On 1/28/2011 7:59 PM, Rex Allen wrote:
On Fri, Jan 28, 2011 at 3:37 PM, Bruno Marchal<marc...@ulb.ac.be>  wrote:
On 28 Jan 2011, at 18:48, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 1/27/2011 8:34 PM, Rex Allen wrote:
On Thu, Jan 27, 2011 at 4:12 PM, Brent Meeker<meeke...@dslextreme.com>
  wrote:

What does "locally" mean in this context?  I doubt that consciousness is
strictly local in the physical sense; it requires and world to interact
with.

I would have thought that dreams would be a pretty clear
counter-example to the claim that consciousness requires a world to
interact with...?

Do you think you could have dreams if you had never interacted with the
world?

There are evidences (REM) that mammal fetus does dream.
Do you agree that DM implies that possibility.

What's DM? You're theory that the world is a subset of the computations of the universal dovetailer? In that case it certainly implies the possibility - in fact it seems to imply the possibility of far too much.

In practice most of our consciousness grounding heavily relies on the most
probable worlds arising from long deep (linear) computations.

How do you mean "linear" computations? Is there a definition of the sum of two computations? or does it just refer to the computations being sequential?

Apes fetus can
dream climbing trees but they do that with ancestors climbing the most
probable trees of their most probable neighborhoods since a long period.
With classical mechanism, I would say, that to know is to believe p when
"luckily" p is true,

So what is your response to Gettier's problem?

Brent

and to be awaken is to be dreaming of a world when
"luckily" the world is real. But real means here first person sharable, and
may result from its stability on random oracles.
I agree with you that being correct is a matter of luck.  But isn't
this true of every metaphysical option, not just classical mechanism?


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