On 2 February 2011 23:35, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

> To protect a natural world primary ontology, I think Colin has to provide a
> naturalization of consciousness escaping digitalization at all nature
> levels, and this without redefining the first person by its comp domain of
> indeterminacy. Well he has to justify (or not) why he would say no to all
> doctors. But he can develop a theory of mind along this line.
> Colin has to find a difference between the physical world and the physical
> world extracted from comp. I provide a tool for doing that (but it is
> mathematically involved (the main weakness of comp: it demands the study of
> computer science)).

I don't fully follow.  You say that Colin must provide "a
naturalization of consciousness escaping digitalization at all nature
levels".  Well, AFAICS, starting from a "natural world primary
ontology", even in the case that, for example, the structure of
chemical reactions could be shown to be fully digitalisable, it
doesn't immediately follow that a digitalisation of a chemical process
running in a "natural world" computer could literally REPLACE that
process in the natural world.  This is a well-known argument.
Consequently if, on the same assumptions, it could be shown
(hypothetically) that consciousness depends on (say) specific natural
world bio-chemical processes, it wouldn't thereby follow that a
digitalisation of those same processes could replace my bio-chemical
brain.  In that case it would be No Doctor.

I can of course see that, for DM to be a viable mind-body theory, it
must be the case that any processes essential to the theory be
digitalisable - the contrary would obviously rule out any such theory.
 But I don't see why the argument should go through in the opposite
direction: i.e. that the assumption of a digital ontology is somehow
FORCED by the very existence of Turing-emulable processes.  I have a
feeling I'm missing something.  What is it?

