On Feb 14, 8:07 pm, David Nyman <da...@davidnyman.com> wrote: > On 14 February 2011 19:32, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote: > > > > > "If you have a physical token running a computation, you have > > a computation. What is eliminated? > > But such talk is all a posteriori and hence merely circular.
That the aposteriori is uniformly circular is new to me. Proof? > A > priori, if you claim that reality can be reduced to (i.e. actually > consists exclusively of) physical tokens doing whatever they are > doing, then that's all you have to play with, and moreover all you > appear to need to get the job done. If you want to further claim that > "computation" also exists Once more with feeling: reductions are identification, not eliminations. To say that there is nothing more to a computation than physical behaviour is not to say there is no computation. >in some sense capable of accounting for all > the a posteriori appearances (including all this talk of computation > and mind) you need to get a bigger boat. Why? > Or else you've just > eliminated both the computation and the mind (after all, who needs > 'em? - not the physical tokens, apparently). The distinction between > "reduction" and "elimination" is what I have said it is. > is mere absent-mindedness: you just have > to forget to remember that you can't eat your cake and still have it. > > David > > > > > On Feb 14, 6:21 pm, David Nyman <da...@davidnyman.com> wrote: > >> On 14 February 2011 12:35, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote: > > >> > Oh come on. How can you say that after I just told > >> > you 7 doesn't exist. > > >> Wouldn't this then imply that computation also doesn't exist, in an > >> analogous sense? > > > I can still have seven eggs in my fridge, and I can still > > have a computation running on a physical computer. > > >> And that consequently any computational > >> characterisation of the mental is in itself a mere fiction, reducing > >> to whatever physical behaviour is picked out under the rules of a > >> formal "game"? > > > If computation is multiply realisable, it never reduces to > > any particular physical behaviour, even if it always instantiated a > > such > > >> I recall that you aren't committed to CTM per se, but > >> if what you say about mathematics is true, and only the physical is > >> real, wouldn't it follow a priori that CTM just eliminates the mind? > > > No. Every running programme is physical. Only programmes > > with nothing to run on are eliminated > > >> I know you've said before that reduction isn't elimination, but I'm > >> not clear what is supposed to have any claim to "reality" here, other > >> than the physical tokens instantiating the "computation". > > >> David > > > If you have a physical token running a computation, you have > > a computation. What is eliminated? > > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > > "Everything List" group. > > To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. > > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > > For more options, visit this group > > athttp://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.