On 3/5/2011 7:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 04 Mar 2011, at 19:41, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 3/4/2011 6:13 AM, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 4, 7:57 am, Bruno Marchal<marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> If you still don't see this, ask for clarification of the sane04
> paper(*), because it seems to me that the first seven steps are
> clear, there. You have mentioned the WR. I take from this that
> understand the six first steps, don't you? The seven step follows
> mainly from the invariance of first person experience for change in
> the delays of the (virtual) 'reconstitutions'.
> The eighth step is really more conceptually subtle, and the clearer
> presentation I have done until now is in this list in the "MGA"
> (the Movie Graph Argument). It shows that the "real concrete UD" is
> not needed for the reversal to occur.
This touches on my doubts about the MGA. I think that instantiate
consciousness would require a lot of environment outside just the
brain. I base this in part on experiments with sense deprivation
which showed that after a short while, absent any external
stimulation, the brain tends to go into a loop. Bruno has answered
this by saying that the MG is not limited to a brain but can be as
comprehensive as necessary, a whole universe. But in that limit it
becomes clear that the consciousness realized is not in our world but
is in another virtual world.
I am not sure I understand.
That there might, given a suitable interpretation, be computations
and consciousness in some other virtual world ...
Tthat is consequence of comp. Step "six". Step 1-6 use a "generalized
brain = biological brain" only for pedagogical purpose, and then step
7 relaxes that constraint, and the brain can be as big as any finite
digital approximate body (like the Heisenberg matrix of the galaxy
with 10^100 decimals, at the level of strings: the UD, by sheer
stupidity if you want, does go through such program.
... raises the paradox of the self-conscious rock which Stathis and I
discussed at length.
But the UD Argument provides the solution. The rock emerges itself,
relatively to us,
But that's the point. It isn't "relative to us", the virtual world is
self-contained. It's the difference between putting a simulated brain
into this world and creating a separate world in which there is a
simulated brain. The latter is self-contained and the consciousness
that is instantiated is relative to that world. It is inaccessible from
this world and might as well be the rock that computes everything.
from an infinity of (shared) computations. It emulates all
consciousness only in a trivial sense. It is only an object in our
sharable experience. Mind and matter emerges in a non trivial sense as
internal self-measurement or self-observation possible. Consciousness
is not even supervenient on a "brain". (directly from MGA).
But that is dependent on the assumption that the MG instantiates a
consciousness. I think a consciousness is relative to an environment;
and the consciousness that the MG would instantiate is not one relative
to us and our environment - whereas what the doctor proposes to put in
my skull is.
The reversal makes the rock argument non sensical in the comp frame.
It seems to me that you just put some doubt on comp, not on the fact
that if comp is correct physics is not fundamental but is one of the
modality of (arithmetical) self-reference. I doubt that Stathis use
the rock argument against comp.
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