# Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

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On 06 Feb 2011, at 16:37, 1Z wrote:```
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On Feb 5, 7:43 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
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```On 05 Feb 2011, at 14:14, 1Z wrote:

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```On Feb 4, 4:52 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
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```On 04 Feb 2011, at 13:45, David Nyman wrote:
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```I am saying that IF comp is true, then the laws of physics are
derivable/emerging on the computations, in the limit defined by the
first person indeterminacy.
So, for someone who want comp false, it has to hope the 'observed
physics' is different from the comp extracted physics.
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They don't have to do that, because they can resist the conclusion by
```refuting AR (qua Platonism) or MGA
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Computationalism needs Church thesis which needs AR (Arithmetical
Realism).
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Nope, just AT (arithmetic truth).
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Actually, comp needs only, for the ontology, the quite tiny complete Sigma_1 truth. Please don't put metaphysics where there is only religion (saying yes to the admittedly betting doctor). And with comp, it is math, indeed, even (full, above Sigma_1 arithmetic. Arithmetical realism is what you need to apply the excluded middle in computer science and in arithmetic. To understand the fundamental consequences of Church thesis you need to accept that some program computes function despite we have no means to know if it is total or partial, or that a program will stop or not.
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Only ultrafinitist denies AR.
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AR+, the idea that we don't need more than AR, in this setting, is a consequence of the math. From 'outside' the tiny effective universal sigma_1 complete set is enough. from inside, even mathematicalism is not enough (it is more 'theologicalism').
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```The ontological status of
mathematical
objects is a area of contention in metaphysics, and not
straightforwardly
proven  by mathematics itself.
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With comp, you don't need more than the part on which almost everybody agrees: arithmetical realism. The engineers, the scientists, most philosophers. Except for Thorgny Tholerus I never met an ultrafinitist. You don't have to decide if numbers are idea of the mind or sort of angel in Plato Heaven. With comp the very idea of number will itself be a number, a sort of second order number, relative to universes (universal numbers).
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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_mathematics

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```And you cannot refute an argument by anticipating a refutation. So if
you have a refutation of MGA you should present it.
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See Colin Klein;s refutation of Maudlin's Olympia.
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We have already discussed this and Colin Klein does not touch the movie graph argument. For now, I have not the time to evaluate if it really refutes Maudlin.
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(re)read the MGA posts and tell me how you solve the problem (without introducing non turing emulable magic in disguise).
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I am just translating the mind body problem in a language that a universal number can understand, and then this leads to the body problem, or the WR problem.
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We are just at the beginning of the formulation of the problem. yet, there is that radical idea that physics can be reduced to a part of universal number self-reflexion. Given that the mind body problem is not yet solved it seems obvious it is premature to say that science has decided between Plato and Aristotle.
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UDA is: comp entails a body-appearance problem.
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AUDA is: "Indeed. said the universal machine". But then it is a mathematical problem, and the universal machine, the LĂ¶bian one, can already provide a tiny modest hint to the quantum and the quale. The 1- comp white rabbits disappear by a similar process than the first person plural quantum rabbits, a sort of phase randomization.
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It is not my task to exhibit "anti-WR". I just show that IF comp is kept true, then there are "anti-WR", and let us search them, and if there are none, we can abandon comp, of course.
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You talk like if it was obvious that there is an irretrievable first person WR avalanche for a number/machine which experiences are distributed in a continuum of computational sequences (arithmetical relations). I just show that computer science makes this a non trivial (body appearance) problem at all, beyond the problem to define belief, knowledge, observability and sensibility in arithmetical or near arithmetical (for the non definable) one. AUDA is comp + classical theory of knowledge.
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Bruno

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I could say that Fermat theorem is false, because in one billion years
```someone will eventually find a flaw in Wiles' proof!

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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