On Mar 6, 4:17 am, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: > On 3/5/2011 4:04 PM, Pzomby wrote: > > > > > > > On Mar 5, 1:50 pm, Brent Meeker<[email protected]> wrote: > > >> On 3/5/2011 7:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > >>> On 04 Mar 2011, at 19:41, Brent Meeker wrote: > > >>>> On 3/4/2011 6:13 AM, 1Z wrote: > > >>>>> On Mar 4, 7:57 am, Bruno Marchal<[email protected]> wrote: > > >>>>> .... > > >>>>>>> If you still don't see this, ask for clarification of the sane04 > >>>>>>> paper(*), because it seems to me that the first seven steps are > > >>>>>> rather > > >>>>>>> clear, there. You have mentioned the WR. I take from this that > > >>>>>> you do > > >>>>>>> understand the six first steps, don't you? The seven step follows > >>>>>>> mainly from the invariance of first person experience for change in > >>>>>>> the delays of the (virtual) 'reconstitutions'. > > >>>>>>> The eighth step is really more conceptually subtle, and the clearer > >>>>>>> presentation I have done until now is in this list in the "MGA" > > >>>>>> thread > > >>>>>>> (the Movie Graph Argument). It shows that the "real concrete UD" is > >>>>>>> not needed for the reversal to occur. > > >>>> This touches on my doubts about the MGA. I think that instantiate > >>>> consciousness would require a lot of environment outside just the > >>>> brain. I base this in part on experiments with sense deprivation > >>>> which showed that after a short while, absent any external > >>>> stimulation, the brain tends to go into a loop. Bruno has answered > >>>> this by saying that the MG is not limited to a brain but can be as > >>>> comprehensive as necessary, a whole universe. But in that limit it > >>>> becomes clear that the consciousness realized is not in our world but > >>>> is in another virtual world. > > >>> I am not sure I understand. > > >>>> That there might, given a suitable interpretation, be computations > >>>> and consciousness in some other virtual world ... > > >>> Tthat is consequence of comp. Step "six". Step 1-6 use a "generalized > >>> brain = biological brain" only for pedagogical purpose, and then step > >>> 7 relaxes that constraint, and the brain can be as big as any finite > >>> digital approximate body (like the Heisenberg matrix of the galaxy > >>> with 10^100 decimals, at the level of strings: the UD, by sheer > >>> stupidity if you want, does go through such program. > > >>>> ... raises the paradox of the self-conscious rock which Stathis and I > >>>> discussed at length. > > >>> But the UD Argument provides the solution. The rock emerges itself, > >>> relatively to us, > > >> But that's the point. It isn't "relative to us", the virtual world is > >> self-contained. It's the difference between putting a simulated brain > >> into this world and creating a separate world in which there is a > >> simulated brain. The latter is self-contained and the consciousness > >> that is instantiated is relative to that world. It is inaccessible from > >> this world and might as well be the rock that computes everything. > > >>> from an infinity of (shared) computations. It emulates all > >>> consciousness only in a trivial sense. It is only an object in our > >>> sharable experience. Mind and matter emerges in a non trivial sense as > >>> internal self-measurement or self-observation possible. Consciousness > >>> is not even supervenient on a "brain". (directly from MGA). > > >> But that is dependent on the assumption that the MG instantiates a > >> consciousness. I think a consciousness is relative to an environment; > >> and the consciousness that the MG would instantiate is not one relative > >> to us and our environment - whereas what the doctor proposes to put in > >> my skull is. > > >> Brent > > > Not sure if I follow your wording . The wording appears to be not > > consistent with your prior statement. Would the altered wording below > > be what you are meaning or have I got it wrong? > > > But that is dependent on the assumption *that consciousness is an > > instantiation of MG*. I think a consciousness is relative to an > > environment; and *the MG that the consciousness would instantiate* is > > *not* > > > one relative to us and our environment > > The MG doesn't interact with our world. It doesn't take in an process > information or act. > > > - whereas what the doctor > > proposes to put in my skull is. > > The way I see it the MG consciousness would not be conscious of any > world except the virtual world of the MG, which is to say not conscious > at all in our terms. It could, provided enough environment and Bruno > emphasizes the UD will provide an arbitrarily large environment, be > conscious *in this other universe*. But I think that's Stathis's > example of the conscious rock. It's conscious modulo some > interpretation, but that's a reductio against saying it's conscious at all. > > Brent
I am not a fan of the MG specifically, but I don't see why you need a world to have consciousness "as if" of a world. The BIV argument indicates that you only need to simulate incoming data on peripheral nerves -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
