On 05 Mar 2011, at 22:50, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 3/5/2011 7:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 04 Mar 2011, at 19:41, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 3/4/2011 6:13 AM, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 4, 7:57 am, Bruno Marchal<marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> If you still don't see this, ask for clarification of the
> paper(*), because it seems to me that the first seven steps
> clear, there. You have mentioned the WR. I take from this
that you do
> understand the six first steps, don't you? The seven step
> mainly from the invariance of first person experience for
> the delays of the (virtual) 'reconstitutions'.
> The eighth step is really more conceptually subtle, and the
> presentation I have done until now is in this list in the
> (the Movie Graph Argument). It shows that the "real concrete
> not needed for the reversal to occur.
This touches on my doubts about the MGA. I think that instantiate
consciousness would require a lot of environment outside just the
brain. I base this in part on experiments with sense deprivation
which showed that after a short while, absent any external
stimulation, the brain tends to go into a loop. Bruno has
answered this by saying that the MG is not limited to a brain but
can be as comprehensive as necessary, a whole universe. But in
that limit it becomes clear that the consciousness realized is not
in our world but is in another virtual world.
I am not sure I understand.
That there might, given a suitable interpretation, be computations
and consciousness in some other virtual world ...
Tthat is consequence of comp. Step "six". Step 1-6 use a
"generalized brain = biological brain" only for pedagogical
purpose, and then step 7 relaxes that constraint, and the brain can
be as big as any finite digital approximate body (like the
Heisenberg matrix of the galaxy with 10^100 decimals, at the level
of strings: the UD, by sheer stupidity if you want, does go through
... raises the paradox of the self-conscious rock which Stathis
and I discussed at length.
But the UD Argument provides the solution. The rock emerges itself,
relatively to us,
But that's the point. It isn't "relative to us", the virtual world
Let us not mix the difficulty of step seven and step eight. So here I
interpret "virtual world" by a virtual observer+environment executed
by a concrete physical UD, which does this infinitely often. But then,
the word "us" is ambiguous. Do you mean the "us" in the primary
physical reality + outside the UD, or us as being multiplied in the
UD. I don't see your point, because in the second case, we know
already that a rock is not really an object, but a shared pattern of
information among collections of observers. So we can say that a rock,
like the quantum vacuum, is a universal dovetailer. "You" are in the
rock, but "trivially so". A bit like the border of the Mandelbrot set
is made only of Mandelbrot sets, comp makes the physical world "made
of" (in a not obvious sense based on self-reference logics, or
informally with the step seven) universal dovetailing. But neither the
UD can be said to think (it is not even a person) and the rock does
not think either (it is made of infinities of infinite computations,
and some generate thinking person). This does not change anything on
the measure problem, so it is not a new paradox, but again only a
version of the WR problem.
The rock computes everything in QM already.
I am not sure now if you see how physics should be emerging from
computations, even in the case of step seven, where the UD is executed
and never stopped.
It's the difference between putting a simulated brain into this world
But "this world" has no meaning in any robust universe. If "this
world" continue to make sense in a robust universe, then "this world"
has to be justified by a measure on computations.
and creating a separate world in which there is a simulated brain.
The latter is self-contained and the consciousness that is
instantiated is relative to that world. It is inaccessible from
this world and might as well be the rock that computes everything.
I am not sure I understand, but it looks like you are saying that you
agree up to step 5, but stop before step six.
from an infinity of (shared) computations. It emulates all
consciousness only in a trivial sense. It is only an object in our
sharable experience. Mind and matter emerges in a non trivial sense
as internal self-measurement or self-observation possible.
Consciousness is not even supervenient on a "brain". (directly from
But that is dependent on the assumption that the MG instantiates a
I don't see why. I explain that "consciousness is not even
supervenient on a "brain", by a reductio ad absurdum, with the "absurd
conclusion" is that a MG instantiates a consciousness. I certainly
don't assume that!
I think a consciousness is relative to an environment;
Me too. Most of the time, mundane or usual consciousness is relative
to infinities of environment, computational histories, universal
and the consciousness that the MG would instantiate is not one
relative to us and our environment - whereas what the doctor
proposes to put in my skull is.
The MG does not instantiate any consciousness. The MG does not even
instantiate computations (other that all by being material in the comp
sense). You get me lost.
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