On 05 Mar 2011, at 22:50, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 3/5/2011 7:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 04 Mar 2011, at 19:41, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 3/4/2011 6:13 AM, 1Z wrote:

On Mar 4, 7:57 am, Bruno Marchal<marc...@ulb.ac.be>  wrote:

....
> If you still don't see this, ask for clarification of the sane04 > paper(*), because it seems to me that the first seven steps are rather > clear, there. You have mentioned the WR. I take from this that you do > understand the six first steps, don't you? The seven step follows > mainly from the invariance of first person experience for change in
>  the delays of the (virtual) 'reconstitutions'.
>
> The eighth step is really more conceptually subtle, and the clearer > presentation I have done until now is in this list in the "MGA" thread > (the Movie Graph Argument). It shows that the "real concrete UD" is
>  not needed for the reversal to occur.


This touches on my doubts about the MGA. I think that instantiate consciousness would require a lot of environment outside just the brain. I base this in part on experiments with sense deprivation which showed that after a short while, absent any external stimulation, the brain tends to go into a loop. Bruno has answered this by saying that the MG is not limited to a brain but can be as comprehensive as necessary, a whole universe. But in that limit it becomes clear that the consciousness realized is not in our world but is in another virtual world.

I am not sure I understand.


That there might, given a suitable interpretation, be computations and consciousness in some other virtual world ...

Tthat is consequence of comp. Step "six". Step 1-6 use a "generalized brain = biological brain" only for pedagogical purpose, and then step 7 relaxes that constraint, and the brain can be as big as any finite digital approximate body (like the Heisenberg matrix of the galaxy with 10^100 decimals, at the level of strings: the UD, by sheer stupidity if you want, does go through such program.



... raises the paradox of the self-conscious rock which Stathis and I discussed at length.


But the UD Argument provides the solution. The rock emerges itself, relatively to us,

But that's the point. It isn't "relative to us", the virtual world is self-contained.

Let us not mix the difficulty of step seven and step eight. So here I interpret "virtual world" by a virtual observer+environment executed by a concrete physical UD, which does this infinitely often. But then, the word "us" is ambiguous. Do you mean the "us" in the primary physical reality + outside the UD, or us as being multiplied in the UD. I don't see your point, because in the second case, we know already that a rock is not really an object, but a shared pattern of information among collections of observers. So we can say that a rock, like the quantum vacuum, is a universal dovetailer. "You" are in the rock, but "trivially so". A bit like the border of the Mandelbrot set is made only of Mandelbrot sets, comp makes the physical world "made of" (in a not obvious sense based on self-reference logics, or informally with the step seven) universal dovetailing. But neither the UD can be said to think (it is not even a person) and the rock does not think either (it is made of infinities of infinite computations, and some generate thinking person). This does not change anything on the measure problem, so it is not a new paradox, but again only a version of the WR problem.
The rock computes everything in QM already.
I am not sure now if you see how physics should be emerging from computations, even in the case of step seven, where the UD is executed and never stopped.


It's the difference between putting a simulated brain into this world

But "this world" has no meaning in any robust universe. If "this world" continue to make sense in a robust universe, then "this world" has to be justified by a measure on computations.


and creating a separate world in which there is a simulated brain. The latter is self-contained and the consciousness that is instantiated is relative to that world. It is inaccessible from this world and might as well be the rock that computes everything.

I am not sure I understand, but it looks like you are saying that you agree up to step 5, but stop before step six.




from an infinity of (shared) computations. It emulates all consciousness only in a trivial sense. It is only an object in our sharable experience. Mind and matter emerges in a non trivial sense as internal self-measurement or self-observation possible. Consciousness is not even supervenient on a "brain". (directly from MGA).

But that is dependent on the assumption that the MG instantiates a consciousness.

I don't see why. I explain that "consciousness is not even supervenient on a "brain", by a reductio ad absurdum, with the "absurd conclusion" is that a MG instantiates a consciousness. I certainly don't assume that!




I think a consciousness is relative to an environment;

Me too. Most of the time, mundane or usual consciousness is relative to infinities of environment, computational histories, universal numbers, etc.



and the consciousness that the MG would instantiate is not one relative to us and our environment - whereas what the doctor proposes to put in my skull is.

The MG does not instantiate any consciousness. The MG does not even instantiate computations (other that all by being material in the comp sense). You get me lost.

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Reply via email to