On Feb 14, 8:07 pm, David Nyman <da...@davidnyman.com> wrote:
> On 14 February 2011 19:32, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
>
>
> > "If you have a physical token running a computation, you have
> > a computation. What is eliminated?
>
> But such talk is all a posteriori and hence merely circular.

That the aposteriori is uniformly circular is new to me. Proof?

> A
> priori, if you claim that reality can be reduced to (i.e. actually
> consists exclusively of) physical tokens doing whatever they are
> doing, then that's all you have to play with, and moreover all you
> appear to need to get the job done.  If you want to further claim that
> "computation" also exists

Once more with feeling: reductions are identification, not
eliminations.
To say that there is nothing more to a computation than physical
behaviour is not
to say there is no computation.

>in some sense capable of accounting for all
> the a posteriori appearances (including all this talk of computation
> and mind) you need to get a bigger boat.

Why?

> Or else you've just
> eliminated both the computation and the mind (after all, who needs
> 'em? - not the physical tokens, apparently).  The distinction between
> "reduction" and "elimination"

is what I have said it is.

>
is mere absent-mindedness: you just have
> to forget to remember that you can't eat your cake and still have it.
>
> David
>
>
>
> > On Feb 14, 6:21 pm, David Nyman <da...@davidnyman.com> wrote:
> >> On 14 February 2011 12:35, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> >> > Oh come on. How can you say that after I just told
> >> > you 7 doesn't exist.
>
> >> Wouldn't this then imply that computation also doesn't exist, in an
> >> analogous sense?
>
> > I can still have seven eggs in my fridge, and I can still
> > have a computation running on a physical computer.
>
> >>  And that consequently any computational
> >> characterisation of the mental is in itself a mere fiction, reducing
> >> to whatever physical behaviour is picked out under the rules of a
> >> formal "game"?
>
> > If computation is multiply realisable, it never reduces to
> > any particular physical behaviour, even if it always instantiated a
> > such
>
> >>  I recall that you aren't committed to CTM per se, but
> >> if what you say about mathematics is true, and only the physical is
> >> real, wouldn't it follow a priori that CTM just eliminates the mind?
>
> > No. Every running programme is physical. Only programmes
> > with nothing to run on are eliminated
>
> >> I know you've said before that reduction isn't elimination, but I'm
> >> not clear what is supposed to have any claim to "reality" here, other
> >> than the physical tokens instantiating the "computation".
>
> >> David
>
> > If you have a physical token running a computation, you have
> > a computation. What is eliminated?
>
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