Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 22 Feb 2011, at 22:14, benjayk wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Now, just recall that "Platonia" is based on classical logic where
>>>>> the
>>>>> falsity f, or 0 = 1, entails all proposition. So if you insist to
>>>>> say
>>>>> that 0 = 1, I will soon prove that you owe to me A billions of
>>>>> dollars, and that you should prepare the check.
>>>> You could prove that, but what is really meant by that is another
>>>> question.
>>>> It may simply mean "I want to play a joke on you".
>>>>
>>>> All statements are open to interpretation, I don't think we can
>>>> avoid that
>>>> entirely. We are ususally more interested in the statements that are
>>>> less
>>>> vague, but vague or crazy statements are still valid on some level
>>>> (even
>>>> though often on an very boring, because trivial, level; like saying
>>>> "S afs
>>>> fdsLfs", which is just expressing that something exists).
>>>
>>> We formalize things, or make them as formal as possible, when we
>>> search where we disagree, or when we want to find a mistake. The idea
>>> of making things formal, like in first order logic, is to be able to
>>> follow a derivation or an argument in a way which does not depend on
>>> any interpretation, other than the procedural inference rule.
>> Yes, I get the idea. I agree that the derivation does not depend on
>> any
>> interpretation (other than one we can easily agree on). But what the
>> axioms
>> and the derivations thereof "really" mean is open to interpretation.
>> Otherwise we would have no discussion about "Do numbers exist?".
>> I don't think we can understand "1+1=2" without some amount of
>> interpretation. We need to interpret that the two objects are of the
>> same
>> kind, for example.
>> Formal results are useless if we are not able to interpret what they
>> mean.
>
> I am not sure. We want avoid the "philosophical discussion", which can
> be endless and obstructive. So instead of trying to find the ultimate
> interpretation on which everybody would agree, we try, in a spirit of
> respect of all interpretation, to find our common agreement.
> Is 0 a number? OK, we agree that 0 is a number, and from that,
> agreeing with classical logic, we already agree that at least one
> number exist, 0. And the existence case is closed.
> OK?
> Next question, do we agree that numbers have a successor? Yes, that is
> the point, if x is a number, we want it having a successor, and
> successors ...., 0, s(0), s(s(0)), ...
>
> In this manner, we don't throw away, any interpretation of the
> numbers, but we are able to derive many things from what we agree on.
>
> The question of the relation between human and numbers is very
> interesting, but has to be addressed at some other levels, with some
> supplementary hypotheses. If not we mix unrelated difficulties.
I agree. Some interpretation is needed to make sense of numbers, but we can
easily agree on that. Some more interpretation is needed to make sense of
numbers in the context of practical use (we need relative interpretation of
one as one meter, one joule, one apple, which all are different yet all use
the number one, so in this context 1=1 may be false or undefined because we
might need *different* relative one, just like there are different relative
x).
So our disagreement seems to be quite subtle. It seemed to me you wanted to
make numbers the absolute thing. But when we are really modest it seems to
me we have to admit the meaning in numbers is an intersubjective agreement
in interpretation and we should not be too quick in disregarding seemingly
contradictory statements as completetly false.
See my example of 1=2. It might reveal a deeper sense of the relativity of
numbers (what is one in a context is one billion in another; my one head may
be conceived of consisting of many billions of cells), that is quite
compatible with the sense in 1+1=2.
By the way I have some doubts about 0 being properly conceived of as a
number. It might be more useful to conceive of it as a non-number symbol,
like for example infinity. Zero makes some things in mathematics messy if
interpreted as a number. For example "removable discontinuities" in
functions (I don't know what the right term is in English): If we have the
function (x+1)(x-1)/(x+1)(x+2), this functions is not defined for x=-1, but
in a sense it clearly should be and indeed if we reduce the terms (which
seems to be seen as valid, although we implicitly divide through zero) it is
defined for x=-1. So this suggest that it would be better to give zero a
relative meaning, so that for example 0/0 may mean different things in
different contexts (like the symbol x).
I have no clue how this could be formalized, though. Also it may be I'm just
interpreting some inconsistency that is not there due to my lack of
understanding.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> It might lead to a language that is too
>> difficult, too little flexible and too much restricting for almost all
>> purposes.
>
> Not really. Formal can be very flexible, like the programming
> languages, but natural language are "naturally" self-transforming, and
> have to adapt.
