On 22 Feb 2011, at 19:53, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
Thank you for your answers. I have still a coupled of questions.
But with computer science, intuition can be misleading.
Intuition could be misleading not only in computer science. I
Moreover my first person view assumes that there are some
others first person views, for example, that of my wife and
that of my daughter. Then a question is how the first person
view of my daughter has been formed according to your theory.
Never. You have just make higher the probability that she could
manifest herself relatively to you. But souls lives in Platonia,
they only dream that they leaved Platonia. Somehow, you make her
soul falling from Heaven, but then it is part of the game (I
don't think that making love is a sin, to be clear!).
I am fine that souls live in Platonia. Let me put the question this
way. If I have understood you correctly, "I" is a combination of
the first person view and the diary.
Precisely, I "define" the first person "I", 1-I, by the "knower", and
I define the knower, following Theaetetus, by the combination
(conjunction) of the "Bp" (I believe p, I assert p, I prove p,
equivalent in the toy theology of the ideally correct machine) and
"p". So I know p = I believe p & p is true.
So, the question is when the first person view of my daughter has
started her diary? In other words, how her diary is related to her
Well, the problem is that we can not know that. For many reasons.
First we cannot know our substitution level. If the level is very
low, she might have start the diary before the big bang. If the level
is very low but not that low, she might have start the diary at the
moment of fecundation, like if her DNA is part of the diary. If the
level is high, she might start it when she get enough stable neuronal
connection, etc. We cannot know that (assuming comp), but that is a
good thing. It makes her a respectable person who is the only judge
in the matter, but even herself cannot know when the diary started,
and if it started at all.
Finally what happens from the third person view if we compare
my current first person view with that before conceiving the
I am not sure I understand the question.
I am fine that the third person view is related to numbers and not
to physics. Let me put this question this way. My first person view
Hmm... careful, it is when the content of the diary is true. The
worst case (total delusion) is when that truth coincide only with
consciousness, and all the rest (described in the diary) is a dream.
The first person is the "dreamer of reality". By definition it is
when her beliefs are correct. With "truth" = "God/One", the first
person is the believer (Bp) when and if, or in the circumstance that
p is the case (only "God knows" that).
and the question is what is the different with the third person
view now and then when in my diary has appeared a record about the
birth of my daughter?
"You" go from the state "Peano-arithmetic" to "Peano-arithmetic + I
have a daughter". You can say: I believe I have a daughter. If it is
the case that you have a daughter, then you know you have daughter,
because it happens that your belief is true. But this is bit
stretching the "theory". The ideally correct machine is to the human
what a material point is to the sun. My answer tries only to help you
to understand what I mean by a knowing machine, not really a knowing
human. Human have non-monotonic layers, they can update beliefs. The
logic G and G*, and the six intensional variants can be seen as the
tangential theology, but we are variable machine. G and G* remains
invariant, but get each nanosecond (say) a different arithmetical
interpretations. To extract physics, you need only the
You see, my goal is just to translate some typical statements of my
first person view to your language.
Which is what I try to do with the language of the "chatty" universal
machine, like (a theorem prover for) Peano arithmetic (remember that
by Bp I mean Gödel's Peano arithmetical (or any Löbian machine)
provability predicate (BEWEISBAR), and p is for some arithmetical
proposition. (Bp & p) is literally an arithmetical proposition, like
BEWEISBAR("2+2=4") & 2+2=4. "2+2=4" is for the Gödel number of a
sentence asserting that 2+2=4.
The (Gödelian) surprise about the ideally correct universal Löbian
machine, is that although it is an ultra-simplistic model of
self-reference, it is already incredibly complex in possibilities.
Platonia is definitely not the same before and after Gödel, we know
now that universal numbers lives there and put a huge mess. It is
now, a bit more that a perfect square and a perfect and a perfect
circle, it is all that + the Mandelbrot set. If you have the time,
look at this video which illustrates nicely the expressive richness
of the M set: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JGxbhdr3w2I
In Plotinus and Plato, Platonia is not the ONE, which is "Truth", (in
the arithmetical interpretation), but platonia is the divine
intellect, or the Noűs, the realm of ideas (here: programs, machine,
numbers) and their interconnections, including numbers "having" or
"implementing" (with respect to some universal numbers) beliefs in
those ideas. Those numbers+beliefs are the "terrestrial intellects",
toy scientists----if you want, they are the owners of "p", "Bp", "Bp
& p", etc. when "B" is the arithmetical description of their
"proving" or "believing", predicates. etc. They are Plotinus'
discursive reasoner, or 'man' (human). Thay are the Lôbian machines
or numbers (combinators, ...).
A number might assert that "24 is even", but also that "24 is the
address of my grandmother". I use a Dennett-like
intensional/intentional stance toward that number, betting that it
knows what it talks about (in case I got myself evidence that 24 is
even and that 24 is its grandmother address, relatively to some
plausible universal number(s).