On Mar 6, 4:17 am, Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com> wrote:
> On 3/5/2011 4:04 PM, Pzomby wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Mar 5, 1:50 pm, Brent Meeker<meeke...@dslextreme.com>  wrote:
>
> >> On 3/5/2011 7:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> >>> On 04 Mar 2011, at 19:41, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> >>>> On 3/4/2011 6:13 AM, 1Z wrote:
>
> >>>>> On Mar 4, 7:57 am, Bruno Marchal<marc...@ulb.ac.be>    wrote:
>
> >>>>> ....
>
> >>>>>>>      If you still don't see this, ask for clarification of the sane04
> >>>>>>>   paper(*), because it seems to me that the first seven steps are
>
> >>>>>> rather
>
> >>>>>>>   clear, there. You have mentioned the WR. I take from this that
>
> >>>>>> you do
>
> >>>>>>>   understand the six first steps, don't you? The seven step follows
> >>>>>>>   mainly from the invariance of first person experience for change in
> >>>>>>>   the delays of the (virtual) 'reconstitutions'.
>
> >>>>>>>   The eighth step is really more conceptually subtle, and the clearer
> >>>>>>>   presentation I have done until now is in this list in the "MGA"
>
> >>>>>> thread
>
> >>>>>>>   (the Movie Graph Argument). It shows that the "real concrete UD" is
> >>>>>>>   not needed for the reversal to occur.
>
> >>>> This touches on my doubts about the MGA.  I think that instantiate
> >>>> consciousness would require a lot of environment outside just the
> >>>> brain.  I base this in part on experiments with sense deprivation
> >>>> which showed that after a short while, absent any external
> >>>> stimulation, the brain tends to go into a loop.  Bruno has answered
> >>>> this by saying that the MG is not limited to a brain but can be as
> >>>> comprehensive as necessary, a whole universe.  But in that limit it
> >>>> becomes clear that the consciousness realized is not in our world but
> >>>> is in another virtual world.
>
> >>> I am not sure I understand.
>
> >>>>   That there might, given a suitable interpretation, be computations
> >>>> and consciousness in some other virtual world ...
>
> >>> Tthat is consequence of comp. Step "six". Step 1-6 use a "generalized
> >>> brain = biological brain" only for pedagogical purpose, and then step
> >>> 7 relaxes that constraint, and the brain can be as big as any finite
> >>> digital approximate body (like the Heisenberg matrix of the galaxy
> >>> with 10^100 decimals, at the level of strings: the UD, by sheer
> >>> stupidity if you want, does go through such program.
>
> >>>> ... raises the paradox of the self-conscious rock which Stathis and I
> >>>> discussed at length.
>
> >>> But the UD Argument provides the solution. The rock emerges itself,
> >>> relatively to us,
>
> >> But that's the point.  It isn't "relative to us", the virtual world is
> >> self-contained.  It's the difference between putting a simulated brain
> >> into this world and creating a separate world in which there is a
> >> simulated brain.  The latter is self-contained and the consciousness
> >> that is instantiated is relative to that world.  It is inaccessible from
> >> this world and might as well be the rock that computes everything.
>
> >>> from an infinity of (shared) computations. It emulates all
> >>> consciousness only in a trivial sense. It is only an object in our
> >>> sharable experience. Mind and matter emerges in a non trivial sense as
> >>> internal self-measurement or self-observation possible. Consciousness
> >>> is not even supervenient on a "brain". (directly from MGA).
>
> >> But that is dependent on the assumption that the MG instantiates a
> >> consciousness.  I think a consciousness is relative to an environment;
> >> and the consciousness that the MG would instantiate is not one relative
> >> to us and our environment - whereas what the doctor proposes to put in
> >> my skull is.
>
> >> Brent
>
> > Not sure if I follow your wording .  The wording appears to be not
> > consistent with your prior statement. Would the altered wording below
> > be what you are meaning or have I got it wrong?
>
> > But that is dependent on the assumption *that consciousness is an
> > instantiation of MG*. I think a consciousness is relative to an
> > environment; and *the MG that the consciousness would instantiate* is
>
> *not*
>
> > one relative to us and our environment
>
> The MG doesn't interact with our world. It doesn't take in an process
> information or act.
>
> >   - whereas what the doctor
> > proposes to put in my skull is.
>
> The way I see it the MG consciousness would not be conscious of any
> world except the virtual world of the MG, which is to say not conscious
> at all in our terms.  It could, provided enough environment and Bruno
> emphasizes the UD will provide an arbitrarily large environment, be
> conscious *in this other universe*.  But I think that's Stathis's
> example of the conscious rock.  It's conscious modulo some
> interpretation, but that's a reductio against saying it's conscious at all.
>
> Brent

I am not a fan of the MG specifically, but I don't see why
you need a world to have consciousness "as if" of a world.
The BIV argument indicates that you only need to simulate
incoming data on peripheral nerves

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