On Mar 4, 6:29 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > On 04 Mar 2011, at 15:13, 1Z wrote: > > > > > > > On Mar 4, 7:57 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > >> On 03 Mar 2011, at 18:39, 1Z wrote: > > >>> If you have a UDA inside a physical universe, > > >> I guess you mean "a UD inside a physical universe". > > >> UDA is for the UD-Argument. The Universal Dovetailer Argument. > > >>> there is real physics > >>> (qua physicalevents) > >>> outside it, and there is a real study of physics outside it as well. > >>> What goes on in a > >>> virtualised environment is not real. You could feed virtualised > >>> people > >>> false information > >>> about the past, but that would not be rewriting history (in the > >>> sense > >>> of changing the real > >>> past) and it would have not mean that the virtualissed people had > >>> some > >>> valid kind of history qua study of the past) either, since it would > >>> not be based > >>> on true facts. > > >> That might be consistent in some theory. > > > ie the common-sense intutions most people have > > We can use common-sense to find on what we agree, not for disagreing > about a conclusion of a reasoning. > "Everyone knows that" is not available as argument in science. Cf: > "Everyone knows that the sun moved around the earth".
But, again, this is about what words mean, and the ultimate authority there is common usage. History is the study or real events. That's what it means. > > >> But you elude the reasoning > >> and the questions. > > >>> Likewise, their "phsyics" would not really be phsyics > >>> , because it would not be based on the only real phsyical reality, > >>> the > >>> one in which > >>> the UDA is embedded. > > >> Sorry but in this case, it would be based on the 'real physical > >> reality'. > > > It would not be based on empirical data about the real physical > > reality. It would be based on it ontologically, but they would > > be unawae of that > > That's the point. How could you then be aware you are in the first > physical universe, and not in the virtual but still physical universe > without finding a flaw in UDA[1-6]? > That's *not* the point. If I am virtualised, my physics isn't real physics either! > > >> The UD is physically running in that universe, and by the > >> first person indeterminacy, even if you do an experiment in the > >> physical universe, your first person experience remains determined by > >> the physical computations made by the physical UD. So to connect your > >> experience with the physical reality, that physical reality has to be > >> retrievable from the mathematics of the UD (computer science/number > >> theory). > > > But there is no guarantee that a virtualised person would > > have any epistemic connection to physical reality. > > So you reject the step 6? What do you say in step 6? That people in virtual environments can reach out the outside reality? > > Some > > of them might see a realistic simulation through coincidence, > > but it is doubtful that coincidence can found knowledge. > > There can no be coincidence, given that what will happen from the > first person view is a sum on an infinity of computation. > (A friend of mine has perhaps find, today!, a way to justify the role > of the complex numbers from just that). If you don't even have a coincidental resemblance to reality inside the simulation, that just makes matters worse > > >>> There is no particular reason to think that > >>> phsyics (qua study) that is baeed > >>> on false information counts as physics in the true sense of the > >>> term. > > >> You always manage to use the term "true". But we cannot use that term > >> when doing science. We put our assumptions on the table, and we > >> reason > >> from there. You are wrongly "using" the term "truth", like pseudo- > >> religion wrongly use the term "God", like a sort of authoritative > >> thing. > > > The kind of truth in question here is stipulative definition. To > > say that physics is the study of flowers or rocks is not to use > > the true, correct, conventional meaning of "physics" > > When working on the mind-body problem you cannot take anything > granted, neither on mind, nor on matter (and thus physics) without > taking the risk of begging the question. When doing any kind of philosphy, you cannot just change the meanings of words to suit the argument > Anyway, I use physics in a sense accepted by most physicists: the > science of what is observable and predictive locally. THat is not how most physicists use the word > > > > >>> If "physics" *means* > >>> the study of what is ontologically fundamental, then what is going > >>> on > >>> in the UDA can > >>> only be pseudo physics. > > >> Then you have to say "no" to the doctor, because he will build a > >> pseudo brain. > > > I have to say no to *a* doctor who will not build a physical brain. > > I can still say yes to a doctor who promises to reincarnate me > > in silicon. > > OK, but then the reversal occur in any universe running a UD made with > silicon. I don;t have to accept that there is reversed physics inside a UD, because I don't have to accept that there is any physics there, properly so called > > >> The point is that once you have said "yes" to the > >> doctor, qua computatio, you can understand that your next most > >> probable first person state will be more related to the infinitely > >> many third person corresponding states run by the UD than by the one > >> single out as being the "true universe", even if that concept makes > >> sense. > > > But I don't have to accept that physics becomes reversed. I can > > take the view that there is no study of physics, properly > > so called, in the UD. > > ? > Then there is no physics at all anywhere, or you