On 21 Feb 2011, at 21:16, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

Thank you for your answer. I am also sorry for confusion as with

"What mind-body research says about the development of mind from a single cell and then its death?"

I have meant

"What mind-body research says about the development of mind from a single cell and then the death of mind?"

So it was not about single cell organisms, it was just misplaced "its".

I realize this eventually. No problem.

Right now I am not trying to follow your UDA, rather I am trying to understand the consequences. I am a chemist by background and I prefer follow my intuition rather than following proofs.

But with computer science, intuition can be misleading. Intuition is handled by the first person, and recover with the "soul hypostase (Bp & p)". But G and G* are known as being counter-intuitive, like the UDA illustrates already a bit "intuitively".

I agree with you in that what people refer to as "I" is not associated with the brain only. Let me quote two citations from the book Spontaneity of Consciousness by Russian scientist Vasily Nalimov that I like a lot:

"Human consciousness is seen by us as a text."

"Personality is primarily the text that interprets itself."

OK. Except that consciousness is not literally a text. It is an experience. A deep quale.

The book seems not be translated in English but if you interested there is a paper from Journal of Humanistic Psychology that introduces the author:


Hence I would agree that when my body dies I will presumably remain in my archives on the hard disc of my computer (or somewhere in Platonia), or something like this.

It makes no sense if the text is not interpreted. But arithmetic does interpret it. Arithmetic emulates the computation, like a block- universe in general relativity can be said to emulate the observer's time.

Yet, then let us consider the birth as it could be even more interesting. Let me put it this way.

Some time ago my wife and I have conceived a daughter that now she is in Netherlands where she likes making photos (http://fortunaa.viewbook.com/ ).

Nice pics :)

I guess that this is my first person view. Well, I also agree that there are actually many my first person views, as I have changed a lot during my life. Still in my current first person view there is some invariant that I refer to as "I". By the way, how would you define such an invariant in your theory?

Bp & p (in AUDA)
Personal diary, being annihilated and reconstituted, in UDA. (as opposed to the diary of the third person observers who does not enter in the teleportation and self-multiplication device). If comp is true, then the "real first person" is not definable by a machine. Minsky is right about this: machines will be bewildered as we are about who we "really" are.

Moreover my first person view assumes that there are some others first person views, for example, that of my wife and that of my daughter. Then a question is how the first person view of my daughter has been formed according to your theory.

Never. You have just make higher the probability that she could manifest herself relatively to you. But souls lives in Platonia, they only dream that they leaved Platonia. Somehow, you make her soul falling from Heaven, but then it is part of the game (I don't think that making love is a sin, to be clear!).

Finally what happens from the third person view if we compare my current first person view with that before conceiving the daughter?

I am not sure I understand the question. Third person views are captured by what you can describe with numbers. But due to UDA, even the physical reality is actually a first person (plural) view, which limits the third person view to arithmetic, and makes things a bit hard to describe in simple terms (first person plural looks like third person views). The difference of your first person views is more or less a difference of accessible memories, related to the infinities of the most probable computations related to your histories. You might try to articulate why this does not really answer your question, as I feel it did not. Perhaps after you progress enough in the UD stuff?



On 20.02.2011 22:16 Bruno Marchal said the following:

On 20 Feb 2011, at 19:46, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

Dear Bruno,

Embryogenesis concerns a multicellular organism

Obviously. But you ask for the *mind* of cells, which are
unicellular, (although I like currently to see them as bacteria (+ a
virus) occupying a sort of house).


I am not sure if one can speak of embryogenesis of amoeba or

I was talking on the multicellular planaria:


My self-regenerating program PLANARIA was made of many cells,
subprograms occupying different locations (in the code), and having
different functions. Yet you can cut it in many pieces as little as
one cell, and any such one cell regenerates the entire program! It is
described in the volume 2, 2, here:
(That work describes theorem provers, in LISP, for each hypostasis).

The recursion theoretic answer to self-regeneration gives the
conceptual solution to embryogenesis, as that one cell regenerating
complete "planaria" illustrates. Of course the whole thing is far
more sophisticated for the carbon implemented local living beings.

So my question was actually about human being. I believe that I was
conceived by fertilization the ovum in my mother by sperm from my
father. Then the question is how my first person view has been
developed and what happens with it after my death?

That's the question I have always been interested in.

OK, I will "answer" it, but please add as many grains of salt as

The answer is that it depends to what you identify your soul to. If
you identify yourself (your 1-self) as you in company of your dog
Pluto, you will already die the day Pluto dies.

So your first person view will go as far as the condition are met
such that you can say "OK, I survive this far".

Where is located your 'first person', your 'soul'. Well the theory
(Bp & p) says that is located both - 'on earth', by which I mean
'effectively implemented', that is by a number ( a 'body')
incarnating (implementing itself) a set of beliefs (Bp), - and in
Platonia (p), because the soul keep up the umbilical cord between its
body (Bp) and truth p.

