Dear Bruno,

Please set this aside as a stand alone synopsis of your idea. It is a brilliant explanation that I cannot argue against. I would only append to it additional considerations that must be taken into account if we are going to consider how many minds (or many bodies) can be considered as interacting. For example: each "body", as per your definition, would have at least one "mind" that would have simulations of the possible behaviors of bodies, dually every mind would have a collection of bodies that could implement it. A Mind meets another Mind only via the simulations of bodies that they have in common and a Body can met another Body only via the minds that they can implement in common. This is what we see in Pratt's Chu space transform. :-)

Onward!

Stephen

-----Original Message----- From: Bruno Marchal
Sent: Sunday, February 20, 2011 4:16 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: How embryogenesis fits in the mind-body problem?


On 20 Feb 2011, at 19:46, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

Dear Bruno,

Embryogenesis concerns a multicellular organism

Obviously. But you ask for the *mind* of cells, which are unicellular,
(although I like currently to see them as bacteria (+ a virus)
occupying a sort of house).



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Embryogenesis

I am not sure if one can speak of embryogenesis of amoeba or bacteria.

I was talking on the multicellular planaria:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J9EuFuJF9N0
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vXN_5SPBPtM

My self-regenerating program PLANARIA was made of many cells,
subprograms occupying different locations (in the code), and having
different functions. Yet you can cut it in many pieces as little as
one cell, and any such one cell regenerates the entire program!
It is described in the volume 2, 2, here:
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/bxlthesis/consciencemecanisme.html
(That work describes theorem provers, in LISP, for each hypostasis).

The recursion theoretic answer to self-regeneration gives the
conceptual solution to embryogenesis, as that one cell regenerating
complete "planaria" illustrates.
Of course the whole thing is far more sophisticated for the carbon
implemented local living beings.




So my question was actually about human being. I believe that I was conceived by fertilization the ovum in my mother by sperm from my father. Then the question is how my first person view has been developed and what happens with it after my death?

That's the question I have always been interested in.

OK, I will "answer" it, but please add as many grains of salt as needed.

The answer is that it depends to what you identify your soul to.
If you identify yourself (your 1-self) as you in company of your dog
Pluto, you will already die the day Pluto dies.

So your first person view will go as far as the condition are met such
that you can say "OK, I survive this far".

Where is located your 'first person', your 'soul'. Well the theory (Bp
& p) says that is located both
- 'on earth', by which I mean 'effectively implemented', that is by a
number ( a 'body') incarnating (implementing itself) a set of beliefs
(Bp),
- and in Platonia (p), because the soul keep up the umbilical cord
between its body (Bp) and truth p.

How? Lucklily or because glued by an explosive sheaves of coherent
histories in the computational continuum (but this is more
sensibility: Bp & Dp & p).

So what happens after your death?

First there is no evidence that 'death' ever happens as a first person
experience. Second, as I said, it might depend on what you identify
yourself with.

You do "know", accepting the theory of the universal lobian machine,
that you have a part on Earth (Bp, provable) and a part in Heaven(Hell-
Platonia-truth)  (p). And I said, you have the choice for the
identification.

I am not sure if you have followed the UDA from step 1 to step 8. It
is something that you can, if not understand the necessity (assuming
comp) at least understand the possibility. Your consciousness is not
related to the "physical brain state", it is related to the person,
itself related to the infinities of computational histories going
through their current digital states. Normally this is easier to
conceive for the quantum many-worlders than anyone else. Your
consciousness is related to a continuum of computational histories,
and below your substitution level, all universal machines competes,
with all oracles. Now, given that continuum; locally you can conceive
that your consciousness is a consciousness flux going through many
computations (which are all emulated by the additive and
multiplication relations among natural numbers).
So it is, with that view, even unclear if you can die in any way, or
at any time, from your first person view. In principle you survive
always in the most normal computation (comp-immortality).

But less us assume you can die. (What does that mean?). The relation
between provability (Bp) and truth (p) run very deep.

If you can survive the death of your dog, you might survive with less
memories, or, like in dreams, with other memories. Here this might
leads to thought experiment involving amnesia and memories
substitution, which can help, but also perturbates a little bit. And
the same can be said for "real" experimentation with drugs.

In principle, you might discover that you are already happy to be just
a modest universal machine, and what can seem to be amazing is that
could correspond to a sort of "enlightened-altered" state of
consciousness which is statical, that machine is in Platonia, and can
know it (it is outside of time space and numbers). Through amnesia
consciousness can backtrack on histories, and by remorse, might
undifferentiate you and redifferentiate you, wandeling on the coherent
multi-dreams until you make peace with your self, or just recognize
your self. This is speculative, AUDA gives the tools to ask the
machine. It is technically hard to answer those question todays.

Dissociative drugs are very interesting. Unlike cannabis which put oil
on all synapses and augment the relative activity of all neurons, a
dissociative drug like Salvia seems to cut the connection, very
selectively, between parts of your brain. It gives tool to discover
that we can identify ourselves to something more basic and primary,
even up to that state "out of time and space".

The "error" of many aristotelians consist in "attaching" consciousness
to the "the brain". It seems to me that a literal understanding of
comp leads to the understanding that consciousness is not related to
the brain, but to the infinity of similar brain (emulated in
arithmetic). If you assume a "big" universe, you don't need MGA (the
step 8) to see that. A body brain is more a filter of consciousness so
that a person evolves through "normal histories".  Consciousness
accelerates the histories, it bends somehow the 1-computational space.

Evgenii, you ask the most difficult question, although I consider it
to be both very important, but also that it is important that we
cannot know the answer. It is not serious to be to much serious on
this. But we can propose theories, reason, experiments, and progress
in that field too, never pretending we have the truth. Experimentally,
through the mentally ill and their medication, many information can be
drawn, also. Listening to the other is a good heuristic.

Probably the Tibetans got the main point. After death, nothing is
easy, and there can be more death and more taxes. There is a whole
arithmetical bardo thodol, I think. Not all experiences are
memorizable, and comp keeps a part of the secret naturally. You might
after death, wake up as someone, in the year 9007 after JC, who was,
for a minute, emulating a moment of a life of Evgenii Rudnyi.  And
that, might depend if we succeed to keep up teaching math to our
children.

It is ironical that with mechanism, when a machine has the cognitive
ability to get the point on its possibility to perpetuate its local
implementation (with an 'artificial' brain), she has the cognitive
ability to get the point that she will survive anyway, no matter what.
It is the comp-immortality stuff, and if things goes well, it should
explain the quantum immortality stuff. But with amnesia, immortality
itself get more, much more, than one meaning. The real question
concern first person plural immortality, and on this 'we are nowhere",
sorry.

Anyway, what matter are our values. To share them. To multiply them,
if only to make higher the credibility that they will apply to you who
ever you are.

Ah! I think I can say this, assuming two seconds that hell and heaven
exist. There is a good news and there is a bad news. The bad news is
that in Heaven, there are still (many) doors to Hell. The good news is
that in Hell there are (few) doors to Heaven. And this might be used
to comfort the harm-reduction philosophy on theoretical computer
science grounds.

I have probably asserted many propositions belonging to G* minus G,
which should be kept secret, and I hope some plant will forgiven me
from this :)
The key is that *you* add the grains of salt, and notably the comp
hypothesis, the local but interrogative self-correctness, etc.

Best,

Bruno



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