Yes, I meant flexible in the latter sense of transforming and adapting.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>> I'm not sure, either, if it is - even just in science - always a good
>> approach to try to find mistakes.
>> Maybe there are none and we never really
>> know and trying to do will lead nowhere or there always some
>> mistakes and
>> trying to eliminate them will just spawn new ones. Maybe both are
>> true in
>> some way.
>
> Mistakes are what make us progress. Beware the fatal mistake, like
> flying a plane with a bug in the altimeter.
Right, though some times we have to trust in order to not waste time
controlling everything for the billionth time. Therefore I believe we can
not make it the top priority to find mistakes.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> 3=7 may mean that there are 3 objects that are 7
>>>>>> objects which might be interpreted as aserting the existence of
>>>>>> (for
>>>>>> example) 7*1, 7*2 and 7*3.
>>>>>
>>>>> Logicians and mathematicians are more simple minded than that,
>>>>> and it
>>>>> does not always help to be understood.
>>>>> If you allow circles with edges, and triangles with four sides in
>>>>> Platonia, we will loose any hope of understanding each other.
>>>> I don't think we have "disallow" circles with edges, and triangles
>>>> with four
>>>> sides; it is enough if we keep in mind that it is useful to use
>>>> words in a
>>>> sense that is commonly understood.
>>>
>>> That is why I limit myself for the TOE to natural numbers and their
>>> addition and multiplication.
>>> The reason is that it is enough, by comp, and nobody (except perhaps
>>> some philosophers) have any problem with that.
>> I'm not so sure about this. There seem to be many people who have a
>> problem
>> with numbers, especially with ascribing existence to them (even if
>> it seems
>> obvious to you) - not just "some philosophers".
>
>
> People having problem with numbers have been victim of a traumatic
> teaching of math.
> The philosophical question of the existence of any thing, except
> consciousness here and now, is desperately complex.
Right, after all every question can be formulated as an problem of
determining existence ("Does there is exist a solution for the problem
that,...").
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> That is why I like comp, because it allows (and forces) to derive the
> psychological existence, the theological existence, the physical,
> existence, and the sensible existence from the classical existence of
> numbers, which is simple by definition, if you agree with the use of
> classical logic in number theory.
Honestly I still have doubts about this. The reason is that there is always
the implicit axiom "I am conscious." (for example a bit more explicit in
"Yes, Doctor"), which is incredibly general. I am not sure that if we take
"I am conscious" as axiom, we can say we derived the existence of any mental
state from arithmetics, because we may simply derive what we already know:
"I am conscious" (or "I have an unspecified but existent mental state").
After all we can not say we derived the existence of number 1 by saying
3-2=1, because we had to assume one at the beginning, to make sense of 3 and
2.
But maybe I don't get a crucial thing.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>> I think it is a bit authoritarian to disallow some statements as
>>>> truth.
>>>>
>>>> I feel it is better to think of truth as everything describable or
>>>> experiencable; and then we differ between truth as non-falsehood and
>>>> the
>>>> trivial truth of falsehoods.
>>>> It avoids that we have to fight wars between truth and falsehood.
>>>> Truth
>>>> swallows everything up. If somebody says something ridiculous like
>>>> "All non
>>>> christian people go to hell.", we acknowledge that expresses some
>>>> truth
>>>> about what he feels and believes, instead of only seeing that what
>>>> he says
>>>> is false.
>>>
>>> This is a diplomatic error. Doing that will end up with everyone
>>> doing
>>> war to you.
>> There is definitely some truth in that. Many people don't like lack of
>> opposition, or even interpret too much agreement as a kind of
>> opposition. I
>> experienced this quite a few times.
>
>
> Like when Alice said that mustard is not a bird, and the duchess said
> 'you are so right', and Alice said she thinks mustard is a mineral,
> and the duchess daid "of course it is", and Alice add "oh I know it is
> a vegetable" and then duchess still agree, and on and on ...
Yes, disagreeing is needed to communicate anything. But so is agreeing, I
would argue.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> I don't have the experience that "everyone" is doing war to me, when
>> I am
>> very much inclusive in what I believe to be true (or good). Some
>> people,
>> especially those holding unconventional beliefs, will appreciate your
>> openness.
