On Feb 3, 9:34 pm, David Nyman <da...@davidnyman.com> wrote: > On 3 February 2011 13:40, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > >>> Colin has to find a difference between the physical world and the > >>> physical > >>> world extracted from comp. > > What I think I'm still missing is the precise significance of "has to" > in the above.

If platonism/AR is false, there has to be a real physical world, because there is then no mathematical world for the appearance of a real world to emerge from >>> including Maudlin's Olympia/Klara and Bruno's MGA, the burden of which > >>> is to reveal contradictions inherent in any such conjunction of > >>> computationalism and materialism. As it happens, Maudlin uses this > >>> result to reject CTM, and Bruno follows the opposite tack of rejecting > >>> materialism. > > >>> Yes. The basic reason is as I said that it is more easy to explain the > >>> illusion of matter to a mind than the reality of mind to an assumed > >>> primary > >>> matter. > >>> Comp is delivered with a user guide: computer science. > > >>> There is some controversy over these results from > >>> supporters of CTM who continue to find ways to dispute them with > >>> auxiliary assumptions. Personally, these auxiliaries strike me as > >>> being rather in the nature of epicycles, but then I'm hardly an > >>> authority. > > >>> Anyway, forgive me if this was already obvious, but I suppose the > >>> conclusion might be that, if you reject fundamental computational > >>> science as your basic theory of "matter", Bruno would expect you to > >>> take the same tack with respect to mind. I'm sure both he and you > >>> will put me right on this. > > >>> To protect a natural world primary ontology, I think Colin has to provide > >>> a > >>> naturalization of consciousness escaping digitalization at all nature > >>> levels, and this without redefining the first person by its comp domain > >>> of > >>> indeterminacy. Well he has to justify (or not) why he would say no to all > >>> doctors. But he can develop a theory of mind along this line. > >>> Colin has to find a difference between the physical world and the > >>> physical > >>> world extracted from comp. I provide a tool for doing that (but it is > >>> mathematically involved (the main weakness of comp: it demands the study > >>> of > >>> computer science)). > > >>> Bruno > > >>> Bruno Marchal wrote: > > >>> On 01 Feb 2011, at 07:51, Colin Hales wrote: > > >>> Hi Bruno, > > >>> I have been pondering this issue a bit and I am intrigued about how you > > >>> regard the problem space we inhabit. When you say things like ... > > >>> "Are you aware that If comp is true, that is if I am a machine ..." > > >>> I cannot fathom how you ever get to this point. > > >>> By looking at amoeabs, then reading book on molecular genetics, smelling > > >>> Turing universality, then by reading Gödel's proof and the discovery of > >>> how > > >>> to handle self-duplication and self-reference in representational > >>> machine, > > >>> ... > > >>> I did not take this too much seriously until my understanding of Church > > >>> thesis deepens. The closure of computerland for diagonalization makes > > >>> universal machine extremely universal, if I can say. > > >>> This is a presupposition that arises somehow in the lexicon you have > > >>> established within your overall framework of thinking. > > >>> It has lead me to some interest with that hypothesis. > > >>> Let me have a stab at how my view and yours correlate. > > >>> In my view > > >>> ======================================================== > > >>> A) There is a natural world. > > >>> We, Turing machines dogs, computers are all being 'computed' by it. > > >>> This is a set of unknown naturally occurring symbols > > >>> The natural 'symbols' interact naturally. > > >>> This is 'natural computation'. NOT like desktop computing. > > >>> Universe U ensues. > > >>> Scientist S is being computed within U > > >>> Scientist S can observe U from within. > > >>> U makes use of fundamental properties of the symbols to enable > > >>> .... observation, from within. Call this principle P-O > > >>> If by natural world you mean the world of the natural numbers with > > >>> addition and multiplication, I am OK. I can picture your "A)". > > >>> No. Here's where we part company. This presupposition about the relation > > >>> between the abstractions for quantity we call numbers, and the natural > >>> world > > >>> is one I do not make. All you can logically claim is that it is made of a > > >>> large set of 'something', these 'somethings' interact > > ... > > read more » -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.