On 07 Feb 2011, at 21:22, Andrew Soltau wrote:

On 07/02/11 19:42, Bruno Marchal wrote:Many would agree that mind might be related to the execution of analgorithm on some physical machine, as I like to explore that idea,but this is at the starting point of the reasoning, and is not,then, related to the fact that physical machines appears asrelatively stable products of some unknown number of algorithm too,and that this is already not just described in arithmetic, butemulated in arithmetical truth.This is the starting point I am trying to agree between the two of us. PROPOSITION 1The mind is related to the execution of an algorithm -- forinstance, on some physical machine.Then, we propose, we go beyond the concept of the physical machine,and simply suppose that:PROPOSITION 2The mind is the execution of an algorithm, an algorithm which simplyexists, without the requirement for any physical instantiation, orany physical universe / multiverse in actuality.In other words, the algorithm simply exists, and simply runs, andthe subjective experience of this algorithm:Looks exactly like Feels exactly like Sounds exactly like Smells and tastes exactly like a real physical, relativistic, quantum mechanical reality.The first proposition, that the mind is / is related to theexecution of an algorithm, I have no problem with whatsoever. Thisis what I see emphasised in your steps 1-7, with examples ofdisplacement of the observer in space, and then time, and thenreplacement, and then duplication in space and time.This all makes perfect sense. I think of this as tautological.

?

`Comp is everything but tautological. It asks for an act of faith. It`

`is a big jump. Even actual machine can prove that they cannot be sound`

`and prove that they are machine. Also, I don't like using the notion`

`of algorithm because it is a very complex notion which does not admit`

`precise definition. I prefer to talk on more concrete "programs",`

`which can be see as numbers relative to a universal number. I fix the`

`universal universal system to arithmetic (addition and`

`multiplication), which I assume, and from that I prove the existence`

`of universal numbers and many machines, and they discourses.`

The consequence of comp are usually judge even more less obvious.

Equally, there is no problem, of course, that in the context of theexecution of the algorithm, "physical machines appears as relativelystable products of some unknown number of algorithm too".ButThe *obvious* implication is that the physical machines *are*relatively stable products of some unknown number of algorithm,specifically, the algorithm instantiated in the physical quantummechanical universe.And that"physical machines appears as relatively stable products of someunknown number of algorithm too", in the virtual reality eachobserver generates between the ears, as Deutsch describes.Now Going on from that starting pointWe are philosophically interested in showing that this execution ofthe algorithm may be taking place in such a way as to give theappearance of the physical quantum mechanical universe, withoutthere having to be an actual physical quantum mechanical universe.I am delighted to entertain this possibility. However, I have not todate understood the basis on which you are claiming you have foundsupport for it. I'm sure I'll get there!

`You still miss the point. It is not a question of having any support`

`of that idea. It is a question of understanding that it is a`

`consequence of the comp assumption. It is a theorem, if you want. may`

`be there is still a flaw, but people fails to find it, despite a`

`reasonable number of people have tried. Some can sometimes show that`

`the reasoning might be improved and more pedagogical, but I think it`

`is just a theorem. You can obvioulsy still believe in a primitive`

`physical universe by either abandoning comp, or by adding an invisible`

`physical universe as an epiphenomenon (which is pretty ridiculous`

`'course).`

`Anyway, I give the tools to extract the physics, so we can already`

`compare. Eventually this can lead to a measuring of our degree of`

`computationalism with respect to nature.`

Bruno

It is hard for me to believe in any of this, but I just follow atheory toward its logical consequences.I know exactly what you mean about this. For years, after I had Ideduced the extraordinary implications of Everett's formulation, Iacknowledged that very peculiar properties of the transtemporalexperiential reality were implied, but I could not really take themas real and actual, let alone make them part of my personalepistemology. (Eventually, however, quite recently, theseimplications began to become real for me. This, I can report, is awildly exciting, terrifying, and totally all consuming transition!)I have titled the reply to your email as The propositions of comp?In this thread I would like to be crystal clear simply about whatthe propositions are, then I know exactly what we are discussing insubsequent / parallel threads.Andrew --You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

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