On 01 Feb 2011, at 23:53, Colin Hales wrote:

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Bruno Marchal wrote:On 01 Feb 2011, at 07:51, Colin Hales wrote:Hi Bruno,I have been pondering this issue a bit and I am intrigued abouthow you regard the problem space we inhabit. When you say thingslike ..."Are you aware that If comp is true, that is if I am a machine ..." I cannot fathom how you ever get to this point.By looking at amoeabs, then reading book on molecular genetics,smelling Turing universality, then by reading Gödel's proof and thediscovery of how to handle self-duplication and self-reference inrepresentational machine, ...I did not take this too much seriously until my understanding ofChurch thesis deepens. The closure of computerland fordiagonalization makes universal machine extremely universal, if Ican say.This is a presupposition that arises somehow in the lexicon youhave established within your overall framework of thinking.It has lead me to some interest with that hypothesis.Let me have a stab at how my view and yours correlate. In my view ======================================================== A) There is a natural world. We, Turing machines dogs, computers are all being 'computed' by it. This is a set of unknown naturally occurring symbols The natural 'symbols' interact naturally. This is 'natural computation'. NOT like desktop computing. Universe U ensues. Scientist S is being computed within U Scientist S can observe U from within. U makes use of fundamental properties of the symbols to enable .... observation, from within. Call this principle P-OIf by natural world you mean the world of the natural numbers withaddition and multiplication, I am OK. I can picture your "A)".No. Here's where we part company. This presupposition about therelation between the abstractions for quantity we call numbers, andthe natural world is one I do not make. All you can logically claimis that it is made of a large set of 'something', these 'somethings'interact simultaneously, on mass. The 'numbers' do not relate toeach other like natural numbers, but they do relate in a way thatcan be MODELLED using natural numbers.

`You confuse the numbers used by humans to model,and theorize, about`

`physical phenomenon, and the infinitite relations between numbers that`

`we have to take into account by the first person indeterminacy. Read,`

`or reread UDA1-7. Take the digital thesis seriously by doing the`

`thought experiment. You are confusing numbers and numbers' dream`

`somehow.`

If by natural world you mean the physical worlds as seen by'numbers', what you say might be locally correct, but that remainsto be proved (assuming comp).No. You have it all backwards. You can assume _nothing_ about thenatural world and abstract number systems.

`The morning I assume there is coffee in the kitchen. This assumes`

`already, albeit implicitly, many things about *some* natural world.`

`And then I assume there is a level of description of myself such that`

`I am Turing emulable at that level, in the sense that I would not see`

`any difference would a malin génie decide to make the substitution.`

`What do I make that assumption? Because many makes it, and got it`

`wrong. Once you make it, you might understand that 'the natural world'`

`is itself, and by itself, a rather strong assumption. With mechanism,`

`comp, COMP, CTM made precise, etc., you have to take into account that`

`numbers, just with the addition and multiplication law, plays the`

`whole drama of all the possible ways universal machine multiplies and`

`reflect themselves, and the physical realm can be seen as a secondary`

`effect of numbers dreams, some dreams glue together and leads to`

`physical realities. Computer science and mathematical logic, with`

`Church thesis, can make this sufficiently precise so that it can be`

`verified (for the ideal case of correct (and little) 'numbers'), and`

`assuming the classical theory of knowledge.`

B) This is a symbolic description of U created by S from within U S can concoct a description of the natural symbols in (A) It need not be unique, many (B) correspond to one (A) S can never know if it's completely done. S can never know the real nature of the sybols in (A) Descriptions (B), with P-O, explains observation and the observer S C) There is a _second_ description It is also concocted by S These are the normal empirical laws we all know so well?It describes how the U appears to S from inside It need not be unique, many (C) correspond to one (A) No (C) ever explains observation. In this framework(i) a computer running description/rules (B) is not the naturalworld.OK. With the two sense of natural world I accept above.(ii) a computer running description/rules (C) is not the naturalworld.OK.(iii) a computer running descriptions (B) or (C) is 'artificially computing'Yes. it is an isolated malin génie.(iv) (C) is physics that present day scientists constructI don't get "C".So you don't understand what basic empirical scientists do. Boyhave I failed to connect or what!

