2011/2/12 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com>

>
>
> On Feb 11, 11:47 pm, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > 2011/2/11 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com>
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > > On Feb 10, 5:51 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> > > > Hi Stephen,
> >
> > > > On 10 Feb 2011, at 16:20, Stephen Paul King wrote:
> >
> > > > > Hi Bruno,
> >
> > > > > -----Original Message----- From: Bruno Marchal
> > > > > Sent: Thursday, February 10, 2011 8:24 AM
> > > > > To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
> > > > > Subject: Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false
> > > > > before its
> > > > > false?
> >
> > > > >> The only ontology is my conciousness, and some amount of
> consensual
> > > > >> reality (doctor, brain, etc.). It does not assume that physical
> > > > >> things
> > > > >> "really" or primitively exists, nor does it assume that numbers
> > > > >> really
> > > > >> exist in any sense. Just that they exist in the mathematical
> sense.
> >
> > > > >   Are you claiming that numbers have an existence that has no
> > > > > connection
> > > > > what so ever to the possibility of being known or understood or any
> > > > > other
> > > > > form of prehension or whatever might be considered as being the
> > > > > subject of
> > > > > awareness in any way?
> >
> > > > I was just saying that number does not need to be real in a sense
> > > > deeper than the usual mathematical, informal or formal, sense.
> >
> > > There is no usual sense.
> >
> > > >The
> > > > usual sense is enough to understand that the additive and
> > > > multiplicative structure emulates the UD, and that universal machines
> > > > project their experience on its border so that they perceive (and at
> > > > the least pretend and belief so) a physical reality, and this
> > > > correctly, assuming comp.
> >
> > > > >   What then establishes the mere possibility of this existence?
> >
> > > > The existence of the natural number is forever a mystery, provably so
> > > > assuming comp. You cannot extract the integers from a hat without
> > > > integers already in the hat.
> >
> > > However, they don't exist, so there is no mystery. You just
> > > have to pretend they do in order to play certain games.
> >
> > However they do exists...
>
> Proof?
>
>
I can think about them. I exist.


>  >you don't have to pretend to play games... what
> > does it mean to pretend something exists ?
>
> And you from the brithplace of Marcel Marceau!
>

?


>
> > All your definitions of existing lies down to interaction with you
> > (RITSTIAR)... You are so sure by what you mean by real, that it has so
> much
> > sense that you could not look beyond...
>
> I don't need to. Existing abstract objects, ie numbers, explain
> nothing about our ability to think about  abstract objects ,
> since they can't interact with our brains. (Benacerraf)
>

They interact with mine, I can think about them, that's an interaction, I
don't invent them. I do not decide their properties.


>
> > I don't agree with your definition
> > even with RITSTIAR just because I don't know what makes me real and I
> don't
> > know in what sense I'm more real than you or not... but I'm sure I'm more
> > real than you from my own POV.
>
> I don't think I need to worry about how real I am for my argument to
> go through
>
>
I think it does because you insist about RITSTIAR... and I don't know if you
are Real In the sense that *I* am real... I don't know either in what sense
I'm real, does it mean something beyond the fact that I can die and no more
be real if it's what it is ?


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