David


>
> On 02 Feb 2011, at 01:46, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 1 February 2011 22:53, Colin Hales <c.ha...@pgrad.unimelb.edu.au> wrote:
>
> Colin
>
> Do forgive me for butting in on an exchange I sometimes only dimly
> follow, but I think I may possibly see a misunderstanding on your part
> about what Bruno actually claims about "comp" (forgive me, both of
> you, if I'm wrong).  As I've understood Bruno over the years, he has
> never asserted that comp(utational science) necessarily is the
> fundamental science of body and mind.  Rather, he is saying that IF
> computational science is assumed (e.g. by proponents of CTM) to be the
> correct mind-body theory, THEN the appearance of the body (and
> consequently the rest of matter/energy) must emerge as part of the
> same theory.  In other words, EITHER the correctness of comp as a
> mind-body theory directly implies the "emptiness" of any fundamental
> theory of matter; OR alternatively (i.e. accepting a "fundamental"
> theory of matter) comp can't be the correct mind-body theory.
>
> That's the point.
>
>
> The establishment of this disjunction depends on a number of logical
> steps, culminating in a class of "reductio" thought experiments
> including Maudlin's Olympia/Klara and Bruno's MGA, the burden of which
> is to reveal contradictions inherent in any such conjunction of
> computationalism and materialism.  As it happens, Maudlin uses this
> result to reject CTM, and Bruno follows the opposite tack of rejecting
> materialism.
>
> Yes. The basic reason is as I said that it is more easy to explain the
> illusion of matter to a mind than the reality of mind to an assumed primary
> matter.
> Comp is delivered with a user guide: computer science.
>
>
> There is some controversy over these results from
> supporters of CTM who continue to find ways to dispute them with
> auxiliary assumptions.  Personally, these auxiliaries strike me as
> being rather in the nature of epicycles, but then I'm hardly an
> authority.
>
> Anyway, forgive me if this was already obvious, but I suppose the
> conclusion might be that, if you reject fundamental computational
> science as your basic theory of "matter", Bruno would expect you to
> take the same tack with respect to mind.  I'm sure both he and you
> will put me right on this.
>
> To protect a natural world primary ontology, I think Colin has to provide a
> naturalization of consciousness escaping digitalization at all nature
> levels, and this without redefining the first person by its comp domain of
> indeterminacy. Well he has to justify (or not) why he would say no to all
> doctors. But he can develop a theory of mind along this line.
> Colin has to find a difference between the physical world and the physical
> world extracted from comp. I provide a tool for doing that (but it is
> mathematically involved (the main weakness of comp: it demands the study of
> computer science)).
>
> Bruno
>
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 01 Feb 2011, at 07:51, Colin Hales wrote:
>
> Hi Bruno,
>
> I have been pondering this issue a bit and I am intrigued about how you
>
> regard the problem space we inhabit. When you say things like ...
>
> "Are you aware that If comp is true, that is if I am a machine ..."
>
> I cannot fathom how you ever get to this point.
>
> By looking at amoeabs, then reading book on molecular genetics, smelling
>
> Turing universality, then by reading Gödel's proof and the discovery of how
>
> to handle self-duplication and self-reference in representational machine,
>
> ...
>
> I did not take this too much seriously until my understanding of Church
>
> thesis deepens. The closure of computerland for diagonalization makes
>
> universal machine extremely universal, if I can say.
>
>
>
>
> This is a presupposition that arises somehow in the lexicon you have
>
> established within your overall framework of thinking.
>
> It has lead me to some interest with that hypothesis.
>
>
> Let me have a stab at how my view and yours correlate.
>
> In my view
>
> ========================================================
>
> A) There is a natural world.
>
>  We, Turing machines dogs, computers are all being 'computed' by it.
>
>  This is a set of unknown naturally occurring symbols
>
>  The natural 'symbols' interact naturally.
>
>  This is 'natural computation'. NOT like desktop computing.
>
>  Universe U ensues.
>
>  Scientist S is being computed within U
>
>  Scientist S can observe U from within.
>
>  U makes use of fundamental properties of the symbols to enable
>
>    .... observation, from within. Call this principle P-O
>
>
> If by natural world you mean the world of the natural numbers with
>
> addition and multiplication, I am OK. I can picture your "A)".
>
> No. Here's where we part company. This presupposition about the relation
>
> between the abstractions for quantity we call numbers, and the natural world
>
> is one I do not make. All you can logically claim is that it is made of a
>
> large set of 'something', these 'somethings' interact simultaneously, on
>
> mass. The 'numbers' do not relate to each other like natural numbers, but
>
> they do relate in a way that can be MODELLED using natural numbers.
>
> If by natural world you mean the physical worlds as seen by 'numbers',
>
> what you say might be locally correct, but that remains to be proved
>
> (assuming comp).
>
> No. You have it all backwards. You can assume _nothing_ about the natural
>
> world and abstract number systems.
>
>
>
> B) This is a symbolic description of U created by S from within U
>
>  S can concoct a description of the natural symbols in (A)
>
>  It need not be unique, many (B) correspond to one (A)
>
>  S can never know if it's completely done.
>
>  S can never know the real nature of the sybols in (A)
>
>  Descriptions (B), with P-O, explains observation and the observer S
>
> C) There is a _second_ description
>
>  It is also concocted by S
>
>  These are the normal empirical laws we all know so well
>
> ?
>
>
>  It describes how the U appears to S from inside
>
>  It need not be unique, many (C) correspond to one (A)
>
>  No (C) ever explains observation.
>
> In this framework
>
> (i) a computer running description/rules (B) is not the natural world.
>
> OK. With the two sense of natural world I accept above.
>
>
>
> (ii)  a computer running description/rules (C) is not the natural world.
>
> OK.
>
>
> (iii) a computer running descriptions (B) or (C) is 'artificially
>
>     computing'
>
>
> Yes. it is an isolated malin génie.
>
> (iv)  (C) is physics that present day scientists construct
>
> I don't get "C".
>
> So you don't understand what basic empirical  scientists do. Boy have I
>
> failed to connect or what!
>
>
>
> (v)   (B) is physics of a natural world prior to an observer.
>
> This exist for Löbian machine (although they can find it "looking
>
> inward").
>
> Who's 'they'?
>
>
>
> (vi)  (A) is 'NATURALLY computing' in the sense that it is literally
>
>     'computing' scientist S.
>
> =====================================================
>
> OK.
>
> These options are the logically justifiable position we can take when we
>
> are, as we are, inside U trying to work U out from within, using an
