On Mar 6, 1:14 pm, Andrew Soltau <andrewsol...@gmail.com> wrote:
> Hi Bruno
> On 05/03/11 14:46, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> > On 04 Mar 2011, at 20:10, Andrew Soltau wrote:
> >>> I remind you that we are in the everything list which is based on
> >>> the idea that "everything" is simpler than "something".
> >> If we take Chalmers and Bitbol seriously, consciousness is a
> >> perfectly symmetrical emergent property of the Everything, and you
> >> can't get much simpler than that.
> > Can you elaborate. What are their assumption? What do you mean by
> > "perfectly symmetrical emergent property of the Everything".  Almost
> > all words here needs a clear context to make sense. Which everything?
> I skipped over the details because I was don't want to be repeating
> paragraphs of stuff each time I make a point. Not sure about the
> protocol. Anyway.
> Chalmers states
> I suggest that a theory of consciousness should take experience as
> fundamental ... we will take experience itself as a fundamental feature
> of the world, alongside mass, charge, and space-time. (1995, p. 216)

> Clearly it is a universal property of the system in which we find
> ourselves, physical or arithmetical.

One philosopher saying something doesn't make it "clear"

> Bitbol concludes his section One mind, many points of view with
> Mind is by itself point-of-view-less, just as it is placeless and
> timeless. The aporia is the following: Mind is not within the world
> since, even if it can identify itself to any available point of view, it
> is not identical to this point of view. Nor does Mind stand outside the
> world, since it has no point of view of its own, independent from the
> points of view the world can offer. Wittgenstein would say that Mind is
> the limit of the world.
> and continues
> More formally, Mind can be considered as an empty space in the triadic
> relation: "point of view of ( ) on a 'real universe'". This scheme
> provides another way of seeing why Mind retains its necessity, even
> though the "real universe" gathers all that falls under the categories
> of knowledge: Mind plays a key role in the very constitutive relations
> of this knowledge. Its closest philosophical equivalents are Husserl's
> and Sartre's Transcendental ego; or, even better, Wittenstein's subject
> which "(...) does not belong to the world: rather it is a limit of the
> world" (Tractatus 5.632).
> It is the same Mind, phenomenal conciousness, in all places and at all
> times.
> In Logical Types in Quantum Mechanics I show that it is necessarily an
> emergent property of the unitary totality, Russell's 'Everything', which
> fits this concept precisely. It is also necessarily, from the
> perspective of any specific framework, perfectly symmetrical.
> Other points answered in separate posts to try and keep things simple
> enough for me.
> Andrew

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