>> You will not have the masses or authorities behind you, though (they
>> like
>> people reiterating their beliefs in strong and authoritative
>> manner). But
>> neither do I want to. Well, maybe in some way I would like to, but
>> then I
>> would probably fall into the trap of authoritarianism myself. There
>> seems to
>> be inherent tension between being believed in and not being
>> authoritative.
>>
>
> Not really. Authoritative argument are symptoms of lies or bad faith.
> If you trust truth (which is hard given that it is unknown) you fear
> nothing.
The problem is that we either formulate total modesty (or rather we get as
close as we can about it and say "I really don't know so I better don't pose
any possibility that might influence you in what you think is right" or
better "..." ) or we pose some truth to be the truth; and as soon as we do
this, some might take us to be an authority. We don't necessarily decide if
we want to be an authority. You don't have to say "I am right and you have
to obey me", we may say "Everything is fine and you can't do anything wrong
and you don't have to do anything" (like some spiritual teachers do) and
thus prevent personal progress, because there are seen as authorities.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> It is far too much "politically correct'.
>>>
>> I don't think I am politically correct.
>> Saying that the state or conventional religion is harmful (or just
>> superfluous) - like I do sometimes - will lead you into much
>> opposition (the
>> second not so much in my particular environment).
>> I am not saying we shouldn't disagree (even vehemently). We may
>> disagree,
>> but at the same time realize that there is some truth to what is
>> being said
>> by the other party. I agree, though, that it is a hard line to walk
>> between
>> disagreeing too much and agreeing to much. Most confusingly sometimes
>> agreeing to much might seem like disagreeing (with disagreeing) too
>> much.
>
> Yes. This can be contingent, but religion is the best thing in the
> world until the power steals it. This lead to unending confusion and
> suffering, and "religion" is made into the worst thing, *especially*
> that some truth remains.
>
> I think religion, that is your relation with truth, is eminently
> private, and that no one can tell what you need to believe in, unless
> your belief harm others.
I would very much like to agree. But unfortunately "harming others" is an
relative and personal term itself. Probably christians believe they are
right in trying to muzzle atheists, because in their mind they are doing
incredible harm (they send people into hell for gods sake!). And they
*really* don't know better.
Ultimately I think no one can tell anyone what to believe in... This is not
a statement of "should" or "should not", but a statement about reality.
Reality does what reality does. And honestly - even if I am careful to whom
I communicate this - I think it ultimately will be seen to be the best
thing, regardless what it is. Otherwise reality would have a sort of mistake
built in that seems totally senseless. And if this is true we really could
believe everything about this world (if it there are totally senseless
things ins this world, maybe one of them is that God does indeed sent many
people to hell forever!).
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> Of course, when someone genuinely says that all "non christian people
>>> go to hell", there are many possible "truth" behind the statement,
>>> like "F..ck the atheists", "F..ck the agnostics", "I hate you", "you
>>> have to obey to what I say", "You don't belong to my club", etc.
>> Or "I believe there will be justice and non-Christian people are
>> inherently
>> evil and thus have to go to hell for justice to prevail, even if I
>> don't
>> like it" or "I believe what I have been told, because I cannot
>> believe only
>> what I see myself".
>
> Yes. Lack of self-confidence. It is the children philosophy: p is true
> because my father said so. It should no be used in the academy, I
> think. It can be useful in the army, or with the fire men, when quick
> decision have to be made. For poliltics, it is already much more
> complex.
The problem is that we can totally doubt everything everyone says. So we are
somewhere in the continuum between "believing everything everybody says" and
"believing nothing anybody says". How can we now what is the right point to
stand on?
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> On the contrary, when you want to make a point, especially a new one,
>>> it is far better to respect the truth of your opponents, but then you
>>> have to distill what you and your opponent agree on. In science this
>>> works very well in theory (in practice we have often the obligation
>>> to
>>> wait that the opponent dies).
>> "On the contrary"? What you wrote seems to be a confirmation of
>> respecting
>> that there is truth in other people beliefs.
>
> Because then you can extract the partial truth on which you agree, but
> this asks for accepting there is a part where we disagree. There is no
> shame in that, and in absence of convincing argument, we have to know
> we don't know the truth. The genuine respect comes from the genuine or
> sincere doubting.
Yes. I wanted to point to the synthesis of agreement and disagreement, not
to the substitution of agreement for disagreement!
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>> I believe the only way we can learn to understand each other is if
>>>> we
>>>> acknowledge the truth in every utterance.
