On 22 Feb 2011, at 19:53, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
Thank you for your answers. I have still a coupled of questions. > But with computer science, intuition can be misleading. Intuition could be misleading not only in computer science. I know. >> Moreover my first person view assumes that there are some others >> first person views, for example, that of my wife and that of my >> daughter. Then a question is how the first person view of my >> daughter has been formed according to your theory. > > Never. You have just make higher the probability that she could> manifest herself relatively to you. But souls lives in Platonia, they> only dream that they leaved Platonia. Somehow, you make her soul > falling from Heaven, but then it is part of the game (I don't think > that making love is a sin, to be clear!).I am fine that souls live in Platonia. Let me put the question this way. If I have understood you correctly, "I" is a combination of the first person view and the diary.
Precisely, I "define" the first person "I", 1-I, by the "knower", and I define the knower, following Theaetetus, by the combination (conjunction) of the "Bp" (I believe p, I assert p, I prove p, equivalent in the toy theology of the ideally correct machine) and "p". So I know p = I believe p & p is true.
So, the question is when the first person view of my daughter has started her diary? In other words, how her diary is related to her birth?
Well, the problem is that we can not know that. For many reasons. First we cannot know our substitution level. If the level is very low, she might have start the diary before the big bang. If the level is very low but not that low, she might have start the diary at the moment of fecundation, like if her DNA is part of the diary. If the level is high, she might start it when she get enough stable neuronal connection, etc. We cannot know that (assuming comp), but that is a good thing. It makes her a respectable person who is the only judge in the matter, but even herself cannot know when the diary started, and if it started at all.
>> Finally what happens from the third person view if we compare my >> current first person view with that before conceiving the >> daughter? > > I am not sure I understand the question.I am fine that the third person view is related to numbers and not to physics. Let me put this question this way. My first person view has diary
Hmm... careful, it is when the content of the diary is true. The worst case (total delusion) is when that truth coincide only with consciousness, and all the rest (described in the diary) is a dream. The first person is the "dreamer of reality". By definition it is when her beliefs are correct. With "truth" = "God/One", the first person is the believer (Bp) when and if, or in the circumstance that p is the case (only "God knows" that).
and the question is what is the different with the third person view now and then when in my diary has appeared a record about the birth of my daughter?
"You" go from the state "Peano-arithmetic" to "Peano-arithmetic + I have a daughter". You can say: I believe I have a daughter. If it is the case that you have a daughter, then you know you have daughter, because it happens that your belief is true. But this is bit stretching the "theory". The ideally correct machine is to the human what a material point is to the sun. My answer tries only to help you to understand what I mean by a knowing machine, not really a knowing human. Human have non-monotonic layers, they can update beliefs. The logic G and G*, and the six intensional variants can be seen as the tangential theology, but we are variable machine. G and G* remains invariant, but get each nanosecond (say) a different arithmetical interpretations. To extract physics, you need only the self-referential invariant.
You see, my goal is just to translate some typical statements of my first person view to your language.
Which is what I try to do with the language of the "chatty" universal machine, like (a theorem prover for) Peano arithmetic (remember that by Bp I mean Gödel's Peano arithmetical (or any Löbian machine) provability predicate (BEWEISBAR), and p is for some arithmetical proposition. (Bp & p) is literally an arithmetical proposition, like BEWEISBAR("2+2=4") & 2+2=4. "2+2=4" is for the Gödel number of a sentence asserting that 2+2=4.
The (Gödelian) surprise about the ideally correct universal Löbian machine, is that although it is an ultra-simplistic model of self- reference, it is already incredibly complex in possibilities. Platonia is definitely not the same before and after Gödel, we know now that universal numbers lives there and put a huge mess. It is now, a bit more that a perfect square and a perfect and a perfect circle, it is all that + the Mandelbrot set. If you have the time, look at this video which illustrates nicely the expressive richness of the M set:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JGxbhdr3w2IIn Plotinus and Plato, Platonia is not the ONE, which is "Truth", (in the arithmetical interpretation), but platonia is the divine intellect, or the Noûs, the realm of ideas (here: programs, machine, numbers) and their interconnections, including numbers "having" or "implementing" (with respect to some universal numbers) beliefs in those ideas. Those numbers+beliefs are the "terrestrial intellects", toy scientists----if you want, they are the owners of "p", "Bp", "Bp & p", etc. when "B" is the arithmetical description of their "proving" or "believing", predicates. etc. They are Plotinus' discursive reasoner, or 'man' (human). Thay are the Lôbian machines or numbers (combinators, ...).
