On 3/5/2011 7:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 04 Mar 2011, at 19:41, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 3/4/2011 6:13 AM, 1Z wrote:

On Mar 4, 7:57 am, Bruno Marchal<marc...@ulb.ac.be>  wrote:

....
>     If you still don't see this, ask for clarification of the sane04
> paper(*), because it seems to me that the first seven steps are rather > clear, there. You have mentioned the WR. I take from this that you do
>  understand the six first steps, don't you? The seven step follows
>  mainly from the invariance of first person experience for change in
>  the delays of the (virtual) 'reconstitutions'.
>
>  The eighth step is really more conceptually subtle, and the clearer
> presentation I have done until now is in this list in the "MGA" thread
>  (the Movie Graph Argument). It shows that the "real concrete UD" is
>  not needed for the reversal to occur.


This touches on my doubts about the MGA. I think that instantiate consciousness would require a lot of environment outside just the brain. I base this in part on experiments with sense deprivation which showed that after a short while, absent any external stimulation, the brain tends to go into a loop. Bruno has answered this by saying that the MG is not limited to a brain but can be as comprehensive as necessary, a whole universe. But in that limit it becomes clear that the consciousness realized is not in our world but is in another virtual world.

I am not sure I understand.


That there might, given a suitable interpretation, be computations and consciousness in some other virtual world ...

Tthat is consequence of comp. Step "six". Step 1-6 use a "generalized brain = biological brain" only for pedagogical purpose, and then step 7 relaxes that constraint, and the brain can be as big as any finite digital approximate body (like the Heisenberg matrix of the galaxy with 10^100 decimals, at the level of strings: the UD, by sheer stupidity if you want, does go through such program.



... raises the paradox of the self-conscious rock which Stathis and I discussed at length.


But the UD Argument provides the solution. The rock emerges itself, relatively to us,

But that's the point. It isn't "relative to us", the virtual world is self-contained. It's the difference between putting a simulated brain into this world and creating a separate world in which there is a simulated brain. The latter is self-contained and the consciousness that is instantiated is relative to that world. It is inaccessible from this world and might as well be the rock that computes everything.

from an infinity of (shared) computations. It emulates all consciousness only in a trivial sense. It is only an object in our sharable experience. Mind and matter emerges in a non trivial sense as internal self-measurement or self-observation possible. Consciousness is not even supervenient on a "brain". (directly from MGA).

But that is dependent on the assumption that the MG instantiates a consciousness. I think a consciousness is relative to an environment; and the consciousness that the MG would instantiate is not one relative to us and our environment - whereas what the doctor proposes to put in my skull is.

Brent

The reversal makes the rock argument non sensical in the comp frame.

It seems to me that you just put some doubt on comp, not on the fact that if comp is correct physics is not fundamental but is one of the modality of (arithmetical) self-reference. I doubt that Stathis use the rock argument against comp.

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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