On Feb 15, 1:27 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 14 Feb 2011, at 20:05, 1Z wrote:
> > On Feb 14, 2:52 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> >> On 14 Feb 2011, at 13:35, 1Z wrote:
> >>> On Feb 14, 8:47 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> >>>> Do you believe that Goldbach conjecture is either true or false? If
> >>>> you agree with this, then you accept arithmetical realism, which is
> >>>> enough for the comp consequences.,
> >>> Nope. Bivalence can be accepted as a formal rule and therefore
> >>> not as a claim that some set of objects either exist or don't.
> >> That's my point.
> > Such a formal claim cannot support the conclusion that
> > I am an immaterial dreaming machine.
> It entails it formally. Then you interpret it like you want, with the  
> philosophy you want.

I want to say "number aren't real, so I'm not really a number"

>Just be careful in case you do say "yes" to a  
> physically real doctor.
> >>>> Do you believe that Church thesis makes sense? That is enough to  
> >>>> say
> >>>> that you believe in the 'arithmetical platonia'
> >>> Not at all.
> >> OK. This means that you are using "arithmetical platonia" in a sense
> >> which is not relevant for the reasoning.
> >> If you accept CT, there should be no problem with the reasoning at  
> >> all.
> > I accept CT and reject Platonism,
> > and thus the reasoning does not go
> > through.
> To provide sense to CT, you need to be able to say that any program P  
> on any input x will stop or will not stop. So you have to accept the  
> use of classical logic on numbers definable properties. That is what I  
> called Arithmetical realism.

That doesn't tell me anything about what I am.

> I prefer to use Platonism for theology. Platonism is the theology in  
> which the physical reality is the shadow, or the border, or the  
> projection of something else.

In the context of phiosophy of mathematics, Platonism
is the claim that numbers have immaterial, non spatio temporal

>That use of Platonism come up in the  
> conclusion of the reasoning and is not assumed at the start.
> >>>> . People needs to be
> >>>> ultrafinitist to reject the arithmetical platonia.
> >>> No, they just need to be anti realist.
> >> Same remark.
> > Nope. Finitists think 7 exists., anti realists think it doesn't.
> Use AR formally. The theological conclusion will be provided by the  
> fact that you might be able to imagine surviving a digital graft.

I might well imagine being reincarnated in some other physical
medium. I won't imagine being reincarnated as a number

> >>>> Personnaly I am a bit skeptical on set realism, because it is  
> >>>> hard to
> >>>> define it, but for the numbers I have never met people who are not
> >>>> realist about them.
> >>> Oh come on. How can you say that after I just told
> >>> you 7 doesn't exist.
> >> You contradict your self,
> > No I don't. How many times have I explained that
> > mathematical existence claims are true in a fictive
> > sense that doesn't imply real existence
> Then please use that fictive sense in the reasoning. Then yes doctor +  
> occam gives the ontological conclusion.

No, if it has a fictive premise, it has a fictive conclusion.

> >> unless you mean that seven is not made of
> >> matter. In which case comp nothing exists.
> > What does "comp nothing exists" mean?
> Sorry. I meant "In which case comp implies nothing exists."

Comp implies that the midn is a computer. All known
computers are phsycial, so comp implies that the mind is physical.

> >>>> Even to say "I am not arithmetical realist" is
> >>>> enough to be an arithmetical realist
> >>> Nonsense.
> >> Probable, given your rather inappropriate sense of metaphysical
> >> realism in mathematics.
> > I am  not a realist about maths. You must be because you exist
> > and you think you are a  number
> I start from the assumption that I can survive through a digital  
> backup. So locally "I am a number", in that sense.

That's misleading. There is a difference between being tied
to no particular physical instance and being tied to no instance at

>But this concerns  
> only my third person I (body), and I show that the first person  
> naturally associated (by its memories, or by the classical theory of  
> knowledge) is not a number.
> >>>> . A real anti-ariothmetical
> >>>> realist cannot even spaeak about arithmetical realism. You need  
> >>>> to be
> >>>> an arithmetical realist to make sense of denying it.
> >>> Like the old canard that to deny God is to accept God? Naah. Meaning
> >>> is not
> >>> just reference.
> >> A reasoning is valid, or not valid.
> > A true conclusion requires soundness as well as validity
> In science we never know if our premisses and conclusions are true or  
> not.

I can still resist the conclusion by *believing* Platonism
to be false, while believing comp to be true.

>We judge validity only.
> Bruno
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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