>>>
>>>
>>> That is extreme relativism, and makes truth so trivial that it lost
>>> its meaning.
>> I think truth is a naturally very relative notion, today it might be
>> true
>> that "it rains today" on Monday and it might be false on Tuesday.
>
> That might be absolute truth disguised into indexical statement. "It
> rains today" is "it rains the 23 february 2011" uttered the 23
> february 2011.
Okay, but then it is plausible to say relative truth is absolute truth.
Which again leads to truth being a relative notion.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> It might
>> be true that x=3 in some context and in some other x=4.
>
> And given that Leibniz convinced us that two quantities (3 and 4)
> equals to some other (x) are equal to each other, we can derive that 3
> = 4.
> Come on, x is a variable. Variables variate. You were obliged to
> mention the context. This does not relativize truth. It just motivates
> us for the study of functions and all that.
I don't know. Maybe truth is like X. Sure, in a weak sense it has absolute
existence (some x does exist), but it's expression takes place in an
infinite number of relative contexts.
It seems to me that the more we discover, we more discover the relativity of
everything (think of Einstein - the relativity of time and space -, quantum
theory - the relativity of physical existence and non-existence - or Gödel -
the relativity of provability).
The absolute seems to remain only as the fact of existence of infinite
relativity.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> But paradoxically it seems like an absolute notion, too. There
>> really seems
>> to be an absolute truth regardless of circumstances.
>> So I am an extreme relativist, but also an absolutist.
>
> Doubt can rise only from at least a certainty, like consciousness.
Right, but this certainty might be a really really weak one. We are certain
that we are conscious, but in non-lucid dreams we experience how weak the
sense of being conscious can be. It seems to be almost a paradox: There is
no experience of unconsciousness but plausibly almost unconsciousness.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> It's the same with triviality. Truth is trivial, it simply is true
>> and it is
>> hard to say anymore about it that is surely true. On the other hand,
>> it's
>> highly non-trivial, as seen in this non-trivial world; there seem to
>> be
>> infinite structures in or of truth.
>
> Logic makes that clear. Some truth are trivial (like "p -> p", or "p &
> q -> p", or "0 = 0"), but the notion of truth itself is so complex and
> non trivial that there is no arithmetical predicate for just
> arithmetical truth. Truth is as trivial as God! It has no description.
Or it has every description! It might be too trivial to express in
arithmetics, not too complex.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I don't think the omnipotence paradox is problematic, also. It
>>>>>> simply shows
>>>>>> that omnipotence is nothing that can be properly conceived of
>>>>>> using
>>>>>> classical logic. We may assume omnipotence and non-omnipotence are
>>>>>> compatible; omnipotence encompasses non-omnipotence and is on some
>>>>>> level
>>>>>> equivalent to it.
>>>>>> For example: The omnipotent God can make a stone that is too heavy
>>>>>> for him
>>>>>> to lift, because God can manifest as a person (that's still God,
>>>>>> but
>>>>>> an
>>>>>> non-omnipotent omnipotent one) that cannot lift the stone.
>>>>>
>>>>> That makes the term "omnipotent" trivial. You can quickly be lead
>>>>> to
>>>>> give any meaning to any sentence.
>>>> Well I think this makes sense on some level. Language is symbols
>>>> that are
>>>> interpreted. There is no absolute rule how to interpret them, so we
>>>> *can*
>>>> interpret everything in it (but we don't have to!).
>>>
>>> We can do poetry. But if you allow this practice in science
>>> (including
>>> theology) you will just prevent progresses.
>> I don't think science has to defend itself against something by
>> disallowing
>> something; it follows simply from what we understand as science that
>> is
>> doesn’t include poetry in the usual sense.
>
> You are quite optimistic here. If you were correct on this, I think
> human science would be much more human. We would practice harm
> reduction since a much longer time, and cannabis would never have been
> made illegal (not even a second).
> Poetry and art are not a problem, but rhetoric and sophistry is.
Maybe it has its important place. Why would it be there, else?
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> Language are interpreted plausibly by universal machine (brains,
>>> bodies). The interpretation have to follow constraints to be
>>> sensical.
>> But if there are no constraints they can follow constraints.
>
> ?
It's similar to the omnipotence paradox. If there are no constraints it need
not be a constraint that there are no constraints.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>> In most cases it is most useful to interpret some quite specific
>>>> meaning
>>>> into a sentence (if you don't want to act madly), but as we use more
>>>> broad
>>>> and vague terms there are more and more ways to interpret what is
>>>> said.