have to find a flow > in UDA[1-6]. OK: THe flaw is that there is no material UD, and there is no immaterial one either because Platonism is false. > >>> On the other hand, if "phsyics" just means > >>> "investigation of subjective phenomenology"" > >>> then the argument goes through -- but only because that particular > >>> definition of physics is > >>> doing the heavy lifting. It isn't difficult to prove that physics > >>> isn't about objective reality if > >>> you have started with the assumption that it *is* about subjective > >>> reality. > > >> I do assume there is a physical reality. I would not talk on doctor > >> and digital brain if that was not the case. > > > Then your conclusion that there isn't physical reality is in > > contradiction > > ? > I think you confuse the idea that physical reality exist (which I > accept, given that I try to explain it) with the idea that physical > reality is the fundamental ontological basic (primary reality) reality. That would confuse anybody. You are using "physics" to mean "phenomenology" > All what I say is that comp makes physical reality necessarily > explainable by (infinities of) arithmetical relations. I have never > said that there isn't any physical reality. The step zero of UDA, i.e. > the definition of comp, would already be total nonsense. > > > > > > >> The only assumption is > >> that a digital brain, physical and constructed from piece of matter > >> in > >> my neighborhood, is able to sustain my consciousness together with my > >> current correct relative computation. I would not say yes to the > >> doctor if this could change the frequence of observable, by me, white > >> rabbits, for example. > >> This means that the UD, generates the right measure of computations > >> corresponding to my observations. Below my level of substitution, it > >> generates all the possible continuation, and so that fuzziness should > >> be observable, and should be the bottom level defining what I will > >> take at first sight to be primary matter. Comp reduces the physical > >> laws to a measure on provable (sigma_1) arithmetical propositions > >> weighted by the proofs/computation (the arithmetical UD). > > > I don't have to accept that what the acitvity performed > > by scientists in the UD is actually physics. I think it is > > phenomenology. > > This is incoherent with steps [1-6]. Which one? Where in steps 1-6 does it prove that physics really means phenomenogy? > > >> If you still don't see this, ask for clarification of the sane04 > >> paper(*), because it seems to me that the first seven steps are > >> rather > >> clear, there. You have mentioned the WR. I take from this that you do > >> understand the six first steps, don't you? The seven step follows > >> mainly from the invariance of first person experience for change in > >> the delays of the (virtual) 'reconstitutions'. > > >> The eighth step is really more conceptually subtle, and the clearer > >> presentation I have done until now is in this list in the "MGA" > >> thread > >> (the Movie Graph Argument). It shows that the "real concrete UD" is > >> not needed for the reversal to occur. > > >> Also, each time you use the term truth and real, you have to recall > >> what is your assumption, and to relate your notion of truth to it. No > >> one can be certain of the ultimate third person (public) truth. > > > I don't need ultimate truth, I just need words to mean what > > they usually mean. > > This is not available in science. In complex issues we have to be > flexible on the meaning of the words, and inflexible on the validity > of the reasoning. > WHat you are doing is philosophy, and in philosophy you have to be extremely careful about the meanings of words > >> What I know, because you told us, is that you assume (well, that was > >> probably not your wording) the existence of a physical universe, > >> being > >> primitively physical, and made of some primary stuff, which would be > >> ontologically existing and not made of, or reducible to, simpler > >> entities. > >> What I try to explain, is that if you are using this primary matter > >> to > >> singularize and make existing consciousness, then the primary matter > >> AND the mind associated with it have to be non Turing emulable. > > > Matter doesn't have to be non-turing emulable *maths*. > > This comes at step 8. The reversal appears already in step 7 for > *robust* universe. > > Mind can still be Turing emulable, since your conclusions can > > resisted by rejecting Platonsim and keeping comp. > > Show me where in the reasoning the term "Platonism" is used in your > sense. It sometimes an implication of your "AR", although sometimes it isn't. I do not follow your usage of AR because it is equivocal > The current question I did ask you explicitly here is "do you > get the point that in a Robust universe the reversal does occur > (independently of "Platonism")?". Then we can go to step 8 to see that > a form of Platonism is a *consequence* of comp. > > Bruno > > > > > > >> Comp > >> assumes the mind to be Turing emulable, so you better say "no" to the > >> doctor. > >> ... unless you realize, may be, that, after all the physical laws > >> might be not primitive, but themselves selected by the > >> 'consciousness- > >> filtering' on infinities of arithmetical relations. > > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > > Groups "Everything List" group. > > To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. > > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > > . > > For more options, visit this group > > athttp://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en > > . > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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