A number might assert that "24 is even", but also that "24 is the address of my grandmother". I use a Dennett-like intensional/ intentional stance toward that number, betting that it knows what it talks about (in case I got myself evidence that 24 is even and that 24 is its grandmother address, relatively to some plausible universal number(s).
Best, Bruno
On 22.02.2011 10:39 Bruno Marchal said the following:On 21 Feb 2011, at 21:16, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:Thank you for your answer. I am also sorry for confusion as with "What mind-body research says about the development of mind from a single cell and then its death?" I have meant "What mind-body research says about the development of mind from a single cell and then the death of mind?" So it was not about single cell organisms, it was just misplaced "its".I realize this eventually. No problem.Right now I am not trying to follow your UDA, rather I am trying to understand the consequences. I am a chemist by background and I prefer follow my intuition rather than following proofs.But with computer science, intuition can be misleading. Intuition is handled by the first person, and recover with the "soul hypostase (Bp & p)". But G and G* are known as being counter-intuitive, like the UDA illustrates already a bit "intuitively".I agree with you in that what people refer to as "I" is not associated with the brain only. Let me quote two citations from the book Spontaneity of Consciousness by Russian scientist Vasily Nalimov that I like a lot: "Human consciousness is seen by us as a text." "Personality is primarily the text that interprets itself."OK. Except that consciousness is not literally a text. It is an experience. A deep quale.The book seems not be translated in English but if you interested there is a paper from Journal of Humanistic Psychology that introduces the author: http://www.biometrica.tomsk.ru/nalimov/NALIMOV9.htm Hence I would agree that when my body dies I will presumably remain in my archives on the hard disc of my computer (or somewhere in Platonia), or something like this.It makes no sense if the text is not interpreted. But arithmetic does interpret it. Arithmetic emulates the computation, like a block-universe in general relativity can be said to emulate the observer's time.Yet, then let us consider the birth as it could be even more interesting. Let me put it this way. Some time ago my wife and I have conceived a daughter that now she is in Netherlands where she likes making photos (http://fortunaa.viewbook.com/).Nice pics :)I guess that this is my first person view. Well, I also agree that there are actually many my first person views, as I have changed a lot during my life. Still in my current first person view there is some invariant that I refer to as "I". By the way, how would you define such an invariant in your theory?Bp & p (in AUDA) Personal diary, being annihilated and reconstituted, in UDA. (as opposed to the diary of the third person observers who does not enter in the teleportation and self-multiplication device). If comp is true, then the "real first person" is not definable by a machine. Minsky is right about this: machines will be bewildered as we are about who we "really" are.Moreover my first person view assumes that there are some others first person views, for example, that of my wife and that of my daughter. Then a question is how the first person view of my daughter has been formed according to your theory.Never. You have just make higher the probability that she could manifest herself relatively to you. But souls lives in Platonia, they only dream that they leaved Platonia. Somehow, you make her soul falling from Heaven, but then it is part of the game (I don't think that making love is a sin, to be clear!).Finally what happens from the third person view if we compare my current first person view with that before conceiving the daughter?I am not sure I understand the question. Third person views are captured by what you can describe with numbers. But due to UDA, even the physical reality is actually a first person (plural) view, which limits the third person view to arithmetic, and makes things a bit hard to describe in simple terms (first person plural looks like third person views). The difference of your first person views is more or less a difference of accessible memories, related to the infinities of the most probable computations related to your histories. You might try to articulate why this does not really answer your question, as I feel it did not. Perhaps after you progress enough in the UD stuff? Best, Bruno--You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en .
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