On Feb 16, 5:10 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 16 Feb 2011, at 16:17, 1Z wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Feb 16, 8:46 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> >> On 15 Feb 2011, at 20:22, 1Z wrote:
>
> >>>>>>> I want to say "number aren't real, so I'm not really a number"
>
> >>>>>> All your talk about numbers which are not real seems to me
> >>>>>> nonsensical. Also you seems to know what is real and what is not
> >>>>>> real,
>
> >>>>> Sure. Horses are real and unicorns aren't. Didn't you know that?
>
> >>>> I meant "in general".
>
> >>> I don't need anything more than
> >>> 1) I am real
> >>> 2) Unreal things don't generate real things
>
> >>> I think both of those are hard to dispute.
>
> >> But nobody believes that numbers are unreal.
>
> > I do. Hartry Field does. Etc.
>
> Fair enough. Nobody except nominalist philosophers.

Is that supposed to mean that the intuitions of working mathematicians
override the mere arguments of philosophers

> >> They believe that numbers
> >> are not material but that is different.
> >> You beg the question by identifying real with material, and by
> >> assuming a primitive materiality.
>
> > You beg the question by assuming Platonism
>
> I assume that arithmetical truth (actually the tiny effective part) is
> true independently of observers. It is a common assumption, and I am
> not saying it is true, just part of what is needed to make sense of
> the term  'digital' in digital mechanism. All we nedd is that it makes
> sense to say that ExP(x) or that ~ExP(x), with P decidable, so that we
> can say that the (mathematica) run of a (mathematical) program stop,
> or does not stop, and proceed to the consequences of Church thesis.

Without Platonism you cannot eliminate matter

>
>
> >> This is obstructive of thought,
> >> only. Your critics of science reminds me on the critics on Einstein's
> >> relativity by Bergson. I do appreciate Bergson, but his dialog with
> >> Einstein was a dialog of deaf. A bit like Goethe critics of Newton.
> >> Pseudo-philosophy, like pseudo-religion, are authoritative argument
> >> in
> >> disguise.
>
> >>>>> You cannot come to conclusions about my existence
> >>>>> with a merely formal statement of bivalence
>
> >>>> I use bivalence but also "yes doctor".
>
> >>> But YD doesn't get anywhere if I am only agreeing
> >>> to a physical substitution
>
> >> The whole point of the UDA+MGA is to show that YD (defined by a
> >> physical substitution) does lead to the abandon of the physical as
> >> primary.
>
> > The physical cant be abandoned unless there is something to
> > take its place. Hence you need Platonism
>
> The physical is not abandoned.

It is abandoned as primary. In your own words.

> Just that if comp is correct it has to
> be retrieved from self-reference logic.



> >> So you are just confirming that you are using the notion of
> >> primary matter as a reason for not studying an argument. You should
> >> better search an error in it.
>
> >>>> Then after concluding, we can
> >>>> take as theory of everything just elementary arithmetic, and it is
> >>>> explained in all detail how to recover formally physics (among
> >>>> other
> >>>> things) from that.
>
> >>>>>>>> Use AR formally. The theological conclusion will be provided by
> >>>>>>>> the
> >>>>>>>> fact that you might be able to imagine surviving a digital
> >>>>>>>> graft.
>
> >>>>>>> I might well imagine being reincarnated in some other physical
> >>>>>>> medium. I won't imagine being reincarnated as a number
>
> >>>>>> It is not so difficult to imagine. If you can imagine being
> >>>>>> reincarneted in a virtual reality, like in a dream, you can
> >>>>>> uderstand
> >>>>>> that the feeling of "matter" is a construct of your mind. Then it
> >>>>>> is
> >>>>>> just a matter of study to understand that arithmetical truth
> >>>>>> contains
> >>>>>> all the emulation of all programs,
>
> >>>>> As it is purely hypothetical it doesn't contain a ny actual
> >>>>> running programmes.
>
> >>>> Actual is an indexical, and can be relative to numbers'
> >>>> configurations.
>
> >>> If a multiverse is not actual, no-one within it can make
> >>> and indexical judgement of actuality.
>
> >> Sure. But that's begging the question again and again.
>
> > The converse is also question begging.
>
> I don't see this. The ontology and the epistemology are clear enough.
> Primary matter is not needed,