>>>
>>> I think that humans suffering is in great part due to a feeling that
>>> in religion and in human affair we have to let people believe in what
>>> they want to believe. We just tolerate superstition.
>> I disagree very much with that.
>> I think tolerating superstition is important. Otherwise we are just
>> being
>> authoritarian. If people can't believe what they want to believe,
>> they will
>> have to believe what you want them to believe - everybody needs to
>> believe
>> something.
>> What would you do with superstition, if not tolerate it? If you don’t
>> tolerate superstition you can’t tolerate superstitious people. And
>> this will
>> lead to great disaster of leaders imposing their superstitions on
>> other
>> people. Because the leaders will not be aware they are being
>> superstitious.
>> They believe especially strongly that they are in possession of the
>> truth.
>
> Oh! I can tolerate superstition, unless they harm people (me, but also
> children).
Ok, this is a much more complex question. It is really hard to decide what
to tolerate and what not, and in what way to not tolerate (can we kill
killers?)
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> To give a cruel example, if you are not to much sensible, look at this:
>
> http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aVn856yEd5Q
This is just awful. It is so hard to imagine why it could be necessary that
such acts are done.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> I don't say it is easy to fight them, but I think we have to fight
> them. It makes the fear of some people harmful to themselves and to
> the others. It also put pseudo magical marmalade on top of mystery,
> hiding the fundamental questions and the deeper mystery to people.
Yes, but fighting is maybe best fighting in a very peaceful manner, like
Gandhi. I don't know. It just seems to me we can not use force to overcome
force.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>> But that it is impractical to speak in a in an incomprehensible way
>>>> can be
>>>> reconciled with that it still makes sense on some level.
>>>
>>>
>>> Of course.
>> Well, that was my point.
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> But that is the reason that we should avoid going to that
>>> level.
>> So we should avoid about talking truth in the seemingly
>> incomprehensible?
>
> OK, let me tell you the truth once and for all: thu ioplokio
> kjy7n'k, but but isnasmich ty(6,iolopik, no?
It is a good example of a sentence that is supposed to be incomprehensible,
but has a quite clear message: "I'm trying to say something you don't
understand." - which is easier to understand then many other things you say,
honestly.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> Honestly it seems that would lead to disregarding truth we simply do
>> not
>> understand, which is not good.
>
> uityju778, thryunbvazo^lo-iolopik, ##@jolopik#
I don't disregard this. You want to show me "Don't interpret too much where
there is plausibly not much there, like in this sentence". It is a very
useful statement. I am indeed prone to do what you just communicated ;).
It *might* be that some entity residing in your head (beside your usual
self) wants to communicate trough your "nonsense". But it might be better to
not think of such things, or at least to take a good distance from it.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> I don't think we need to be afraid of any level.
>> If we avoid this level we will exclude persons from society that
>> speak in a
>> way that is hardly comprehensible, for example schizophrenics (I
>> know one).
>
> This is different. As we might feel some empathy for some person or
> group, we can *try* to understand. But we are not obliged to make
> sense. You might ended like the duchess. Someone tells her
> "thryunbvazo^lo-iolopik, ##", and she will tell you "Oh, you are so
> right, my dear".
You seem to like the word "iolopik". Maybe it conveys some deep truth, maybe
it is more connected to the way the letters are arranged on your keyboard,
maybe both. ;)
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> Among them it is quite common that they talk a way that is hard to
>> comprehend.
>
> *That* is the problem.
Yep, but it can't be solved by avoiding to make sense of them.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> If you approach that level, you can please everyone for a time
>>> but soon enough, everyone will disagree and feel betrayed.
>> I am not saying we should pretend to not disagree if we do disagree.
>> But we
>> still can appreciate some underlying truth in every utterance.
>
> Once people genuinely engage a discussion, they appreciate the truth
> of mutual respect and mind opening.
> A conversation where people agree is quickly boring. Disagreement is
> the salt and pimento of the rich conversation.
> What is not nice is *systematic* disagreement, or *systematic*
> agreement (unless you are a dictator or something).
>
> There are two very bad sort of parents. Those who say always "yes" to
> their children, and those who say always "no".
I agree...
...how boring!
I disagree. Wait, but then I agree that we should disagree. So I agree.