>
> observation faculty provided by U as part of (A). Empirical evidence
>
> justifying (C) is normal overvation (contents of one or more observer-agreed
>
> conscious experisnces). Empirical evidence justifying (B) is implicit in the
>
> existence of an observer concocting a set (C). You can't be confused about
>
> an bservation unless there is an observer to be confused.
>
> =====================================================
>
> All that said.....now ....
>
> You mention "digital physics". You say "Are you aware that If COMP is
>
> true, that is if I am a machine ..."
>
> In terms of my framework....you are speaking of ...what?
>
>
>
> I postulate, eventually, only natural numbers and addition and
>
> multiplication. Then from this (it is not obvious but standard in good logic
>
> textbook) you can show that the arithmetical relation (defined with "+" and
>
> "*", and classical logic) emulate all computations. Physics or the natural
>
> world is never emulated (but often simulated by malin génie program).
>
> Physics is what appear from inside taking the first person indeterminacy
>
> inyto account. A priori the natural world is not a computational object.
>
> "Physics is what appear from inside taking the first person indeterminacy
>
> inyto account. "
>
> This is (C). Standard empirical physics.
>
> "A priori the natural world is not a computational object"
>
> This is (A). the universe U is not a computational object. Not computed.
>
> OK. Clarity of a sort. Where does (B) fit in? I think you assume it as a
>
> com,puter program on a magical non-existent computer running something. I
>
> hold that descriptions (B) are accessible. I also hold that these
>
> descriptions are not the same as the (C) descriptions. Both constructed by
>
> the same observer/scientist.
>
> No I think maybe you merge (A) and (B) and then replace them both with your
>
> lower-case comp machine. OK.
>
>
> (1) A 'Turing machine (digital computer)' inside U running (B)
>
>   descriptions?
>
> (2) The natural computation itself, of kind (A)?
>
> I suspect
>
> (3) Some kind of magical 'computer' in idea-space computing us as (A)?
>
>  i.e. A 'virtual machine' that 'acts as if' it generates an arbitrary
>
>  number of different U?
>
> The COMP I talk about having refuted is in (i) or (ii) above.
>
> I suspect this is not the COMP you are speaking of...
>
> The comp I talk about is the assumption that my (generailzed) brain can be
>
> emulated by a digital computer. The rest should follow.
>
>
> The 'comp' you talk about is actually an abstract machine in a non-existent
>
> abstract space that manipulates abstractions. It's got nothing to do with
>
> the COMP I talk about, which is a computer, made of the real world (not
>
> integers), in the real natural world, running a description (made by humans)
>
> of the natural world. This applies to 'quasi-digital' (desktop style),
>
> analogue and quantum computers.
>
> You have a deep seated conviction that this abstract computer that 'is' a
>
> reality and a real computer that runs descriptions of a reality are
>
> indistinguishable. This is unjustifiable. The simpler, parsimonious solution
>
> is to assume that is not the case, and work out what options exist for a
>
> describer and the possible relations between a describer and the described.
>
> The reason your propositions have trouble getting accepted is because they
>
> make this step into a faith-based presupposition that is indistinguishable
>
> from a statement like "the natural world is erected in real time by the
>
> little purple regularity fairies". It has exactly the same level of faith
>
> and assumption. So the comp you speak of, I conclude, at last, is not the
>
> COMP I refute, nor is it the one of the many other refutations. Which is
>
> kind of good from your perspective. From my perspective it means I have to
>
> battle no more with your comp.
>
> In relation to Stathis' request:
>
> If you model a natural environment presenting some problem to a human
>
> within that environment, the simulated human will arrive at the same
>
> solution as the real human would have. If intelligence is
>
> problem-solving behaviour, there is therefore no difference between
>
> the natural world and the model provided that the model is in fact a
>
> good one. Your claim that computers cannot replicate human
>
> intelligence is thus equivalent to a claim that there is some process
>
> in the human brain which is not Turing emulable. What process do you
>
>
> No. This is just plain wrong. You cannot model an observation of something
>
> that you have no idea of the evidence of .i.e. You cannot model the unknown.
>
> If you could then you'd already know it (the observer and the relationship
>
> of the observer to everything else. If you want to get at unknowns, then you
>
> have to model a modeller of the unknown ... and then _assume_ that
>
> everything in a model captures the reality you are modelling, during the
>
> process.
>
> The non-Turing emulable part of the natural world is the relationship
>
> between every little bit X and every other bit of it that is NOT directly
>
> related to X. A product of massive parallelism created by a massive
>
> collection of the entities of which we are actually made, which is best
>
> assumed not to be abstract numbers if you want to understand it. This is
>
> something we inherit by 'being' in the world. Something that cannot be
>
> simulated. Something that a Turing Machine (computer), totally different to
>
> us physically, does not get in its program.
>
> By way of example, I have attached a video of a simulated neuron firing.
>
> It's from a paper I have in review at the moment. The video depicts the
>
> currents originating the biologically realistic EM fields around a neuron
>
> due to the ion channels involed in an action potential. It was produce by
>
> the package NEURON. In it you will see a pair of red/blue interfaces
>
> travelling away from the soma. These interfaces are virtual evanescent
>
> current-dipoles. They are mathematically describable, but form no part of
>
> the mathematical description that generated them. THAT is what is missing.
>
> These are the virtual relationships not accessed by the mathematics of a
>
> Turing machine. No matter what is going on in a Turing machine, NONE of this
>
> kind of phenomenon are accessed by it.
>
> The question is 'what is it like to BE those fields'. It cannot be claimed
>
> to be like the mathematical description that represents them, nor can it be
>
> claimed to be 'like' being the computer running the simulation.
>
> A final demo that tells you what can't be emulated...using, yes, actual
>
> natural numbers.
>
> Here's a 1.
>
> Here another 1.
>
> If I 'be' the first 1, you 'be' the second 1. what 'law' captures the
>
> relationship between the two instances of 1? That 'law' is not any law that
>
> you and I concoct sitting up here, staring down at them like a god. No
>
> amount of abstraction of 'one-ness' capture that relationship.
>
> I am glad I don't have to battle lower case comp any more. So I guess I'll
>
> leave it there for now. Progress has been made.
>
> Cheers
>
> colin
>
>
>
>
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