I am still trying to figure out what is it that you don't understand
in the seventh step of the UDA, as opposed to the eighth step.
I resend my question to 1Z, as promise, with some slight changes.
Most of 1Z critics of the reversal physics/number-theory consequence
of comp were based on immateriality. Immateriality is a consequence of
step 8 (which is the Movie graph argument), but it help to understand
that the reversal occurs already in presence of primary matter once we
assume that the universe is *robust*, with "robust" meaning that the
universe run a UD forever. Neither Andrew nor 1Z answered my question.
I resend it with minor correction.
This shows that the epistemological reversal (reduction of the
*science* physics to the *science* of number) can occur before the
ontological reduction (reduction of primary matter to numbers
Matter is not eliminated. Primary matter is made into phlogistic or
ether like concept.
Peter, we are in a loop, I'm afraid. I suggest that we forget
momentarily that immateriality stuff, which is the last part of the
reasoning, and admittedly the most counterintuitive. Do you have any
problem with UDA1-7? We can come back on UDA-8 later. Do you see that
in any sufficiently big physical universe, physics is already reduced
to computer science?
That's contradictory. You can't show there is no
(primary) physics using a physical UDA.
UDA-7 does not show that there is no primary universe. It assumes it
In UDA-7, the universe is supposed to be sufficiently big or *robust*
in the sense that it physically runs a UD. That is the assumption.
Step-seven is the proof that IF there is a primary universe which is
robust enough to actually do the UD running, THEN the physical science
are reduced to computer science (and NOT: "primary matter* is reduced
to program or number relation, for this you need the step 8).
Now, I guess you agree that if it is the existence of the physical
universe which makes us real, be it by uniqueness (UWI), or
multiplication (MWI), that primary existence will support the running
They might be multiplied accordingly in the primary MWI. So, to
predict ideally correctly my next subjective instants, I have to take
into account the measure, in case it exists, on all the computational
histories, run by the UD, and having gone through my current mental
states (at my substitution level and below).
So, despite the primary matter ontology has not been reduced to
computer science, the physical *science* (the one used to predict
observable events in my physical neighborhood) has been reduced to
computer science. The WR are back.
So, step seven entails already the epistemological reduction in
presence of a *big* universe. The *objects* of the physical science
have not been reduced to the *objects* of computer/number science, but
the physical *science* has been reduced to computer/number *science*,
through COMP + BIG-Universe, and this despite the assumed existence of
In particular, you can, after step seven, still hold both MEC and MAT,
by holding that this has been a proof that our universe is
"little" (not *big*, not robust). If primary matter can makes us
exist, it better should not allow a primary material UD to run
forever, because that generates the primary material emulation of all
the virtual white rabbits. (Or you can try to find a flaw in UDA1-6,
MGA, after that point, makes that move toward a "little" universe
useless, so that with the usual Occam, primary matter is eliminated.
Now some people think that we can already throw out the primary
physical universe at step seven, by using directly Occam. But this
needs the conditional context that comp is true AND will be confirmed.
That is a stronger form of Occam than usual, given the non entire
constructibility of the UD argument, at this stage. But wait AUDA
makes it constructive: so you see AUDA and MGA can compete a bit, in
my mind, for the status of best Occam elimination of primary matter
for the UDA.
Andrew, are you there? Does this help you for the step seven?
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