Ugh, whatever.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> The case of salvia divinorum is particularly interesting with respect
>>> to your question.
>> I had some experience with salvia. It is an interesting herb. One of
>> the
>> most interesting entheogens it seems.
>> My experiences were a bit disappointing, though. I tried maybe 10
>> times;
>> first with minuscule amounts (that didn’t do anything at all), then
>> with as
>> much of 30x extract as I was able to take in. I was sometimes giggly,
>> relaxed, confused or physically uncomfortable. I had the feeling of
>> belonging into another (quiet strange) place, or being (slightly)
>> physically
>> and mentally pulled into another realm. During some tries I was
>> compulsorily
>> making movements or repeating syllables/words. During another try if
>> felt
>> like I was dying during each moment of experience. But none of these
>> experiences were really profound.
>
>
> Try 15X, or perhaps the leaves. You have to be very patient, and
> probably explore a bit more that "quiet strange" place, perhaps.
I meant "quite", but "quiet" fits to.
I'll probably won't try it again. It is not that I disliked the experiences
or didn't find them interesting, but I am a bit worried on the effect those
excursions might have on my psyche. As said, I'm prone to overpinterpreting
things (coincidences etc - I had some very strange ones, but probably
everybody had), I feel psychedelics might exacerbate that. Salvia seems to
be less problematic than shrooms or weed in this regard, but I think it is
better to be careful about this.
I am a bit sad about this, but well...
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> Many experiencers get a distinct feeling that they
>>> got information that they are not supposed to know, or to memorize,
>>> and still less to make public.
>> It is an interesting aspect of the experience. It is hard to judge
>> whether
>> it is more than a feeling that is induced by the drug, or whether
>> there is
>> something more profound behind it.
>
> Eventually the experience can be often described as an hallucination
> that life is an hallucination. It is very amazing, and you learn about
> the capacity of putting in doubt what you believe in the most.
Which might be very uncomfortable or even dangerous at times. If you are
lead to doubt everything you might tend to consider arbitrary things to be
true, because you can not - psychologically - doubt everything.
Ultimately doubting everything might lead our perceptions to becoming
inaccurate, because our internal models of the world (that are necessary to
function normally) are fundamentally questioned beyond just intellectual
doubt.
I experienced this (though thankfully I don't hallucinate when being sober
like some psychotic people do).
Maybe the salvia reality is some emergency reality that emerges when the
usual models of reality are doubted (even our very deep indentity patterns).
The secret truth might be "doubt everything" and it might be kept secret for
important reasons, because it might only be locally true in an environment
where things are very unbelievable and should be doubted almost universally
(eg salvia land) - and might lead to destruction of the local person if it
is too much remembered. Maybe you would go so terribly insane that you would
make the rest of the world go insane too (by downloading very very
convincing, yet extremely false arguments, from the salvia realm - which is
crazy enough to generate such arguments), and thus make the world a dream
like world full of white rabbit generating "Gods", which would explain why
you don't seem to go insane in our local world :D. Dreams and drug
experiences might be the tool to include / distribute such white rabbit
worlds (or pieces thereof) in our more consistent world.
Also heaven and hell (not in the christian sense of course) and
reincarnation might be emergency realities that are there as a
semi-consistent bridge to more consistent histories (maybe some advanced
technological future, where we can learn to locally manifest through
development and with the help of computers and live forever in a more
plausible way than in salvia land or heaven).
Just some speculation - I guess I'm wildly creative today ;).
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> You are not supposed to remember "heaven", because ..., well, because
>>> if comp is correct, that kind of information belongs to G* minus G.
>>> It
>>> is true but unbelievable, incommunicable. So, to make them public,
>>> makes no sense.
>> It conflicts I bit with the observation that seemingly many of the
>> people
>> having an awakening / enlightenment experience try to convey what they
>> realized.
>
> I guess this is due to half or partial enlightenment. The real guru
> might be your taxes inspector, or the taxi driver, you will never
> know. Above some threshold of such experience you know it makes no
> sense to try to share.
> It is "almost" obvious: once you meet God (assuming it exists), you
> can trust Him or She or That concerning the others, accepting some
> usual attribute of God. You can guess somehow that "he" does not need
> you to convey anything.
Do you think it is plausible that there is "absolute" enlightenment? It
seems extremely akward to me.
It might be more true that we all are enlightened all the time, and there
are degrees heightened self-awareness that are interpreted as enlightenment.
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