Given the assumption of Platonism. And vice versa

> unless there are too much WR, but that
> is the point: the mind body problem is reduced into a problem of WRs.
>
>
>
>
>
> >>>>>>>>>> You contradict your self,
>
> >>>>>>>>> No I don't. How many times have I explained that
> >>>>>>>>> mathematical existence claims are true in a fictive
> >>>>>>>>> sense that doesn't imply real existence
>
> >>>>>>>> Then please use that fictive sense in the reasoning. Then yes
> >>>>>>>> doctor +
> >>>>>>>> occam gives the ontological conclusion.
>
> >>>>>>> No, if it has a fictive premise, it has a fictive conclusion.
>
> >>>>>> That is your idiosyncracy. You can add as many "fictive" terms as
> >>>>>> you
> >>>>>> want, it will not change the validity of the reasoning, and the
> >>>>>> testability of comp (+ the classical theory of knowledge).
>
> >>>>> If it is testable, it is false.
>
> >>>> Why?
>
> >>> Not enough WR's.
>
> >> Intuitively you are right, but you have to take into account computer
> >> science which shows that intuition here is of no use. It might be
> >> possible that in fine mechanism leads to too much White Rabbits, but
> >> that has not been proved yet. Again, that would not change the
> >> reasoning, just the conclusion.
>
> > WRs follow from any straightforward approach to measure.
>
> It is nice that you have at least understood this. It is the main
> contribution. But I doubt anyone can take you seriously with the idea
> that the measure problem admit a straightforward approach,

Why not? Why shouldn't I assume
I am equally likely to witness any world I exist in?
Surely tha tis just the Principle of Indifference

>and AUDA
> shows that it is not straightforward at all.
>
> > The burden is on the multiversalists to avoid the objection.
>
> Gleason theorem and/or decoherence theory for the quantum multiverse.

You can't assume that a mathematical multiverse will work
just like a physical multiverse.

> Self-reference logics for the comp multidream.
>
>
>
>
>
> >>>>>>>>> What does "comp nothing exists" mean?
>
> >>>>>>>> Sorry. I meant "In which case comp implies nothing exists."
>
> >>>>>>> Comp implies that the midn is a computer. All known
> >>>>>>> computers are phsycial, so comp implies that the mind is
> >>>>>>> physical.
>
> >>>>>> You will not find any book in physics, except by Zristotle which
> >>>>>> use
> >>>>>> the notion of primary matter.
>
> >>>>> They all do. Physicists think matter/energy exists.
>
> >>>> Some does not. John A. Wheeler is open to the idea that physics
> >>>> emerge
> >>>> from something non physical (cf It from Bit).
>
> >>> And everyone else doesn't.
>
> >> New paradigm takes time to be swallowed.
>
> > That is quite a climb-down from your original claim
> > that no physicist believes in matter.
>
> I never said that. I said that no physicist use the concept of
> *primary* matter.

I would say that very few would see any difference.

> On the contrary I took time to explain that we live
> in an Aristotelian paradigm, based on the assumption, made by the
> followers of Aristotle, that there is primary matter. But the only one
> who have really used that concept are the catholic in their attempt to
> explain how bread can be Christ corpus.



> I certainly do believe in matter. I would not have worked so hard to
> explain it, without assuming it, if I was believing that it does not
> exist. But I am pretty sure now that if digital mechanism is true,
> matter is not *primary*, but evolved from coherence dream conditions.
> A good thing because nobody can explain what is primary matter, except
> as a philosophical "don't ask" sort of answer.
>
>
>
> >>>> Anyway, to refer to a what people think is not an argument.
>
> >>> Then why is it refer to books?
>
> >> Because (good) books contain (good) arguments.
>
> > Oh, right, If  a physics text mentions matter, it is a Bad Book.
>
> I think that you are confusing matter and primary matter. Matter is on
> the order of the acceptable facts. Primary matter is a metaphysical
> notion defined by Aristotle, and reified by most his followers (and un-
> reified in Plotinus' matter theory, which has a clean arithmetical
> interpretation (indeed, the measure one for the arithmetical notion of
> probability/credibility on relative computations).
>
>
>
>
>
> >>>>>> You will not find any book on computers which mention the
> >>>>>> notion of
> >>>>>> matter.
>
> >>>>> They don't mention pixie dust either. One cannot
> >>>>> conclude from that that anyone has a background
> >>>>> assumption that computers are made of pixie dust.
>
> >>>> The point is that the notion of computer used in the proof is the
> >>>> traditional mathematical notion.
>
> >>> There is  no mathematical notion such that you can run a
> >>> programme on
> >>> it.
>
> >> (Sigma_1) arithmetical reality do run all programs, in the
> >> mathematical (non material, but real)
>
> > ie Platonic!
>
> Realist. To prove that (Sigma_1) arithmetical reality do run all
> programs, all you need is the axiom of Robinson arithmetic, including
> the excluded middle principle.