I'm afraid you did.

(v) (B) is physics of a natural world prior to an observer.This exist for Löbian machine (although they can find it "lookinginward").Who's 'they'?

`The Löbian machine. UDA shows physics has to be in the head of the`

`Löbian machine, among other things.`

`AUDA, or the Lôbian interview, I actually ask a little Löbian machine`

`(Peano Arithmetic) to take a look.`

(vi) (A) is 'NATURALLY computing' in the sense that it is literally 'computing' scientist S. ===================================================== OK.These options are the logically justifiable position we can takewhen we are, as we are, inside U trying to work U out from within,using an observation faculty provided by U as part of (A).Empirical evidence justifying (C) is normal overvation (contentsof one or more observer-agreed conscious experisnces). Empiricalevidence justifying (B) is implicit in the existence of anobserver concocting a set (C). You can't be confused about anbservation unless there is an observer to be confused.===================================================== All that said.....now ....You mention "digital physics". You say "Are you aware that If COMPis true, that is if I am a machine ..."In terms of my framework....you are speaking of ...what?I postulate, eventually, only natural numbers and addition andmultiplication. Then from this (it is not obvious but standard ingood logic textbook) you can show that the arithmetical relation(defined with "+" and "*", and classical logic) emulate allcomputations. Physics or the natural world is never emulated (butoften simulated by malin génie program). Physics is what appearfrom inside taking the first person indeterminacy inyto account. Apriori the natural world is not a computational object."Physics is what appear from inside taking the first personindeterminacy inyto account. "This is (C). Standard empirical physics. "A priori the natural world is not a computational object"This is (A). the universe U is not a computational object. Notcomputed.

`Yes, we agree on this. Comp or CTM is the assumption (or theory)`

`according to which "I" am computable, in a third and first person`

`sense that I don't see the difference between digital (and physical!)`

`emulation of me described at some level, supposed to exist. If the`

`brain is a natural representational machine (like computer) that is`

`rather plausible (even in the case the brain is a quantum computer).`

OK. Clarity of a sort. Where does (B) fit in? I think you assume itas a com,puter program on a magical non-existent computer runningsomething.

`I am realist on arithmetic. I believe in prime numbers, and I can show`

`you that if you believe in prime numbers, then you have to believe in`

`universal numbers, and their arithmetical emulation.`

I hold that descriptions (B) are accessible. I also hold that thesedescriptions are not the same as the (C) descriptions. Bothconstructed by the same observer/scientist.No I think maybe you merge (A) and (B) and then replace them bothwith your lower-case comp machine. OK.

You lost me.

(1) A 'Turing machine (digital computer)' inside U running (B) descriptions? (2) The natural computation itself, of kind (A)? I suspect(3) Some kind of magical 'computer' in idea-space computing us as(A)?i.e. A 'virtual machine' that 'acts as if' it generates anarbitrarynumber of different U? The COMP I talk about having refuted is in (i) or (ii) above. I suspect this is not the COMP you are speaking of...The comp I talk about is the assumption that my (generailzed) braincan be emulated by a digital computer. The rest should follow.The 'comp' you talk about is actually an abstract machine in a non-existent abstract space that manipulates abstractions.

`Comp is not a machine, it is an hypothesis. Roughly speaking that my`

`brain works like a computer at some level. The notion of level is`

`anything you decide once you accept that it has an instantaneous state`

`describable by a (relative) number.`

It's got nothing to do with the COMP I talk about, which is acomputer, made of the real world (not integers), in the real naturalworld, running a description (made by humans) of the natural world.This applies to 'quasi-digital' (desktop style), analogue andquantum computers.You have a deep seated conviction that this abstract computer that'is' a reality and a real computer that runs descriptions of areality are indistinguishable.

