On Feb 3, 9:34 pm, David Nyman <da...@davidnyman.com> wrote:
> On 3 February 2011 13:40, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>
> >>> Colin has to find a difference between the physical world and the
> >>> physical
> >>> world extracted from comp.
>
> What I think I'm still missing is the precise significance of "has to"
> in the above.

If platonism/AR is false, there has to be a real physical world,
because there is then no mathematical world for the appearance of
a real world to emerge from

 >>> including Maudlin's Olympia/Klara and Bruno's MGA, the burden of
which
> >>> is to reveal contradictions inherent in any such conjunction of
> >>> computationalism and materialism.  As it happens, Maudlin uses this
> >>> result to reject CTM, and Bruno follows the opposite tack of rejecting
> >>> materialism.
>
> >>> Yes. The basic reason is as I said that it is more easy to explain the
> >>> illusion of matter to a mind than the reality of mind to an assumed
> >>> primary
> >>> matter.
> >>> Comp is delivered with a user guide: computer science.
>
> >>> There is some controversy over these results from
> >>> supporters of CTM who continue to find ways to dispute them with
> >>> auxiliary assumptions.  Personally, these auxiliaries strike me as
> >>> being rather in the nature of epicycles, but then I'm hardly an
> >>> authority.
>
> >>> Anyway, forgive me if this was already obvious, but I suppose the
> >>> conclusion might be that, if you reject fundamental computational
> >>> science as your basic theory of "matter", Bruno would expect you to
> >>> take the same tack with respect to mind.  I'm sure both he and you
> >>> will put me right on this.
>
> >>> To protect a natural world primary ontology, I think Colin has to provide
> >>> a
> >>> naturalization of consciousness escaping digitalization at all nature
> >>> levels, and this without redefining the first person by its comp domain
> >>> of
> >>> indeterminacy. Well he has to justify (or not) why he would say no to all
> >>> doctors. But he can develop a theory of mind along this line.
> >>> Colin has to find a difference between the physical world and the
> >>> physical
> >>> world extracted from comp. I provide a tool for doing that (but it is
> >>> mathematically involved (the main weakness of comp: it demands the study
> >>> of
> >>> computer science)).
>
> >>> Bruno
>
> >>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> >>> On 01 Feb 2011, at 07:51, Colin Hales wrote:
>
> >>> Hi Bruno,
>
> >>> I have been pondering this issue a bit and I am intrigued about how you
>
> >>> regard the problem space we inhabit. When you say things like ...
>
> >>> "Are you aware that If comp is true, that is if I am a machine ..."
>
> >>> I cannot fathom how you ever get to this point.
>
> >>> By looking at amoeabs, then reading book on molecular genetics, smelling
>
> >>> Turing universality, then by reading Gödel's proof and the discovery of
> >>> how
>
> >>> to handle self-duplication and self-reference in representational
> >>> machine,
>
> >>> ...
>
> >>> I did not take this too much seriously until my understanding of Church
>
> >>> thesis deepens. The closure of computerland for diagonalization makes
>
> >>> universal machine extremely universal, if I can say.
>
> >>> This is a presupposition that arises somehow in the lexicon you have
>
> >>> established within your overall framework of thinking.
>
> >>> It has lead me to some interest with that hypothesis.
>
> >>> Let me have a stab at how my view and yours correlate.
>
> >>> In my view
>
> >>> ========================================================
>
> >>> A) There is a natural world.
>
> >>>  We, Turing machines dogs, computers are all being 'computed' by it.
>
> >>>  This is a set of unknown naturally occurring symbols
>
> >>>  The natural 'symbols' interact naturally.
>
> >>>  This is 'natural computation'. NOT like desktop computing.
>
> >>>  Universe U ensues.
>
> >>>  Scientist S is being computed within U
>
> >>>  Scientist S can observe U from within.
>
> >>>  U makes use of fundamental properties of the symbols to enable
>
> >>>   .... observation, from within. Call this principle P-O
>
> >>> If by natural world you mean the world of the natural numbers with
>
> >>> addition and multiplication, I am OK. I can picture your "A)".
>
> >>> No. Here's where we part company. This presupposition about the relation
>
> >>> between the abstractions for quantity we call numbers, and the natural
> >>> world
>
> >>> is one I do not make. All you can logically claim is that it is made of a
>
> >>> large set of 'something', these 'somethings' interact
>
> ...
>
> read more »

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Reply via email to