On 01 Feb 2011, at 07:51, Colin Hales wrote:

Hi Bruno,

I have been pondering this issue a bit and I am intrigued about how you regard the problem space we inhabit. When you say things like ...

"Are you aware that If comp is true, that is if I am a machine ..."

I cannot fathom how you ever get to this point.

By looking at amoeabs, then reading book on molecular genetics, smelling Turing universality, then by reading Gödel's proof and the discovery of how to handle self-duplication and self-reference in representational machine, ...

I did not take this too much seriously until my understanding of Church thesis deepens. The closure of computerland for diagonalization makes universal machine extremely universal, if I can say.

This is a presupposition that arises somehow in the lexicon you have established within your overall framework of thinking.

It has lead me to some interest with that hypothesis.

Let me have a stab at how my view and yours correlate.

In my view
A) There is a natural world.
  We, Turing machines dogs, computers are all being 'computed' by it.
  This is a set of unknown naturally occurring symbols
  The natural 'symbols' interact naturally.
  This is 'natural computation'. NOT like desktop computing.
  Universe U ensues.
  Scientist S is being computed within U
  Scientist S can observe U from within.
  U makes use of fundamental properties of the symbols to enable
    .... observation, from within. Call this principle P-O

If by natural world you mean the world of the natural numbers with addition and multiplication, I am OK. I can picture your "A)". If by natural world you mean the physical worlds as seen by 'numbers', what you say might be locally correct, but that remains to be proved (assuming comp).

B) This is a symbolic description of U created by S from within U
  S can concoct a description of the natural symbols in (A)
  It need not be unique, many (B) correspond to one (A)
  S can never know if it's completely done.
  S can never know the real nature of the sybols in (A)
  Descriptions (B), with P-O, explains observation and the observer S

C) There is a _second_ description
  It is also concocted by S
  These are the normal empirical laws we all know so well


  It describes how the U appears to S from inside
  It need not be unique, many (C) correspond to one (A)
  No (C) ever explains observation.

In this framework
(i) a computer running description/rules (B) is not the natural world.

OK. With the two sense of natural world I accept above.

(ii) a computer running description/rules (C) is not the natural world.


(iii) a computer running descriptions (B) or (C) is 'artificially

Yes. it is an isolated malin génie.

(iv)  (C) is physics that present day scientists construct

I don't get "C".

(v)   (B) is physics of a natural world prior to an observer.

This exist for Löbian machine (although they can find it "looking inward").

(vi)  (A) is 'NATURALLY computing' in the sense that it is literally
     'computing' scientist S.
These options are the logically justifiable position we can take when we are, as we are, inside U trying to work U out from within, using an observation faculty provided by U as part of (A). Empirical evidence justifying (C) is normal overvation (contents of one or more observer-agreed conscious experisnces). Empirical evidence justifying (B) is implicit in the existence of an observer concocting a set (C). You can't be confused about an bservation unless there is an observer to be confused.
All that said.....now ....

You mention "digital physics". You say "Are you aware that If COMP is true, that is if I am a machine ..."

In terms of my framework....you are speaking of ...what?

I postulate, eventually, only natural numbers and addition and multiplication. Then from this (it is not obvious but standard in good logic textbook) you can show that the arithmetical relation (defined with "+" and "*", and classical logic) emulate all computations. Physics or the natural world is never emulated (but often simulated by malin génie program). Physics is what appear from inside taking the first person indeterminacy inyto account. A priori the natural world is not a computational object.

(1) A 'Turing machine (digital computer)' inside U running (B)
(2) The natural computation itself, of kind (A)?

I suspect

(3) Some kind of magical 'computer' in idea-space computing us as (A)?
  i.e. A 'virtual machine' that 'acts as if' it generates an arbitrary
  number of different U?

The COMP I talk about having refuted is in (i) or (ii) above.
I suspect this is not the COMP you are speaking of...

The comp I talk about is the assumption that my (generailzed) brain can be emulated by a digital computer. The rest should follow.

As far as I can tell we're not even on the same page. Maybe others here are in a similar position and don't know it.

I hope you can help.

What do you answer to Stathis Papaoiannou question? By putting special actual infinities in your body, you might escape the comp hypothesis, in which case we are indeed not on the same page.

NOTE: When I say I want to build an artificial general intelligence, I say I can build, within (A), using chunks of (A), an inorganic observer of kind S, say S', that will also be able to observe and concoct (B) and (C). S' will NOT be 'artificially computing' rules (B) or (C)! There will be some symbolic manipulation in the hardware, but this is not S', it merely drives some of the S' hardware, like the rules that drive synaptic plasticity. Background housekeeping. In that event, in my framework, the natural world (A) will be 'computing' S' too. The properties of (A) called P-O above, that make S observe also operate within S'. The explanation of HOW observation happens is in P-O as it is configured in (B).

Is S' conscious?




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