You suggest I say 'no' to the doctor?

This is unjustifiable. The simpler, parsimonious solution is toassume that is not the case, and work out what options exist for adescriber and the possible relations between a describer and thedescribed.The reason your propositions have trouble getting accepted

`Ah? I know only one scientist pretending having find a refutation. And`

`I have not yet really submitted (all my publications and text have`

`been ordered to me). I am a bit sorry for that.`

`Colin, it is not a question of being accepted or not, but of`

`presenting a refutation or a critic of the reasoning. People usually`

`understand easily UDA1-7, and get more trouble with MGA, which is`

`perhaps at the crux of the 'reversal'.`

is because they make this step into a faith-based presuppositionthat is indistinguishable from a statement like "the natural worldis erected in real time by the little purple regularity fairies". Ithas exactly the same level of faith and assumption. So the comp youspeak of, I conclude, at last, is not the COMP I refute, nor is itthe one of the many other refutations. Which is kind of good fromyour perspective. From my perspective it means I have to battle nomore with your comp.

`Er ... well, except that you seems to take for granted a 'natural`

`world'. Comp's consequence is that it is about infinitely more`

`plausible that what we call the (multi)-cosmos, is a (tiny) aspect of`

`the relation between little and big universal numbers.`

`And I am not saying that this is true, just that if follows from`

`taking CTM or digital mechanism seriously enough in consideration.`

`I do think you are coherent, and really non computationalist, because`

`you have to, to protect the existence of the 'natural world'.`

I am still agnostic. Bruno

In relation to Stathis' request: If you model a natural environment presenting some problem to a human within that environment, the simulated human will arrive at the same solution as the real human would have. If intelligence is problem-solving behaviour, there is therefore no difference between the natural world and the model provided that the model is in fact a good one. Your claim that computers cannot replicate human intelligence is thus equivalent to a claim that there is some process in the human brain which is not Turing emulable. What process do youNo. This is just plain wrong. You cannot model an observation ofsomething that you have no idea of the evidence of .i.e. You cannotmodel the unknown. If you could then you'd already know it (theobserver and the relationship of the observer to everything else. Ifyou want to get at unknowns, then you have to model a modeller ofthe unknown ... and then _assume_ that everything in a modelcaptures the reality you are modelling, during the process.The non-Turing emulable part of the natural world is therelationship between every little bit X and every other bit of itthat is NOT directly related to X. A product of massive parallelismcreated by a massive collection of the entities of which we areactually made, which is best assumed not to be abstract numbers ifyou want to understand it. This is something we inherit by 'being'in the world. Something that cannot be simulated. Something that aTuring Machine (computer), totally different to us physically, doesnot get in its program.By way of example, I have attached a video of a simulated neuronfiring. It's from a paper I have in review at the moment. The videodepicts the currents originating the biologically realistic EMfields around a neuron due to the ion channels involed in an actionpotential. It was produce by the package NEURON. In it you will seea pair of red/blue interfaces travelling away from the soma. Theseinterfaces are virtual evanescent current-dipoles. They aremathematically describable, but form no part of the mathematicaldescription that generated them. THAT is what is missing. These arethe virtual relationships not accessed by the mathematics of aTuring machine. No matter what is going on in a Turing machine, NONEof this kind of phenomenon are accessed by it.The question is 'what is it like to BE those fields'. It cannot beclaimed to be like the mathematical description that representsthem, nor can it be claimed to be 'like' being the computer runningthe simulation.A final demo that tells you what can't be emulated...using, yes,actual natural numbers.Here's a 1. Here another 1.If I 'be' the first 1, you 'be' the second 1. what 'law' capturesthe relationship between the two instances of 1? That 'law' is notany law that you and I concoct sitting up here, staring down at themlike a god. No amount of abstraction of 'one-ness' capture thatrelationship.I am glad I don't have to battle lower case comp any more. So Iguess I'll leave it there for now. Progress has been made.Cheers colin --You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.<S2_Fig05_movie.avi>

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