, how is it possible for one to report differences in experience? This addresses your question of whether or not there would be an impact to one's consciousness
if their brain were swapped by a device with equivalent processing of
information.
5. If zombies are impossible, then any device containing the same
information and processing it in the same way as another mind should have
the same consciousness.
6. By Church-Turing thesis, a Turing machine (computer) can process
information in any way that information can be processed. Note that to say
the mind is emulable by a computer says very little about a mind, it
essentally says only that that the mind is a process. The analogy is that a computer can process information in any possible way given the appropriate programming, just as a record player can produce any possible sound given the appropriate record. Saying the mind is emulable by a computer is like saying voice is emulable by a record player. (It is not a very big leap,
conceptually)

It doesn't matter if the process is like parallel programs, networked
computers, etc. a single computer can process information in the same way as a whole bunch of computers running in parallel without any difficulty. The thing computers have difficulty with are infinities. Questions which take an infinite amount of processing or infinite amount of information to answer can't realistically be simulated. On this Bruno has said, if you don't believe the neuron requires an infinite amount of information to decide
whether or not to fire, then you are a mechanist.

Jason



On Mon, Dec 13, 2010 at 6:13 PM, ronaldheld <ronaldh...@gmail.com> wrote:
Bruno:
 Thanks for the weekend wishes.
  I believe the Brain runs programs, in parallel, but are they the
Mind, and are they able to be run as Turing emulable programs with no
impact to one's consciousness?
                                                 Ronald

On Dec 11, 7:51 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 11 Dec 2010, at 01:01, ronaldheld wrote:

Bruno:
I stand corrected on steps 6 and 7. I believe I understand your UDA
diagrams.

OK.  Thanks for saying.

Before I can comment, I need to decide waht progrmas are and
are not Turing emulatable,

All programs are Turing-emulable. That is a consequence of Church
thesis.
Many computer scientists tend to consider that Church Thesis is
trivially true, but, when you study it you might realize that CT is on
the contrary quite miraculous. Like Gödel saw, it is a miracle that
the Cantor-like diagonalization procedure does not lead outside the
class of partial recursive functions. The gift is a very robust notion
of universality. The price to pay for that is also very big: the
abandon of any complete TOE (unless ultrafinitism, ...). But
psycholically that price is a relief: it prevents computer science to
be reductionist.

and if the brain runs a program, parallel
programs, or something else.

Brains and other biological organs and organisms,  run parallel
programs. But all digitalizable parallel programs can be made
equivalent with dovetailing on non parallel programs. The UD does run
an infinity of programs in parallel, for example. So the brain
parallelism does not change anything unless the brain is not a
digitalizable physical process (but then we go outside the scope of
Digital Mechanism, the theory I am working in).
Theoretical Computer Science is, amazingly enough, something non
dimensional. This of course forces us to explain why dimensionality
seems so important in the physical sciences, or in the observable
sharable (first person plural) realities.

Don't hesitate to ask for precisions.

Good week-end,

Bruno

On Dec 7, 4:10 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 06 Dec 2010, at 19:00, ronaldheld wrote:

Bruno(and others)
I am going to do this in two posts. The first is my interpretation
of your UDA. Since the Brain is a Turing emulatable program
running on
a biological platform(to start), steps 1-5 are not controversal.
Step
6 scan(and annilates) the body and only places the program on
another
physical hardware platform, for a finite amount of time. Step 7 is
the
usual scan and annihilate,

Well, step 6 and 7 use step 5 where you don't need to annihilate the
original anymore.
A (classical) teleportation without annihilation is a duplication
where the original is considered annihilate and reconstituted at his
original place wihout delay.
You need that to understand that if you do an experience of physics,
you have to to consider into account all computations in the UD
execution to predict your future experience (including "looking at a
measuring apparatus needle'. OK?

and then looks for the program in the UD
still on some physical platform?

Yes. At step seven, you have already that DM entails indeterminacy,
non locality and even (exercice) non clonability of anything
'physically' observable. (mechanism accepts the 3-duplicability of
the
person which is not something physically observable (yet inferable)).

Step 8 removes the physical universe
and had the UD "running" in Arithmetical Platonia?

Yes. The UD is somehow given by the true sigma_1 arithmetical
propositions (with shape like ExP(x) P decidable) together with their many proofs. This can be derived from a well known result asserting that the computable functions are representable in Robinson (tiny)
arithmetic, or you can use the beautiful work of Putnam, Juila
Robinson, Davis, and Matiyazevitch). This makes it Turing universal,
and makes the UD emulated in Platonia (or in any model of Peano
Arithmetic, that is a tiny part of arithmetical truth).

If I basically understand this correctly, then I will interpret UDA
from my(physicla scineces POV).

Normally the reasoning does not depend on any points of view (that is
why is a deductive reasoning or a proof). The step 8 is more
difficult, and I might resend the Movie Graph Argument (MGA) already
sent. Step 8 explains the necessity of immateriality. It explains
that
the physical supervenience thesis cannot work, unless you accept the
idea that an inactive piece of material has an active physical
activity in a computation, and still say "yes" to the doctor, like
Jack Mallah apparently. To avoid this I add sometimes that the
survival, when saying yes to the doctor, is done "qua computatio",
and
I am working to make this more precise. It is always possible to put some magic in the notion of matter to build a fake comp hypothesis
saving primary matter, but then you can save any theology, and it
seems to me quite an ad hoc move. But I am interested in hearing
your
Physical Science point of view.

Bruno

Ronald

On Dec 2, 10:55 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 02 Dec 2010, at 15:51, ronaldheld wrote:

Bruno:
I looked at UDA via the SANE paper. I am not certain the the
mind is
Turing emulatable, but will move onward.

OK. It is better to say brain instead of mind. The doctor
proposes an
artificial digital brain, and keep silent on what is the mind, just
that it will be preserved locally through the running of the
adequate
computer.

Using Star Trek transporter
concepts, I can accept steps 1 through 5.

Nice. Note that the Star trek transporter usually annihilates the
original (like in quantum teleportation), but if I am a
"program" (a
natural program) then it can be duplicated (cut, copy and paste
apply
to it).

Step 6 takes only the mind

(the program, or the digital instantaneous state of a program)

and sends it to a finite computational device or the entire person
into a device similar to a Holodeck,

It is just a computer. A physical embodiment of a (Turing)
Universal
Machine. Assuming the "mind state" (here and now) can be captured
as
an instantaneous description of a digital program, nobody can feel
the

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