How? Lucklily or because glued by an explosive sheaves of coherent
histories in the computational continuum (but this is more
sensibility: Bp & Dp & p).

So what happens after your death?

First there is no evidence that 'death' ever happens as a first
person experience. Second, as I said, it might depend on what you
identify yourself with.

You do "know", accepting the theory of the universal lobian machine,
that you have a part on Earth (Bp, provable) and a part in
Heaven(Hell-Platonia-truth) (p). And I said, you have the choice for
the identification.

I am not sure if you have followed the UDA from step 1 to step 8. It
is something that you can, if not understand the necessity (assuming
comp) at least understand the possibility. Your consciousness is not
related to the "physical brain state", it is related to the person,
itself related to the infinities of computational histories going
through their current digital states. Normally this is easier to
conceive for the quantum many-worlders than anyone else. Your
consciousness is related to a continuum of computational histories,
and below your substitution level, all universal machines competes,
with all oracles. Now, given that continuum; locally you can conceive
that your consciousness is a consciousness flux going through many
computations (which are all emulated by the additive and
multiplication relations among natural numbers). So it is, with that
view, even unclear if you can die in any way, or at any time, from
your first person view. In principle you survive always in the most
normal computation (comp-immortality).

But less us assume you can die. (What does that mean?). The relation
between provability (Bp) and truth (p) run very deep.

If you can survive the death of your dog, you might survive with less
memories, or, like in dreams, with other memories. Here this might
leads to thought experiment involving amnesia and memories
substitution, which can help, but also perturbates a little bit. And
the same can be said for "real" experimentation with drugs.

In principle, you might discover that you are already happy to be
just a modest universal machine, and what can seem to be amazing is
that could correspond to a sort of "enlightened-altered" state of
consciousness which is statical, that machine is in Platonia, and can
know it (it is outside of time space and numbers). Through amnesia
consciousness can backtrack on histories, and by remorse, might
undifferentiate you and redifferentiate you, wandeling on the
coherent multi-dreams until you make peace with your self, or just
recognize your self. This is speculative, AUDA gives the tools to ask
the machine. It is technically hard to answer those question todays.

Dissociative drugs are very interesting. Unlike cannabis which put
oil on all synapses and augment the relative activity of all neurons,
a dissociative drug like Salvia seems to cut the connection, very
selectively, between parts of your brain. It gives tool to discover
that we can identify ourselves to something more basic and primary,
even up to that state "out of time and space".

The "error" of many aristotelians consist in "attaching"
consciousness to the "the brain". It seems to me that a literal
understanding of comp leads to the understanding that consciousness
is not related to the brain, but to the infinity of similar brain
(emulated in arithmetic). If you assume a "big" universe, you don't
need MGA (the step 8) to see that. A body brain is more a filter of
consciousness so that a person evolves through "normal histories".
Consciousness accelerates the histories, it bends somehow the
1-computational space.

Evgenii, you ask the most difficult question, although I consider it
to be both very important, but also that it is important that we
cannot know the answer. It is not serious to be to much serious on
this. But we can propose theories, reason, experiments, and progress
in that field too, never pretending we have the truth.
Experimentally, through the mentally ill and their medication, many
information can be drawn, also. Listening to the other is a good

Probably the Tibetans got the main point. After death, nothing is
easy, and there can be more death and more taxes. There is a whole
arithmetical bardo thodol, I think. Not all experiences are
memorizable, and comp keeps a part of the secret naturally. You might
after death, wake up as someone, in the year 9007 after JC, who was,
for a minute, emulating a moment of a life of Evgenii Rudnyi. And
that, might depend if we succeed to keep up teaching math to our

It is ironical that with mechanism, when a machine has the cognitive
ability to get the point on its possibility to perpetuate its local
implementation (with an 'artificial' brain), she has the cognitive
ability to get the point that she will survive anyway, no matter
what. It is the comp-immortality stuff, and if things goes well, it
should explain the quantum immortality stuff. But with amnesia,
immortality itself get more, much more, than one meaning. The real
question concern first person plural immortality, and on this 'we are
nowhere", sorry.

Anyway, what matter are our values. To share them. To multiply them,
if only to make higher the credibility that they will apply to you
who ever you are.

Ah! I think I can say this, assuming two seconds that hell and heaven
exist. There is a good news and there is a bad news. The bad news is
that in Heaven, there are still (many) doors to Hell. The good news
is that in Hell there are (few) doors to Heaven. And this might be
used to comfort the harm-reduction philosophy on theoretical computer
science grounds.

I have probably asserted many propositions belonging to G* minus G,
which should be kept secret, and I hope some plant will forgiven me
from this :) The key is that *you* add the grains of salt, and
notably the comp hypothesis, the local but interrogative
self-correctness, etc.



You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en .


You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
For more options, visit this group at 

Reply via email to