On 06 Mar 2011, at 14:14, Andrew Soltau wrote:
On 05/03/11 14:46, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I skipped over the details because I was don't want to be repeating
paragraphs of stuff each time I make a point. Not sure about the
On 04 Mar 2011, at 20:10, Andrew Soltau wrote:
I remind you that we are in the everything list which is based on
the idea that "everything" is simpler than "something".
If we take Chalmers and Bitbol seriously, consciousness is a
perfectly symmetrical emergent property of the Everything, and you
can't get much simpler than that.
Can you elaborate. What are their assumption? What do you mean by
"perfectly symmetrical emergent property of the Everything".
Almost all words here needs a clear context to make sense. Which
I suggest that a theory of consciousness should take experience as
fundamental ... we will take experience itself as a fundamental
feature of the world, alongside mass, charge, and space-time. (1995,
Clearly it is a universal property of the system in which we find
ourselves, physical or arithmetical.
I understand Chalmers (materialist) stance, but don't see the relation
with your own saying. I don't see the same words, like "symmetrical"
and "universal". Also, be careful with the possible confusion for the
reader. "Universal" can mean Truing universal (a math concept), or
"pertaining to the whole physical universe, like when saying "the
universal law of gravitation", for example.
I agree, and often say similar things, but of course it is a bit vague
out of the context. ventuall I think Bitbol use "world" in the usual
sense of "physical world", assumed to be primary.
Bitbol concludes his section One mind, many points of view with
Mind is by itself point-of-view-less, just as it is placeless and
timeless. The aporia is the following: Mind is not within the world
since, even if it can identify itself to any available point of
view, it is not identical to this point of view. Nor does Mind stand
outside the world, since it has no point of view of its own,
independent from the points of view the world can offer.
Wittgenstein would say that Mind is the limit of the world.
Also I thought that Wittgenstein said that the World is the border of
the subject (the limit if the mind, not of the world).
Hmm... I thought Wittgenstein said that the world is the limit of the
subject. I have no problem with Husserl's or Sartre transcendental
ego. The 8 hypostases, can be seen in that way.
More formally, Mind can be considered as an empty space in the
triadic relation: "point of view of ( ) on a 'real universe'". This
scheme provides another way of seeing why Mind retains its
necessity, even though the "real universe" gathers all that falls
under the categories of knowledge: Mind plays a key role in the very
constitutive relations of this knowledge. Its closest philosophical
equivalents are Husserl's and Sartre's Transcendental ego; or, even
better, Wittenstein's subject which "(...) does not belong to the
world: rather it is a limit of the world" (Tractatus 5.632).
It is the same Mind, phenomenal conciousness, in all places and at
I like that idea, but it is an open problem (in the comp frame).
In Logical Types in Quantum Mechanics I show that it is necessarily
an emergent property of the unitary totality, Russell's
'Everything', which fits this concept precisely.
What is the role of Quantum Mechanics. What is Russell's everything?
Is it Russell Standish's notion of 'nothing', or Bertrand Russell's
notion of everything in math? You might elaborate a little bit.
It is also necessarily, from the perspective of any specific
framework, perfectly symmetrical.
Other points answered in separate posts to try and keep things
simple enough for me.
I will take a look. You might try to not make exploding the mail box
of the readers of the list. Lot of mails can discourage people, given
that many people have already a large numbers of mails, IMO (but
that's just a suggestive metacomment that you don't need to mind too
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