No,k that proves that it truly does. To prove that it reallty does,
you need an ontological argument to the effect that it exists
somewhere

> >> sense. To make primitive matter
> >> to instantiate consciousness, you will have to make consciousness and
> >> matter non Turing emulable,
>
> > I do not, as I have explained many times
>
> You have to!
> Or you have to find a flaw in the UDA+MGA reasoning.


For and Against Matter
Matter is a bare substrate with no properties of its own. The question
may well be asked at this point: what roles does it perform ? Why not
dispense with matter and just have bundles of properties -- what does
matter add to a merely abstract set of properties? The answer is that
not all bundles of posible properties are instantiated, that they
exist.

What does it mean to say something exists ? "..exists" is a meaningful
predicate of concepts rather than things. The thing must exist in some
sense to be talked about. But if it existed full, a statement like
"Nessie doesn't exist" would be a contradiction ...it would amount to
"the existing thing Nessie doesnt exist". However, if we take that the
"some sense" in which the subject of an "...exists" predicate exists
is only initially as a concept, we can then say whether or not the
concept has something to refer to. Thus "Bigfoot exists" would mean
"the concept 'Bigfoot' has a referent".

What matter adds to a bundle of properties is existence. A non-
existent bundle of properties is a mere concept, a mere possibility.
Thus the concept of matter is very much tied to the idea of
contingency or "somethingism" -- the idea that only certain possible
things exist.

The other issue matter is able to explain as a result of having no
properties of its own is the issue of change and time. For change to
be distinguishable from mere succession, it must be change in
something. It could be a contingent natural law that certain
properties never change. However, with a propertiless substrate, it
becomes a logical necessity that the substrate endures through change;
since all changes are changes in properties, a propertiless substrate
cannot itself change and must endure through change.

> >> and this is in a very special way. With
> >> mechanism, neither consciousness nor matter are globally emulable.
> >> Consciousness and matter is related to infinities of computations,
> >> and
> >> they are observable once we look below our substitution level.
>
> >>>>>> That is why I make those things precise through the MGA. But it
> >>>>>> helps
> >>>>>> people to understand that we are immaterial before learning the
> >>>>>> MGA
> >>>>>> stuff. I am immaterial with comp in the sense that I can in
> >>>>>> principle
> >>>>>> chose a different body at all times, so I am not my body.
>
> >>>>> That is misleading for the usual reasons.
>
> >>>> Klein on Maudlin?
>
> >>> No: "not dependent on a particular body" does not mean "capable of
> >>> existing with no body"
>
> >> You still beg the question. The UDA+MGA shows that "not dependent
> >> on a
> >> particular body" entails that your consciousness needs a relative
> >> body
> >> only for manifesting itself with some reasonable relative
> >> probabilities, and that eventually a body is made of the interference
>
> ...
>
> read more »
>
> >> and this is in a very special way. With
> >> mechanism, neither consciousness nor matter are globally emulable.
> >> Consciousness and matter is related to infinities of computations,  
> >> and
> >> they are observable once we look below our substitution level.
>
> >>>>>> That is why I make those things precise through the MGA. But it
> >>>>>> helps
> >>>>>> people to understand that we are immaterial before learning the  
> >>>>>> MGA
> >>>>>> stuff. I am immaterial with comp in the sense that I can in
> >>>>>> principle
> >>>>>> chose a different body at all times, so I am not my body.
>
> >>>>> That is misleading for the usual reasons.
>
> >>>> Klein on Maudlin?
>
> >>> No: "not dependent on a particular body" does not mean "capable of
> >>> existing with no body"
>
> >> You still beg the question. The UDA+MGA shows that "not dependent  
> >> on a
> >> particular body" entails that your consciousness needs a relative  
> >> body
> >> only for manifesting itself with some reasonable relative
> >> probabilities, and that eventually a body is made of the interference
> >> of infinities of bodies emulations. I am not saying that this is  
> >> true,
> >> but that it follows from the mechanist assumption.
>
> > Not from comp alone. You cannot eliminate matter without having
> > somethin
> > to replace it with
>
> Matter is not eliminated. Primary matter is made into phlogistic or  
> ether like concept.
>
> Peter, we are in a loop, I'm afraid. I suggest that we forget  
> momentarily that immateriality stuff, which is the last part of the  
> reasoning, and admittedly the most counterintuitive. Do you have any  
> problem with UDA1-7? We can come back on UDA-8 later. Do you see that  
> in any sufficiently big physical universe, physics is already reduced  
> to computer science?

That's contradictory. You can't show there is no
(primary) physics using a physical UDA.

> This might help you to proceed on the last step.  
> Let us say that a physical (primary if you want) universe is  
> sufficiently big if, by definition,  it runs the UD forever.
>
> Brunohttp://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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